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Article 
Providing Adolescents with Independent and 
Confidential Access to Childhood Vaccines: A 
Proposal to Lower the Age of Consent 
LOIS A. WEITHORN & DORIT RUBINSTEIN REISS 
The recent rise in rates of nonvaccination and vaccine-preventable diseases 
and the attendant risks to the public’s health require that lawmakers consider new 
policy solutions. This Article proposes one such solution. We recommend creation 
of a limited exception to parental decisionmaking authority by permitting certain 
older minors to provide legally binding consent for childhood vaccinations and 
protecting the confidentiality of minors who request vaccination. We analogize this 
proposed policy to other statutory exceptions that permit certain minors 
independent access to services relating to contraception, pregnancy, sexually 
transmitted diseases, mental health and substance abuse, and sexual assault. In this 
interdisciplinary paper, we analyze the constitutional, policy, scientific, and 
practical issues relevant to this proposal, and provide lawmakers with a blueprint 
with which to enact the proposed legislative reform. We also suggest that, in the 
absence of legislative action, courts allow mature minors to consent independently 
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Providing Adolescents with Independent and 
Confidential Access to Childhood Vaccines: A 
Proposal to Lower the Age of Consent 
LOIS A. WEITHORN & DORIT RUBINSTEIN REISS * 
INTRODUCTION 
The World Health Organization identified vaccine hesitancy (that is, an 
individual’s lack of confidence in vaccines, often leading to vaccine refusal)1 
as one of the major threats to global health in 2019.2 Vaccine hesitancy is an 
important contributor of recent upsurges in rates of infection from diseases 
such as measles and pertussis.3 In the first six months of 2019, 1095 cases 
of measles were confirmed across twenty-eight states in the United States.4 
According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), “[t]his 
is the greatest number of cases reported in the U.S. since 1992” and since 
the elimination of measles in 2000.5 The number of pertussis cases reported 
annually in the last ten years has reached levels that had “not been observed 
in more than 5 decades.”6   
In the last several years, researchers have demonstrated the strong 
relationship between parental refusal to immunize their children and higher 
rates of infection with vaccine-preventable diseases.7 Researchers have also 
                                                                                                                     
* Lois A. Weithorn, J.D., Ph.D.; Professor of Law, Harry & Lillian Hastings Research Chair, 
University of California—Hastings College of Law. Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, LLB, Ph.D.; Professor of 
Law, James Edgar Hervey Chair in Litigation, University of California—Hastings College of Law. The 
authors gratefully acknowledge the enormously helpful feedback on earlier versions of this manuscript 
provided by Dr. Paul Offit, Dr. Douglas Opel, and Professor Michael Wald. We also thank Arianna 
Brady, Margot Brooks, Kya Coletta, Allyson Cox, Enne-Mae Guttiarez, and Alexandra (Ally) Relat for 
excellent research assistance. 
1 Eve Dubé et al., Vaccine Hesitancy: An Overview, 9 HUM. VACCINES & IMMUNOTHERAPEUTICS 
1763, 1763 (2013).  
2 Ten Threats to Global Health in 2019, WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
https://www.who.int/emergencies/ten-threats-to-global-health-in-2019 (last visited Oct. 15, 2019). 
3 Varun K. Phadke et al., Association Between Vaccine Refusal and Vaccine-Preventable Diseases 
in the United States: A Review of Measles and Pertussis, 315 JAMA 1149, 1150 (2016). 
4 Measles Cases and Outbreaks, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/measles/cases-outbreaks.html (last visited July 3, 2019). 
5 Id. 
6 Phadke et al., supra note 3, at 1153. 
7 For reviews of the literature, see Phadke et al., supra note 3, at 1150; Dorit Rubinstein Reiss & 
Lois A. Weithorn, Responding to the Childhood Vaccination Crisis: Legal Frameworks and Tools in the 
Context of Parental Vaccine Refusal, 63 BUFF. L. REV. 881, 930–31 (2015) [hereinafter Reiss & 
Weithorn, Responding to the Childhood Vaccination Crisis]; Lois A. Weithorn & Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, 
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774 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:2 
demonstrated that legal policies governing exemptions from states’ 
school-entry vaccination requirements affect rates and patterns of intentional 
nonvaccination in the United States.8 In response to these data, lawmakers 
in several states have tightened exemption policies.9 Such reforms are 
critical to protecting the public’s health from the dangers posed by vaccine 
refusal. Yet the scope of the childhood vaccination crisis and the 
recalcitrance exhibited by many parents who reject vaccines necessitate 
additional legal reforms. We recommend providing older minors with the 
legal authority to consent to vaccinations independent of their parents as one 
such reform. 
On June 10, 2019, at the annual meeting of the American Medical 
Association (AMA), the Association’s delegates voted “to support ‘state 
                                                                                                                     
Legal Approaches to Promoting Parental Compliance with Childhood Immunization Recommendations, 
14 HUM. VACCINES & IMMUNOTHERAPEUTICS 1610, 1610–11 (2018).  
8 See, e.g., Nina R. Blank et al., Exempting Schoolchildren from Immunizations: States with Few 
Barriers Had Highest Rates of Nonmedical Exemptions, 32 HEALTH AFF. 1282, 1289 (2013) (finding 
that non-vaccination rates in states with simpler nonmedical exemption procedures and less stringent 
requirements were more than twice as high as those in states with more-complex procedures and more 
stringent requirements); Daniel R. Feikin et al., Individual and Community Risks of Measles and 
Pertussis Associated with Personal Exemptions to Immunization, 284 JAMA 3145, 3145 (2000) 
(reviewing studies demonstrating dramatically elevated measles risk in unvaccinated children exempted 
from vaccination mandates); Aamer Imdad et al., Religious Exemptions for Immunization and Risk of 
Pertussis in New York State, 2000-2011, 132 PEDIATRICS 37, 42 (2013) (finding higher rates of pertussis 
in New York State counties with higher rates of vaccine exemptions); Saad B. Omer et al., Nonmedical 
Exemptions to School Immunization Requirements: Secular Trends and Association of State Policies with 
Pertussis Incidence, 296 JAMA 1757, 1763 (2006) (finding elevated exemption rates and pertussis 
incidence in jurisdictions that permit personal belief exemptions and are lenient in granting exemptions); 
Saad B. Omer et al., Vaccination Policies and Rates of Exemption from Immunization, 2005-2011, 367 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1170, 1171 (2012) (analyzing the relationship between legal exemption policies and 
rates of exemption); Jennifer L. Richards et al., Nonmedical Exemptions to Immunization Requirements 
in California: A 16-Year Longitudinal Analysis of Trends and Associated Community Factors, 31 
VACCINE 3009, 3012 (2013); Daniel A. Salmon et al., Factors Associated with Refusal of Childhood 
Vaccines Among Parents of School-aged Children, 159 ARCHIVES PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 
470, 470 (2005) (demonstrating higher rates of disease in areas with higher exemption rates); Daniel A. 
Salmon et al., Health Consequences of Religious and Philosophical Exemptions from Immunization 
Laws: Individual and Societal Risk of Measles, 281 JAMA 47, 51 (1999) (demonstrating statistical 
relationship between  increasing rates of exemption and increases in outbreaks of vaccine-preventable 
diseases); Stephanie Stadlin et al., Medical Exemptions to School Immunization Requirements in the 
United States—Association of State Policies with Medical Exemption Rates (2004-2011), 206 J. 
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 989, 989 (2012) (demonstrating relationship between ease of obtaining medical 
exemptions in states and rates of medical exemptions); Joseph W. Thompson et al., Impact of Addition 
of Philosophical Exemptions on Childhood Immunization Rates, 32 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 194, 200 
(2007) (demonstrating relationship between availability of philosophical exemptions in Arkansas and 
geographic risk of disease outbreaks); Y. Tony Yang & Vicky Debold, A Longitudinal Analysis of the 
Effect of Nonmedical Exemption Law and Vaccine Uptake on Vaccine-Targeted Disease Rates, 104 AM. 
J. PUB. HEALTH 371, 375–76 (2014) (analyzing relationships between exemption policies, vaccination 
rates, and rates of infection). 
9 For recent legislative changes in vaccine exemption laws, see States with Religious and 
Philosophical Exemptions from School Immunization Requirements, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES 
(June 14, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/school-immunization-exemption-state-laws.aspx.  
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2020] VACCINES AND THE AGE OF CONSENT 775 
policies allowing minors to override their parent’s refusal for vaccinations’ 
and encourage ‘state legislatures to establish comprehensive vaccine and 
minor consent policies.’”10 Five days before the AMA action, Professors 
Ross Silverman, Douglas Opel, and Saad Omer published an article in the 
New England Journal of Medicine suggesting that state laws be modified to 
allow adolescents who wish to be vaccinated “despite persistent parental 
resistance” to provide consent for this “medically recommended and 
evidence-based treatment.”11 In 2013, the Society for Adolescent Health and 
Medicine published a position paper, recommending that: “Clinicians, 
public health personnel, and policy makers should explore all available legal 
options for allowing minor adolescents with capacity for informed consent 
to give their own consent for vaccinations.”12  
We concur that authorizing older minors to provide independent consent 
for recommended childhood vaccinations is an important and necessary 
policy reform. In this Article, we provide a comprehensive analysis of the 
relevant legal, bioethical, psychological, and policy issues, as well as a 
detailed proposal to create an exception to the default of parental consent for 
childhood vaccinations. We recommend that states adopt a statutory age of 
consent of fourteen years old for those vaccinations recommended by the 
Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP).13 We further 
recommend that states authorize physicians to administer or authorize 
administration of vaccines to requesting minors ages twelve and thirteen 
who are capable of consenting to vaccination, consistent with the modern 
standards of competence detailed within.14 In states that do not pass such 
legislation, however, we recommend that courts adjudicating a minor’s 
petition to receive vaccinations without parental consent adopt a 
treatment-specific mature minor rule that would allow those minors who 
                                                                                                                     
10 Kevin B. O’Reilly, Highlights from the 2019 AMA Annual Meeting, AMA (June 13, 2019), 
https://www.ama-assn.org/house-delegates/annual-meeting/highlights-2019-ama-annual-meeting. 
Furthermore, “[i]n a separate action, the delegates directed the AMA to develop model legislation for 
mature minor consent to vaccinations.” Id. 
11 Ross D. Silverman et al., Vaccination Over Parental Objection—Should Adolescents Be Allowed 
to Consent to Receiving Vaccines?, 381 NEW ENG. J. MED. 104, 106 (2019). See also Soc’y for 
Adolescent Health & Med., Adolescent Consent for Vaccination: A Position Paper of the Society for 
Adolescent Health and Medicine, 53 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 550, 550 (2013). For proposals focusing 
on minors’ independent access to the vaccine for human papilloma virus (HPV), see, for example, Suchi 
Agrawal & Stephanie R. Morain, Who Calls the Shots? The Ethics of Adolescent Self-Consent for HPV 
Vaccination, 44 J. MED. ETHICS 531, 531 (2018); Allison M. Whelan, Lowering the Age of Consent: 
Pushing Back Against the Anti-Vaccine Movement, 44 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 462, 470 (2016). 
12 Soc’y for Adolescent Health & Med., supra note 11, at 550. Furthermore, in December 2019, 
while this Article was in press, another team of pediatric experts wrote in support of this proposed policy 
reform. See Y. Tony Yang et al., Adolescent Consent to Vaccination in the Age of Vaccine-Hesitant 
Parents, 173 JAMA PEDIATRICS 1123, 1123 (2019), https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamapediatrics/ 
article-abstract/2752559. 
13 See infra notes 27–71 and accompanying text.  
14 See infra notes 328–44 and accompanying text. 
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demonstrate capacity to provide informed consent to access these vaccines 
independently if a physician determines a minor to be mature. Finally, we 
strongly recommend that the authorizing legislation require that minors’ 
preferences regarding confidentiality be respected and that their vaccination 
status and vaccination-related medical contacts not be disclosed to their 
parents without their consent.  
We do not argue here that the demonstration of adult-like health care 
decisionmaking capacities should lead to legal authorization for independent 
consent to treatment by minors more generally. In our nation, parents 
typically retain legal authority to make most health care decisions for their 
minor children,15 There are exceptions, however. The state can intervene on 
a case-by-case basis in medical neglect proceedings, substituting itself for 
the parent when it determines that a parent’s failure to treat a child seriously 
endangers that child’s health.16 A few states authorize “mature minors” to 
consent independently to general medical care by statute or case law.17 Most 
states authorize “emancipated minors” to make independent health care 
decisions for themselves.18 In addition, in order to achieve certain policy 
goals and/or to satisfy constitutional mandates, state legislatures have 
created several treatment-specific statutory exceptions, authorizing older 
minors to consent independently to the specified treatments.19  
Currently, however, the law in most states does not provide a 
mechanism for minors to access vaccinations independent of their parents.20 
In the handful of states that allows mature minors authority to consent to 
general medical treatment, minors who meet the legal criteria of maturity21 
can be vaccinated over parental refusal.22 In addition, some states’ statutory 
exceptions allowing minors to consent to services related to sexually 
                                                                                                                     
15 See Doriane Lambelet Coleman & Philip M. Rosoff, The Legal Authority of Mature Minors to 
Consent to General Medical Treatment, 131 PEDIATRICS 786, 789–91 (2013) (discussing which states 
do not allow mature minors to consent to medical treatment). 
16 See infra Part II.B.2.i.  
17 See infra Part II.B.2.ii. 
18 See infra note 250. 
19 See infra Part II.B.2.iii. 
20 For a detailed, state by state table, see Table of State Laws Relevant to Minors’ Consent to 
Vaccinations Independent of Parents, https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1uUDrkdYqzzSG9icT 
TSHEIWQbgtm0uFVGtBZ7rTDU8sQ/edit?usp=sharing (last visited Oct. 16, 2019). The Society for 
Adolescent Health and Medicine issued a position paper on adolescent consent for vaccination, 
interpreting state laws as somewhat more permissive of minors’ authority to consent independently than 
our analysis suggests. Soc’y for Adolescent Health & Med., supra note 11, at 550. 
21 See infra notes 22–23. 
22 For example, in Alabama and Oregon, minors over a specified age can consent to treatment 
without parental involvement. ALA. CODE § 22-8-4 (West, Westlaw through Act 2019-540); OR. REV. 
STAT. § 109.640 (West, Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess.). Certain other states allow independent 
treatment access by minors, conditioned on determinations of those minors’ maturity or capacity to 
consent. See Coleman & Rosoff, supra note 15, at 789 (noting that some jurisdictions “permit all 
adolescents above a certain age to consent to general medical treatment,” including vaccination).    
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transmitted diseases are broad enough to authorize minors to consent to 
vaccines for hepatitis B and human papilloma virus (HPV).23 A handful of 
legislatures are considering statutes that would authorize minors of specific 
ages to provide independent consent for vaccinations, although none have 
passed to date.24 In this Article, however, we propose a more comprehensive, 
treatment-specific exception that would enable older minors to consent to 
all of the recommended childhood vaccinations25 if their parents have not 
provided consent. We argue, therefore, that the default of sole parental 
discretion in decisionmaking for children’s health care should not prevail in 
this context, and that this default should be supplemented by authorization 
of competent minors to consent independently to recommended childhood 
vaccinations.   
* * * 
In Part I, we establish the medical and public health foundation for our 
proposal. We describe the structure and substance of vaccine 
recommendations in the United States and provide a brief summary of the 
state of knowledge on vaccine safety and efficacy. We discuss current 
understandings of parental vaccine opposition or hesitancy and the public 
health crisis that has resulted from recent increases in parental 
non-vaccination of their children.  
In Part II, we examine the legal landscape for health care 
decisionmaking for minors. In Section A, we discuss the legal and 
                                                                                                                     
23 See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 6926 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess. ch. 524) (“A minor 
who is 12 years of age or older . . . may consent to medical care related to [prevention of a sexually 
transmitted disease] . . . .”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 710 (West, Westlaw through ch. 218 of the 150th 
General Assembly (2019-2020)) (authorizing a minor age twelve and older “who professes to be either 
pregnant or afflicted with contagious, infectious or communicable diseases” to consent to “any 
diagnostic, preventive [or medical care]”). See also Silverman et al., supra note 11, at 104 (noting that 
California and New York permit adolescents to consent to vaccines for hepatitis B and HPV). 
24 For example, in March 2019, Senate Bill 4244 was introduced in New York. The proposed text 
would allow minors aged fourteen and older to consent to the administration of vaccines “if the minor 
has capacity to consent and provides informed consent to the administering of the vaccine.” S.B. 4244, 
2019 Leg., 242d Sess. (N.Y. 2019). Other states considering authorizing all or some minors to consent 
to all or some recommended vaccines include Maryland, Public Health - Immunizations - Minor Consent 
(Access to Vaccines Act), H.B. 87, 441st Gen. Assemb. (Md. 2020) (authorizing minors to consent to 
immunizations if they are aged 16 and older who are determined to be competent to consent by a health 
care provider); Virginia, S.B. 104, 2020 Reg. Sess. (Va. 2020) (authorizing minors who can demonstrate 
decisionmaking competence to consent to vaccinations independently); Illinois, S.B. 3668, 101st Gen. 
Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2019) (authorizing minors aged fourteen and older to consent to 
immunizations with the same legal authority as an adult); New Jersey, S.B. 5399, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(N.J. 2019) (authorizing minors age fourteen and older to receive recommended childhood vaccines, 
including immunization for human papilloma virus (HPV) and hepatitis B, independent of parental 
consent); Washington, D.C., Minor Consent to Vaccinations Amendment Act of 2019, Washington D.C. 
Legislative Bill 171 (D.C. 2019) (authorizing “a minor of any age to consent to receive a vaccine where 
the minor is capable of [giving informed consent], and where the vaccine is recommended by [ACIP] 
and provided in accordance with the ACIP’s recommended vaccinations schedule”); Wisconsin, 
Assemb.B. 863, 104th Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2019) (authorizing minors ages sixteen and older to 
consent independently to recommended vaccines).   
25 See infra notes 27–28 and accompanying text. 
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constitutional justifications for the prevailing legal mechanism governing 
consent for children’s health care: the doctrine of parental consent. In 
Section B, we consider existing exceptions to that doctrine. First, we analyze 
the general constitutional and policy frameworks that underlie the 
exceptions. Second, we detail the exceptions, including those authorized by 
medical neglect statutes, statutory and judicial “mature” minor exceptions, 
and treatment-specific statutes authorizing minors’ independent access to 
health care services. 
In Part III, we lay out the arguments supporting our recommendations 
that certain subsets of minors be authorized to consent to vaccinations 
independent of their parents. In Section A, we assert that the state’s interests 
in protecting the health of the public and individual minors and the child’s 
interests in receiving protection from vaccine-preventable diseases converge 
to outweigh parental interests in sole decisionmaking authority over 
children’s health care in the vaccination context. In Section B, we argue that 
statutory authorization of capable minors to consent independently to 
childhood vaccinations is consistent with the policies justifying existing 
treatment-specific exceptions to the doctrine of parental consent. In Section 
C, we demonstrate that most adolescents and older preadolescents are 
capable of providing meaningful consent, consistent with legal standards of 
competence to make medical decisions. Finally, in Section D, we underscore 
the necessity of legal guarantees of confidentiality for minors who seek 
vaccinations independent of their parents. We observe that minors might be 
deterred from requesting vaccinations due to fear of disclosure to parents. 
Furthermore, in extreme cases, the welfare of minors who disregard parental 
objections to vaccines might be endangered by disclosure of their 
vaccination-related medical contacts. 
Part IV details our legislative proposals and their legal, policy, and 
scientific justifications. Part V provides recommendations to the courts 
regarding adoption of a treatment-specific mature minor rule in appropriate 
cases, in the absence of relevant legislative action. Finally, we make 
concluding observations, placed in context by remarks shared with us by 
Ethan Lindenberger in a recent telephone interview.26 
                                                                                                                     
26 Telephone Interview with Ethan Lindenberger, Pro-vaccination Activist, via Skype (June 16, 
2019) (recording on file with authors). Eighteen-year-old Ethan Lindenberger made national news when 
he testified before Congress regarding his mother’s opposition to vaccinations, and his decision to 
become vaccinated as soon as he was legally capable of doing so. See generally James Doubek, 
18-Year-Old Testifies About Getting Vaccinated Despite Mother’s Anti-Vaccine Beliefs, NPR (Mar. 6, 
2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/03/06/700617424/18-year-old-testifies-about-getting-vaccinated-
despite-mothers-anti-vaccine-beli (discussing Lindenberger’s testimony before Congress). 
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I. VACCINES, THE ANTI-VACCINE MOVEMENT, AND THE VACCINATION 
CRISIS 
A. Recommended Vaccines’ Risks and Benefits 
The Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) currently 
recommends that children in the United States routinely be vaccinated 
against fifteen diseases before the age of eighteen. Children under age two 
are recommended to receive vaccines to protect them from thirteen diseases: 
diphtheria, haemophilus influenzae type b, hepatitis A, hepatitis B, influenza 
(an annual vaccine), measles, mumps, pertussis, pneumococcal disease, 
polio, rotavirus, rubella, and varicella (chicken pox).27 It is recommended 
that preteens receive vaccinations to protect them from meningococcal 
disease and HPV.28 In determining whether to recommend vaccines, the 
ACIP requires that the benefits outweigh the risks and that the 
recommendation be cost-effective.29 After the Committee recommends 
vaccines, the Director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) considers those recommendations, together with input from the 
American Academy of Pediatrics and the American Academy of Family 
Physicians, and makes its own authoritative recommendations.30 Generally, 
the CDC Director accepts ACIP recommendations.31 
Although vaccine recommendations are made by the CDC, a federal 
agency, there are currently no federal vaccine mandates in the United States. 
Rather, in the United States, the authority to mandate vaccine compliance 
rests primarily with the states, which determine which vaccines are required 
prior to school entry.32 Generally, states require some subset of those 
vaccines recommended by ACIP, although the specifics of state 
requirements vary across the nation.33 
Emphasizing the high benefit and low cost ratio characterizing 
recommended vaccines, the National Academies of Science, Engineering, 
and Medicine concluded that vaccines “have many health benefits and few 
                                                                                                                     
27 CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, RECOMMENDED CHILD AND ADOLESCENT 
IMMUNIZATION SCHEDULE FOR AGES 18 YEARS OR YOUNGER tbl.1 (2019), 
https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/schedules/hcp/imz/child-adolescent.html#birth-15 (last visited July 18, 
2019). 
28 Id. 
29 Jean Clare Smith, The Structure, Role, and Procedures of the U.S. Advisory Committee on 
Immunization Practices (ACIP), 285 VACCINE A68, A72 (2010). 
30 Id. at A72–A73. 
31 Id. at A73.  
32 WEN S. SHEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LSB10300, AN OVERVIEW OF STATE AND FEDERAL 
AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE VACCINATION REQUIREMENTS 1 (2019), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/LSB10300.pdf. 
33  Reiss & Weithorn, Responding to the Childhood Vaccination Crisis, supra note 7, at 892–93. 
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side effects.”34 Indeed, there is a global expert consensus that vaccines are 
both safe and effective.35 This is, of course, a generalization: nothing is 
100% safe or 100% effective (and no “consensus” is 100%). It does, 
however, mean that vaccines’ benefits are substantial, vaccines’ risks are 
low, and that the benefits far outweigh the risks. The World Health 
Organization has emphasized that “[t]here is arguably no single preventive 
health intervention more cost-effective than immunization. Time and again, 
the international community has endorsed the value of vaccines and 
immunization to prevent and control a large number of infectious diseases 
and, increasingly, several chronic diseases that are caused by infectious 
agents.”36   
Extensive data reveals that vaccines dramatically reduce the burden of 
disease.37 Public health experts estimated, for example, that over the course 
of the lives of children born from 1994 to 2013, routine vaccination will 
prevent “322 million illnesses, 21 million hospitalizations, and 732,000 
deaths . . . at a net savings of $295 billion in direct costs and $1.38 trillion 
in total societal costs.”38 Globally, the World Health Organization estimates 
that vaccines save 2 to 3 million lives annually, and that another 1.5 million 
lives could be saved if vaccination programs were fully implemented 
worldwide.39 
Some vaccines are more effective than others. For instance, the measles, 
mumps, and rubella vaccine (MMR) is highly effective against measles.40 
The influenza vaccine is less effective,41 although it still prevents deaths and 
                                                                                                                     
34 Vaccines Are Safe, NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. ENGINEERING & MED., http://sites.nationalacademies.org/ 
BasedOnScience/vaccines-are-safe/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2020). 
35 Francis E. Andre et al., Vaccination Greatly Reduces Disease, Disability, Death and Inequity 
Worldwide, 86 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 140, 140 (2008), https://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/ 
86/2/07-040089/en/.  
36 Ten Facts on Immunization, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://origin.who.int/features/factfiles/ 
immunization/en/ (last updated Mar. 2018). 
37 Sandra W. Roush & Trudy V. Murphy, Historical Comparisons of Morbidity and Mortality for 
Vaccine-Preventable Diseases in the United States, 298 JAMA 2155, 2156–59 tbls.1–2 (2007); Cynthia 
G. Whitney et al., Benefits from Immunization During the Vaccines for Children Program Era – United 
States, 1994-2013, 63 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 352, 352–55 (2014), 
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6316a4.htm. 
38 Whitney et al., supra note 37, at 352. 
39 WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 36. 
40 CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, EPIDEMIOLOGY AND PREVENTION OF VACCINE-
PREVENTABLE DISEASES 218 (Jennifer Hamborsky et al. eds., 13th ed. 2015) [hereinafter PINK BOOK] 
(“Studies indicate that more than 99% of persons who receive two doses of measles vaccine (with the 
first dose administered no earlier than the first birthday) develop serologic evidence of measles 
immunity.”). 
41 CDC Seasonal Flu Vaccine Effectiveness Studies, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/flu/vaccines-work/effectiveness-studies.htm (last visited July 18, 
2019). 
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other adverse effects of disease, especially in children.42 Both the polio43 and 
hepatitis B vaccines44 are extremely effective, protecting over 95% of 
recipients. In addition to reducing deaths and suffering, vaccines 
dramatically reduce costs to society and individuals, saving billions of 
dollars annually.45 Vaccines also have positive effects on health equity and 
lead to other social benefits.46 In short, all routinely recommended vaccines 
have considerable benefits, both for the individual and for society. 
Vaccines protect not only those individuals who are vaccinated from 
becoming infected, they also confer an additional benefit through 
community (or herd) immunity. When enough people in a community are 
vaccinated, others at risk of infection from the disease are also protected. 
These other beneficiaries include those who cannot safely be vaccinated for 
medical reasons, those who are too young to be fully vaccinated, those 
within the small minority of persons for whom vaccinations did not create 
immunity, and those who are intentionally unvaccinated.47 Thus, when 
parents vaccinate their child, they protect not only their child through direct 
action, but also others in the community who, as noted above, are not or 
cannot be fully vaccinated. And conversely, parents who do not vaccinate 
are creating a risk not just for their own child, but also for other unprotected 
individuals. As the number of unvaccinated children in the community 
increases, the risk of outbreak also increases, putting anyone who is 
                                                                                                                     
42 See Brendan Flannery et al., Influenza Vaccine Effectiveness Against Pediatric Deaths: 
2010-2014, 139 PEDIATRICS 1, 1–8 (2017) (reporting rates of infection and death from influenza in 
children); Karen K. Wong et al., Influenza Associated Pediatric Deaths in the United States 2004-2012, 
132 PEDIATRICS 796, 796–803 (2013) (same); see also Faruque Ahmed et al., Effect of Influenza 
Vaccination of Healthcare Personnel on Morbidity and Mortality Among Patients: Systematic Review 
and Grading of Evidence, 58 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 50, 50, 52–56 (2014) (reporting data 
relevant to rates of infection among health care personnel); E. Amodio et al., Can Influenza Vaccination 
Coverage Among Healthcare Workers Influence the Risk of Nosocomial Influenza-Like Illness in 
Hospitalized Patients?, 86 J. HOSP. INFECTION 182, 182–86 (2014) (same). 
43 The CDC estimates that 99% of people who received three doses of inactivated polio vaccine are 
immune. PINK BOOK, supra note 40, at 302–03. 
44 The hepatitis B vaccine is 95% effective in children, but is slightly less effective in adults. PINK 
BOOK, supra note 40, at 159 (“After three intramuscular doses of hepatitis B vaccine, more than 90% of 
healthy adults and more than 95% of infants, children, and adolescents [from birth to nineteen years of 
age] develop adequate antibody responses.”).  
45 Fangjun Zhou et al., Economic Evaluation of the Routine Childhood Immunization Program in 
the United States, 2009, 133 PEDIATRICS 577, 581 (2014) (analyzing efficacy and cost-effectiveness of 
immunization initiative); see Charlotte A. Moser et al., Funding the Costs of Disease Outbreaks Caused 
by Non-Vaccination, 43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 633, 633 (2015) (analyzing the economic burden of 
nonvaccination patterns and related disease outbreaks).  
46 See Jeroen Luyten & Philippe Beutels, The Social Value of Vaccination Programs: Beyond 
Cost-Effectiveness, 35 HEALTH AFF. 212, 212–17 (2016) (recommending broad, multidimensional 
evaluations of vaccination programs that expand beyond economic variables, also incorporating 
assessment of social and ethical impacts). 
47 T. Jacob John & Reuben Samuel, Herd Immunity and Herd Effect: New Insights and Definitions, 
16 EUR. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 601, 602–03 (2000); see also Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, Herd Immunity and 
Immunization Policy: The Importance of Accuracy, 94 OR. L. REV. 1, 14–16 (2015). 
 
343891-Connecticut_Law_52-2_Text.indd   253 7/28/20   10:48 AM
 
782 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:2 
vulnerable at risk.48 The decision not to vaccinate, therefore, has substantial 
implications beyond the immediate family. 
Thus, vaccines have substantial individual and social benefits. That 
said, nothing is risk free, and vaccines, too, have risks. Those risks, 
however, are relatively low. The World Health Organization Bulletin 
explains that:  
[I]ndependent experts and WHO have shown that vaccines are 
far safer than therapeutic medicines. Modern research has 
spurred the development of less reactogenic products, such as 
acellular pertussis vaccines and rabies vaccines produced in 
cell culture. Today, vaccines have an excellent safety record 
and most “vaccine scares” have been shown to be false 
alarms.49  
In contrast to the low risks posed by immunizations for these diseases, 
the risks posed by the vaccine-preventable diseases are significant. For 
example, polio led to tens of thousands of cases of paralysis and over a 
thousand deaths each year in the United States before vaccines led to the 
elimination of polio.50 The Oral Polio Vaccine—which is no longer used in 
the United States51—also presented its own risks, however. It could cause 
paralysis in approximately six to ten cases a year.52 The incidence of 
paralysis with the vaccination occurred at a substantially lower rate than that 
which occurred with infection from the polio virus.53 Yet, when it occurred, 
of course, it was still a tragedy for the families affected. The currently used 
Inactivated Polio Vaccine (IPV) does not present the same risk. The IPV has 
                                                                                                                     
48 See Paul Fine et al., “Herd Immunity”: A Rough Guide, 52 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 911, 
914 (2011) (footnote omitted) (“Social clustering among parents who decide not to vaccinate their 
children can result in groups of children in which vaccination levels are well below the herd immunity 
threshold. The same effect is found in religious communities that eschew vaccination . . . .”); see also 
Jessica E. Atwell et al., Nonmedical Vaccine Exemptions and Pertussis in California, 2010, 132 
PEDIATRICS 624, 627 (2013) (analyzing the association of “geographic areas with high rates of 
[nonmedical vaccine exemptions]” and “high rates of pertussis”); Saad B. Omer et al., Geographic 
Clustering of Nonmedical Exemptions to School Immunization Requirements and Associations with 
Geographic Clustering of Pertussis, 168 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1389, 1394 (2008) (discussing the 
significant overlap between clusters of exemptions and clusters of pertussis cases); Jennifer L. Richards 
et al., Nonmedical Exemptions to Immunization Requirements in California: A 16-Year Longitudinal 
Analysis of Trends and Associated Community Factors, 31 VACCINE 3009, 3012 (2013) (reporting that 
geographic areas with high rates of nonmedical exemptions were also associated with high rates of 
pertussis in California between 1994 and 2009). 
49 Andre et al., supra note 35, at 140 (citations omitted).  
50 PINK BOOK, supra note 40, at 297–98. 
51 Id. at 302. 
52 Id. at 301 (“From 1980 through 1999, a total of 162 confirmed cases of paralytic poliomyelitis 
were reported, an average of 8 cases per year. Six cases were acquired outside the United States and 
imported.”). 
53 Id. at 299–300, 303 (demonstrating that this vaccine led to eight to ten cases of paralysis annually 
until its replacement by the inactivated vaccine). 
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fairly minimal side effects: minor local reactions and a theoretical (although 
not observed) risk of allergic reaction.54 It is clear that those risks are both 
absolutely low, and substantially lower than those of the polio virus.  
 
Figure 1: Polio Risks v. Polio Vaccine Risks 
Risks of Polio Virus Risks of Vaccine: 
About 1:200 Paralyzed 
Death 
OPV (not used in United States anymore): 
1:2–3 million paralyzed.  
 
IPV (currently used):  
Local reactions.  
Theoretical risk of allergic reaction to 
antibiotics—never seen in practice. 
  
 
Measles—as another example—can cause complications in about 29% 
of people who get the disease, including pneumonia in over 5%, death in 
about 1 to 3 in a thousand, and encephalitis in 1 per thousand—and that is 
in developed countries.55 It can cause subacute sclerosing panencephalitis 
(SSPE), an always fatal complication that leads to a slow, lingering death.56 
Scientists once thought this complication was very rare, but recent studies 
reveal a higher incidence than initially reported when the measles patient is 
young.57 Even a routine case of measles (without complications) typically 
produces high fever that typically lasts at least a week.58 The CDC estimates 
that three to four million children were infected with measles each year in 
the United States before the advent of the vaccine.59 The present rate of 
measles infection in the United States is the highest rate since 1992.60  
                                                                                                                     
54 Id. at 306.  
55 Robert T. Perry & Neal A. Halsey, The Clinical Significance of Measles: A Review, 189 J. 
INFECTIOUS DISEASES S4, S7 (2004). The rate of harm is, of course, higher in underdeveloped countries. 
56 Id. 
57 See Katharina Schönberger et al., Epidemiology of Subacute Sclerosing Panencephalitis (SSPE) 
in Germany from 2003 to 2009: A Risk Estimation, PLOS (2013), https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article 
?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0068909 (estimating the risk at 1:1700 to 1:3300 in children under age five); 
Kristen Wendorf et al., Subacute Sclerosing Panencephalitis: The Devastating Measles Complication Is 
More Common Than We Think, 3 OPEN F. INFECTIOUS DISEASE 916, 916 (2016) (estimating the rate at 
1:1367 for children under five, and a terrifying 1:609 for infants who contract measles before the age of 
one). 
58 Perry & Halsey, supra note 55, at S4.  
59 Measles History, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/ 
measles/about/history.html (last reviewed Feb. 5. 2018). 
60 See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text. 
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The MMR, which protects against measles, mumps, and rubella, led to 
dramatic reduction in measles cases and attendant harms.61 Of 500,000 
reported cases before the availability of effective vaccines, there were four 
to five hundred deaths and tens of thousands of hospitalizations.62 This 
contrasts with the risks of the MMR, which include fever in 5% to 15% of 
children; a mild, non-contagious rash in 5% of children; febrile seizures 
(which are scary, but usually harmless) in about 1 in 2300 to 2600 children; 
a blood platelet disorder (thrombocytopenia) in about 1 in 30,000 cases; and 
very rarely, an allergic reaction.63 Thrombocytopenia is less common when 
it occurs following administration of the MMR than it is as a complication 
of measles. Furthermore, thrombocytopenia is usually short-lived when it 
follows MMR administration: over 90% of children overcome it in six 
weeks.64 Temporary arthralgia (that is, joint pain) is fairly common (up to 
25%) in adult women who receive the MMR. The CDC explains: “Joint pain 
or stiffness occurs in up to 1 in 4 of females past puberty who were not 
previously immune to rubella; their symptoms generally begin 1 to 3 weeks 
after vaccination, are usually mild and last about 2 days. These symptoms 
rarely come back.”65 
While these vaccine side effects and complications, ranging from 
temporarily unpleasant to serious, are not insignificant, serious reactions 
from MMR are rare.66 In spite of anti-vaccine movement claims, the MMR 
is not linked to autism.67 Most recently, a study of over 650,000 children in 
Denmark reaffirmed the extensive existing literature, finding no increased 
risk of autism with MMR vaccination.68 Indeed, “studies in three continents 
                                                                                                                     
61 See Measles Cases and Outbreaks, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/measles/cases-outbreaks.html (last reviewed Oct. 11, 2019) (finding that the 
majority of people who contracted measles were unvaccinated). 
62 PINK BOOK, supra note 40, at 214. 
63 Id. at 226. 
64 E. Miller et al., Idiopathic Thrombocytopenic Purpura and MMR Vaccine, 84 ARCHIVES DISEASE 
CHILDHOOD 227, 228 (2001), https://adc.bmj.com/content/84/3/227.full.  
65 Measles, Mumps and Rubella (MMR) Vaccine Safety, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/vaccinesafety/vaccines/mmr-vaccine.html (last reviewed Jan. 29, 
2020).  
66 Nicola P. Klein et al., Safety of Measles-Containing Vaccines in 1-year-old Children, 135 
PEDIATRICS e321, e321 (2015); Annamari Patja et al., Serious Adverse Events After 
Measles-Mumps-Rubella Vaccination During a Fourteen-Year Prospective Follow-Up, 19 PEDIATRIC 
INFECTIOUS DISEASES J. 1127, 1127 (2000).  
67 Most recently, seventeen studies examining 657,461 children found no link between MMR and 
autism. Anders Hviid et al., Measles, Mumps, Rubella Vaccination and Autism: A Nationwide Cohort 
Study, 170 ANN. INTERNAL MED. 513, 513 (2019). See also Dorit Rubinstein Reiss & John Diamond, 
Measles and Misrepresentation in Minnesota: Can There Be Liability for Anti Vaccine Misinformation 
that Causes Bodily Harm?, 56 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 531, 562–63 (2019); Jeffrey S. Gerber & Paul A. 
Offit, Vaccines and Autism: A Tale of Shifting Hypotheses, 48 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 456, 456–
58 (2009).  
68 Hviid et al., supra note 67, at 513–14. 
 
343891-Connecticut_Law_52-2_Text.indd   256 7/28/20   10:48 AM
 
2020] VACCINES AND THE AGE OF CONSENT 785 
spanning millions of children [have] found no link between the MMR and 
autism.”69 
 
Figure 2: Risks of Measles v. Risks of MMR: 





1:1000 encephalitis, almost 50% 
mortality. 
1–3:1000 deaths. 
SSPE: Germany: 2003-2009 
1:1750–3300 in kids under 5. 




ITP: 1:24,000, usually temporary.  




More generally, the most serious risk from vaccines are probably severe 
allergic reactions which occur about once in a million doses.70 As this 
discussion demonstrates, the risks of modern vaccines are both absolutely 
and relatively low when compared to the benefits.71  
B. Why Don’t Parents Vaccinate? 
An extensive body of literature72 addresses the question of why people 
do not vaccinate. We touch on key points here. Several studies have 
examined the reasons provided by parents when asked why they do not 
vaccinate. Beyond the articulated justifications, parents’ values may affect 
their susceptibility to specific anti-vaccine arguments. Furthermore, parents’ 
social networks influence their views.  
                                                                                                                     
69 Reiss & Diamond, supra note 67, at 562–63 (providing a detailed overview of the MMR and 
autism studies).  
70 Michael M. McNeil et al., Risk of Anaphylaxis After Vaccination in Children and Adults, 137 J. 
ALLERGY & CLINICAL IMMUNOLOGY 868, 868 (2016).  
71 See also Reiss & Weithorn, Responding to the Childhood Vaccination Crisis, supra note 7, at 
885–88.  
72 For examples of such literature, see generally PAUL A. OFFIT, DEADLY CHOICES: HOW THE 
ANTI-VACCINE MOVEMENT THREATENS US ALL 180–85 (2011); JENNIFER REICH, CALLING THE SHOTS: 
WHY PARENTS REJECT VACCINES (2016); Melissa B. Gikey et al., Forgone Vaccination During 
Childhood and Adolescence: Findings of a Statewide Survey of Parents, 56 PREVENTIVE MED. 202 
(2013); Edward Mills et al., Systematic Review of Qualitative Studies Exploring Parental Beliefs and 
Attitudes Toward Childhood Vaccination Identifies Common Barriers To Vaccination, 58 J. CLINICAL 
EPIDEMIOLOGY 1081 (2005); Douglas J. Opel & Edgar K. Marcuse, Window or Mirror: Social Networks’ 
Role in Immunization Decisions, 131 PEDIATRICS 1619 (2013). 
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We have examined the literature on the rationales for parents’ refusal to 
vaccinate in detail elsewhere.73 We pointed out that the reasons include 
(generally ill-founded) safety concerns, misconceptions about preventable 
diseases that underestimate disease risks and the efficacy of vaccines, 
distrust of doctors and government (shading, in the extreme, into conspiracy 
theories), preferences for alternative medicine as well as “natural” 
approaches to health without scientific foundation, and a view that 
governmental vaccination policies reflect unjustified governmental intrusion 
that violate their civil rights.74 In addition, occasionally religious beliefs 
underlie parental objections.75 While some parents’ objections to vaccines 
may be grounded in sincere religious views, courts and commentators have 
concluded that such assertions at times mask the parents’ true reasons for 
their anti-vaccine positions.76 There is substantial variability in the rationales 
and degree of tenacity in parental opposition to vaccines. Vaccine-hesitant 
parents may be more open to persuasion by their children if the children wish 
to be vaccinated. By contrast, vaccine-rejector parents typically repel any 
form of persuasion. The repercussions for minors who request vaccination 
over parental opposition may be most severe when parents are 
vaccine-rejectors.77  
Parents who refuse vaccines typically voice deep and consistent 
concerns about the harms they believe are associated with vaccines.78  
Typically, however, the information that leads parents to think vaccines’ 
risks are high is misleading or patently false. For example, scientific data do 
not support parental beliefs that vaccines weaken the immune system or that 
the recommended vaccine schedule gives infants too many vaccines too 
soon. Multiple vaccines on the schedule are not harmful in combination (and 
challenge babies’ immune systems to a lesser degree than other natural 
exposures), and have important benefits.79 Concerns about vaccines’ 
                                                                                                                     
73 Reiss & Weithorn, Responding to the Childhood Vaccination Crisis, supra note 7, at 937–52. 
74 Id. at 937.  
75 Anat Gesser-Edelsburg et al., Why Do Parents Who Usually Vaccinate Their Children Hesitate 
or Refuse? General Good vs. Individual Risk, 19 J. RISK RES. 405, 408 (2014). 
76 Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, Thou Shalt Not Take the Name of the Lord Thy God in Vain: Use and 
Abuse of Religious Exemptions from School Immunization Requirements, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 1551, 1570–
88 (2014). 
77 E. Allison Hagood & Stacy Mintzer Herlihy, Addressing Heterogeneous Parental Concerns 
About Vaccination with a Multiple-Source Model: A Parent and Educator Perspective, 9 HUM. 
VACCINES & IMMUNOTHERAPEUTICS 1790, 1791 (2013). 
78 REICH, supra note 72, at 79–86; Mabel Berezin & Alicia Eads, Risk Is for the Rich? Childhood 
Vaccination Resistance and a Culture of Health, 165 SOC. SCI. & MED. 233, 234–35 (2016); Chephra 
McKee & Kristin Bohannon, Exploring the Reasons Behind Parental Refusal of Vaccines, 21 J. 
PEDIATRIC PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 104, 104 (2016); Daniel A. Salmon et al., Factors 
Associated with Refusal of Childhood Vaccines Among Parents of School Aged Children: A Case-Control 
Study, 159 ARCHIVES PEDIATRIC ADOLESCENT MED. 470, 471 (2005).  
79 Francesco Nicoli & Victor Appay, Immunological Considerations Regarding Parental Concerns 
on Pediatric Immunizations, 35 VACCINE 3012, 3015 (2017); Paul A. Offit et al., Addressing Parents’ 
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ingredients raised on anti-vaccine sites80 are also unfounded. The ingredients 
in vaccines that concern some parents occur in amounts that do not present 
a danger to the child.81 For example, formaldehyde is present in vaccines in 
amounts that are substantially less than that which an infant’s body produces 
naturally as part of the infant’s own metabolism.82 Extensive evidence shows 
that vaccines do not cause autism,83 food allergies,84 or Sudden Infant Death 
Syndrome.85 Furthermore, parents also substantially underestimate the risks 
posed by the diseases that vaccines prevent.86 Ironically, at least in part, the 
success of vaccines in preventing disease has contributed to the problem.87 
In other words, as vaccines have led to the disappearance of some diseases, 
parents unfamiliar with the dangers of vaccine-preventable diseases 
disbelieve the evidence on the benefits of these life-saving interventions, and 
                                                                                                                     
Concerns: Do Too Many Vaccines Overwhelm or Weaken the Infant’s Immune System?, 109 PEDIATRICS 
124, 124–25 (2002).  
80 Anna Kata, Anti-Vaccine Activists, Web 2.0, and the Postmodern Paradigm—An Overview of 
Tactics and Tropes Used Online By the Anti-Vaccination Movement, 30 VACCINE 3778, 3781 (2012). 
81 The amount of pork gelatin in vaccines, however, may be associated with allergic reactions in 
about one per two million people. Paul A. Offit & Rita K. Jew, Addressing Parents’ Concerns: Do 
Vaccines Contain Harmful Preservatives, Adjuvants, Additives, or Residuals?, 112 PEDIATRICS 1394, 
1397 (2003). For additional information, see also Vaccine Educ. Ctr., Vaccine Ingredients, CHILD. HOSP. 
PHILA., https://www.chop.edu/centers-programs/vaccine-education-center/vaccine-ingredients (last 
reviewed Oct. 28, 2019). 
82 Vaccine Educ. Ctr., Vaccine Ingredients – Formaldehyde, CHILD. HOSP. PHILA., 
https://www.chop.edu/centers-programs/vaccine-education-center/vaccine-ingredients/formaldehyde 
(last reviewed May 14, 2018). 
83 See notes 67–69 and accompanying text. Most recently, a large study of MMR vaccine found no 
link to autism. See Hviid et al., supra note 67, at 513. Previously, a meta-analysis examining studies 
involving over one million children reached the same conclusion, Luke E. Taylor et al., Vaccines Are 
Not Associated with Autism: An Evidence-Based Meta-Analysis of Case-Control and Cohort Studies, 32 
VACCINE 3623, 3623 (2014), as did an Institute of Medicine Report about vaccines’ adverse events, 
Margaret A. Maglione et al., Safety of Vaccines Used for Routine Immunization of US Children: A 
Systematic Review, 134 PEDIATRICS 325, 325 (2014). See also Frank DeStefano, Heather Monk 
Bodenstab & Paul A. Offit, Principal Controversies in Vaccine Safety in the United States, 69 CLINICAL 
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 726, 726 (2019).  
84 Paul A. Offit & Charles J. Hackett, Addressing Parents’ Concerns: Do Vaccines Cause Allergic 
or Autoimmune Diseases?, 111 PEDIATRICS 653, 653 (2003); see also Vaccine Educ. Ctr., Vaccines and 
Asthma or Allergies: Do Vaccines Cause Asthma or Allergies?, CHILD. HOSP. PHILA., 
https://www.chop.edu/centers-programs/vaccine-education-center/vaccines-and-other-conditions/ 
vaccines-asthma-allergies (last reviewed Oct. 10, 2017). 
85 Pedro L. Moro et al., Deaths Reported to the Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System, United 
States, 1997–2013, 61 VACCINES 980, 980–84 (2015); Giuseppe Traversa et al., Sudden Unexpected 
Deaths and Vaccinations During the First Two Years of Life in Italy: A Case Series Study, 6 PLOS ONE 
e16363, e16363 (2011); Y. Tony Yang & Jana Shaw, Sudden Infant Death Syndrome, 
Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder and Vaccines: Longitudinal Population Analyses, 36 VACCINE 
595, 595 (2018); M.M.T. Vennemann et al., Sudden Infant Death Syndrome: No Increased Risk After 
Immunisation, 25 VACCINE 336, 336–37 (2007). 
86 See Mark Doherty et al., Vaccine Impact: Benefits for Human Health, 34 VACCINE 6707, 6711 
(2016) (discussing the re-emergence of vaccine-preventable diseases and the implications for 
unimmunized persons in a community). 
87 See id. at 6709 (examining the success of vaccines in reducing childhood mortality). 
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focus instead on the more visible, albeit lesser, risks and costs of the 
vaccines.88  
In short, most of the beliefs that typically lead parents to refuse 
vaccination are without scientific foundation. Anti-vaccine websites mislead 
parents who, seeking to choose the lesser risk for their children, ultimately 
choose the greater risk.89 These parents then also, intentionally or 
unintentionally, place others at risk because unvaccinated children are at 
higher risk of becoming infected and transmitting diseases to other 
intentionally unvaccinated individuals: the small percentage of persons for 
whom vaccines are not effective; those too young to be vaccinated; and those 
with medical conditions that preclude some or all vaccinations, such as 
transplant recipients or immunocompromised individuals.90  
In her book Calling the Shots: Why Parents Reject Vaccines, scholar 
Jennifer Reich places vaccine refusal in a broader social and cultural 
context.91 She points out that modern society directs people to be “informed 
consumers,” challenging the pronouncements of scientific and governmental 
authorities and performing “research” themselves.92 Vaccine-rejecting 
parents see themselves as “researchers” of that variety. They perceive 
themselves to be self-educating, as informed consumers, in order to make 
good decisions for their children.93 Similarly, vaccine refusers’ views fit well 
within an age of personalization, explains Reich, and a call to personalize 
both consumption and medicine.94  
Even more broadly, a new body of literature examines the role of values 
in vaccine refusal. Scholars find that parents who are strongly vaccine 
hesitant are more likely than others to value purity (that is, placing an 
emphasis on avoiding anything considered “disgusting” or “unnatural” and 
expressing concerns about vaccines’ content) and liberty (that is, valuing 
personal choice).95 That literature suggests that different messaging might 
be more successful in influencing parents who oppose vaccines.96  
                                                                                                                     
88 Id. at 6708. 
89 Kata, supra note 80, at 3779; Meghan Bridgid Moran et al., What Makes Anti-Vaccine Websites 
Persuasive? A Content Analysis of Techniques Used by Anti-Vaccine Websites to Engender Anti-Vaccine 
Sentiment, 9 J. COMM. HEALTHCARE 151, 151–53 (2016); Richard K. Zimmerman et al., Vaccine 
Criticism on the World Wide Web, 7 J. MED. INTERNET RES. e17, e17 (2005). 
90 See generally IMMUNIZATION ACTION COAL., PERSONAL BELIEF EXEMPTIONS FOR 
VACCINATION PUT PEOPLE AT RISK. EXAMINE THE EVIDENCE FOR YOURSELF (2019), 
http://www.immunize.org/catg.d/p2069.pdf (citing studies demonstrating higher risk from unvaccinated 
individuals).  
91 REICH, supra note 72, at 67–75. 
92 Id. at 72–75. 
93 Id.  
94 Id. at 87–89. 
95 Avnika B. Amin et al., Association of Moral Values with Vaccine Hesitancy, 1 NATURE HUM. 
BEHAV. 873, 873 (2017). 
96 Noel T. Brewer et al., Increasing Vaccination: Putting Psychological Science into Action, 18 
PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 149, 150 (2017). 
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Finally, we observe that vaccine refusal is highly socially embedded. 
Local attitudes  and virtual social networks can influence a person’s vaccine 
hesitancy.97 These networks are also “contagious,” traveling from one 
community to another.98 Social networks support and reinforce parental 
decisions not to vaccinate.99 In a community with high rates of vaccine 
hesitancy, a minor’s choice to be vaccinated may have stronger social 
repercussions for the minor and the minor’s family than in other 
communities, thus creating “counter pressure,” and thereby strengthening 
parental opposition to a minor’s vaccination request.100 
II. AUTHORITY FOR HEALTH CARE DECISIONS FOR MINORS: THE LEGAL 
LANDSCAPE 
A. The Doctrine of Parental Consent 
It is well-established that in the United States, parents and guardians 
retain legal authority to make health care decisions for their minor children. 
This doctrine of parental consent is but one facet of the broad authority 
vested in parents to make decisions affecting the welfare of their minor 
children.101 In 2000, the U.S. Supreme Court reflected that the “the interest 
of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children” is “perhaps the 
oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.”102 The 
state gives parents a relatively wide berth with which to carry out their 
responsibilities vis-à-vis their children.103 Now recognized as a veritable 
fixture in American law, parental discretion in decisionmaking concerning 
minor children is the starting point for most analyses of decisional authority 
                                                                                                                     
97 Katie Attwell et al., The Social Basis of Vaccine Questioning and Refusal: A Qualitative Study 
Employing Bourdieu’s Concepts of ‘Capitals’ and ‘Habitus’, 15 INT’L J. ENVTL. RES. PUB. HEALTH 
1044, 1044 (2018); Heidi Y. Lawrence et al., Reframing Medicine’s Publics: The Local as a Public of 
Vaccine Refusal, 35 J. MED. HUMAN. 111, 111 (2014); Marcel Salathé & Sabastian Bonhoeffer, The 
Effect of Opinion Clustering on Disease Outbreaks, 5 J. ROYAL SOC’Y INTERFACE 1505, 1508 (2008).  
98 Ellsworth Campbell & Marcel Salathé, Complex Social Contagion Makes Networks More 
Vulnerable to Disease Outbreaks, 3 SCI. REP. 1, 1–2 (2013); Y. Tony Yang, George Washington Univ., 
Why Stricter Immunization Laws Are Justified? Empirical Evidence of Nonmedical Exemptions’ 
Contagiousness (Nov. 2019), https://apha.confex.com/apha/2019/meetingapi.cgi/Paper/454274? 
filename=2019_Abstract454274.html&template=Word.  
99 Jennifer A. Reich, “We Are Fierce, Independent Thinkers and Intelligent”: Social Capital and 
Stigma Management Among Mothers Who Refuse Vaccines, SOC. SCI. & MED., July 2020, at 1, 1–4, 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0277953618306233.  
100 Id. at 4. 
101 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (“The primary role of the parents in the 
upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition.”).   
102 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65–66 (2000).  
103 See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (stating that the primacy of the parents 
in raising their children leads the Court to respect a “private realm of family life which the state cannot 
enter”). 
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regarding children or adolescents.104 Yet, it is not necessarily the ending 
point. The law governing health care decisions for minors reveals a complex 
array of exceptions to the doctrine of parental consent, each of which 
provides for a decisionmaking mechanism to supplement, or in some cases 
replace, parental discretion. 
Although principles governing consent for children’s health care 
initially evolved through the common law,105 the doctrine of parental 
consent assumed constitutional dimensions in the latter part of the twentieth 
century.106 This important line of cases had its inception in the 1920s, with 
Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Society of Sisters.107 These cases together 
establish that parental authority to exercise discretion in the upbringing of 
their children is an expression of liberty protected by the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.108  
Investing parents with some measure of discretion in decisionmaking 
regarding their minor children’s welfare recognizes the functional role of 
families in our society. Our social structure is premised upon the existence 
of family units, whose dependent children rely for support, nurturance, and 
                                                                                                                     
104 See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 584–85 (1979); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635–39 (1979) 
105 Under early common law, fathers had property-like interests in their children and their wives, 
which were associated with substantial legal control over those persons. It included, for example, fathers’ 
entitlement to the wages earned by his minor children and disciplinary authority, including corporal 
punishment. See, e.g., Anne C. Dailey & Laura A. Rosenbury, The New Law of the Child, 127 YALE 
L.J. 1448, 1457–58 (2017) (describing common-law property-based theory of parental control of 
children); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “Who Owns the Child?”: Meyer and Pierce and the Child as 
Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 1045–46 (1992) (discussing common law rights of patriarchs 
to “enforce control over their households”). Parental authority for health care decisions specifically, 
however, also flows from tort law. See, e.g., Danny R. Veilleux, Annotation, Medical Practitioner’s 
Liability for Treatment Given Child Without Parent’s Consent, 67 A.L.R. 4th 511 § 2[a] (1989) 
(describing changing liability for treatment of minors without parental consent); Walter Wadlington, 
Medical Decision Making for and by Children: Tensions Between Parent, State, and Child, 1994 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 311, 314–16 (describing early development of doctrine of parental consent). Depending on the 
case facts, physicians’ failure to secure the consent of a child’s parent before treating the child can result 
in liability as a form of battery, or more commonly in recent decades, negligence. Veilleux, supra, at 
517. Principles clarifying exceptions to the doctrine of parental consent that allow minors authority to 
consent, discussed infra Section II.B.2, not only facilitate minors’ independent access to treatment, but 
also protect physicians from such liability when relying solely on the consent of the minor. Doriane 
Lambelet Coleman & Philip M. Rosoff, The Legal Authority of Mature Minors to Consent to General 
Medical Treatment, 131 PEDIATRICS 786, 790 (2013).    
106 See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 620 (1979) (assuming a child has a liberty and due process 
right in their voluntary admittance to a mental institution but ultimately upholding the state of Georgia’s 
procedures for admitting a child for treatment to a state mental hospital); Bellotti v. Baird, 442 U.S. 622, 
651 (1979) (holding a state can require parental consent for a minor to obtain an abortion, but that there 
must be a judicial route for minors seeking an abortion without parental consent). 
107 Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 
(1923).  
108 For a critical analysis of Meyer and Pierce as constitutionalizing a property-like notion of 
parental rights, see Woodhouse, supra note 105, at 997 (asserting that Meyer and Pierce “were animated, 
as well, by . . . a conservative attachment to the patriarchal family, to a class-stratified society, and to a 
parent’s private property rights in his children and their labor”). 
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protection upon parents who have both the desire and capacity to act in their 
children’s best interests.109 Parents in our society are charged with guarding 
their children’s welfare and guiding their children’s destiny. Allowing 
parents to carry out these duties in a manner consistent with their judgment 
and values serves a myriad of positive goals. Indeed, there are many 
justifications for a legal regime that protects parental authority over their 
children’s welfare, including health care decisions.110 We highlight four 
here: (1) the family unit serves as a core building block within our social 
structure and is the institution best situated to care for, protect, and socialize 
children; (2) parental discretion in raising children is an important 
accompaniment to legal childrearing obligations; (3) parents are those 
persons typically most motivated, able, and best situated to make decisions 
in the best interests of their children; and (4) most minors have not yet 
achieved adult levels of maturation and must rely on adults to make 
important decisions for them.  
The primacy of the family in American society provides the first 
rationale for protection of parental authority over children’s welfare. The 
family, as a unit, has a special place in American society. It forms the 
“building blocks out of which the larger units of social organization are 
fashioned,”111 and its social and economic stability and functionality are 
essential to the perpetuation of a healthy society.112 One component of the 
family’s traditional role in society is the procreation, nurturance, and 
socialization of children.113 Modern conceptions of family view it as an 
institution uniquely suited to this role.   
Major shifts in images of children and family occurred during the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.114 For example, historian Michael 
                                                                                                                     
109 Lois A. Weithorn, Envisioning Second-Order Change in America’s Responses to Troubled and 
Troublesome Youth, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1305, 1391–92 (2005) [hereinafter Weithorn, Envisioning]. 
110 Id. at 1391–98. Grounded initially in the legal and social authority of husbands and fathers over 
their wives and children, the purposes and nature of parental control over children has shifted 
substantially over the centuries. MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE 
FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 4–5 (1985). 
111 John Demos, Images of the American Family, Then and Now, in CHANGING IMAGES OF THE 
FAMILY 43, 46 (Virginia Tufte & Barbara Myerhoff eds., 1979). See also Moore v. City of East 
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503–04 (1977) (“It is through the family that we inculcate and pass down many 
of our most cherished values, moral and cultural.”). 
112 See LINDA C. MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES: FOSTERING CAPACITY, EQUALITY, AND 
RESPONSIBILITY 20–21 (2006) (analyzing how families instill values in future generations and help 
perpetuate social goods); Weithorn, Envisioning, supra note 109, at 1389–91 (describing theories of the 
family unit as the foundation of social, religious, educational, and political life).  
113 “Families care for dependent children, prepare them for citizenship, and educate them to be 
productive members of society.” Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, From Contract to Status: 
Collaboration and the Evolution of Novel Family Relationships, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 293, 304 (2015).  
114 For example, sociologist Viviana A. Zelizer highlights children’s roles as substantial economic 
assets to the family through their childhood labor prior to the shifts that occurred during the nineteenth 
and, even more sharply, twentieth century. VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, PRICING THE PRICELESS CHILD: THE 
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Grossberg notes that during the nineteenth century, evolving perceptions of 
children as vulnerable and malleable, with each having his or her own unique 
“needs, talents, and characters,” required the personalized and customized 
upbringing that only a family could provide.115 While the state (such as 
through public schools) shares in “molding the nation’s young, . . . youthful 
minds and bodies would develop properly only in a special, sheltered home 
under the watchful guidance of concerned . . . parents.”116   
Protecting some level of the family’s autonomy in raising and 
socializing children from overly intrusive state regulation is also consistent 
with democratic ideology. In its rebuke to Oregon’s legislature for regulating 
parental decisions regarding school choice with too heavy a hand, the Court 
asserted in Pierce that:  
The fundamental theory of liberty . . . excludes any general 
power of the State to standardize its children . . . . The child is 
not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and 
direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to 
recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.117  
The Court’s opinion implies that vesting considerable discretion in parents 
not only protects against governmental overreaching and excessive intrusion 
in family matters, but also guards other substantive liberties expressed 
within the family (such as political ideology and religious beliefs). Family 
autonomy, in turn, is viewed as fostering pluralism and diversity, which 
reinvigorates our democracy. Thus, constitutional protection for parental 
decisional authority over their minor children serves important social goals 
unrelated to individual children’s needs.   
A second, and corollary, argument for giving parents some degree of 
freedom in the ways in which they raise their children relates to the heavy 
burden parents assume in raising children. Empowering parents with the 
authority to raise children the way they see fit, albeit consistent with certain 
minimal state-imposed limits, may be viewed as a form of reciprocity for 
satisfying the legally enforceable duties of parenthood.118 In this, “[t]he 
exchange view of parenthood[,] . . . [p]arents have rights that create 
obligations and obligations that create rights. Within this circular, 
self-reinforcing cycle of exchange, rights are emphasized, strengthened by 
their justification in obligation.”119 Katharine Bartlett has reframed this 
concept by focusing on the relationship components of parents’ 
                                                                                                                     
CHANGING SOCIAL VALUE OF CHILDREN 5, 56–57 (1985). Children’s value to their parents morphed 
from that of an “instrumental or fiscal” asset to “exclusively emotional and affective.” Id. at 11. 
115 GROSSBERG, supra note 110, at 8. 
116 Id. 
117 Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925). 
118 Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REV. 2401, 2440 (1995). 
119 Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293, 298 (1988). 
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responsibilities to children. “Responsibility describes a certain type of 
connection that persons may experience in their relationships with one 
another . . . . Responsibility, in other words, is a self-enlarging, open-ended 
commitment on behalf of another.”120 She suggests that providing parents 
with a wide berth in the manner in which they carry out their parental 
responsibilities constitutes a logical and natural reliance on the commitment 
parents have made to doing their best for their children.121 
Scott and Scott, by contrast, analogize the role of parents to those of 
fiduciaries: “On this dimension, parental authority over the relationship with 
children is offered as the quid pro quo for satisfactory performance . . . .  
Recognition of these parental claims in some form is an important 
inducement to encourage investment in children’s welfare.”122 Both 
approaches recognize that there is an important connection between the legal 
responsibilities and obligations that parents shoulder in raising children and 
the constitutionally protected authority to carry out those duties in a manner 
consistent with one’s personal judgment and values.    
A third rationale justifying parental authority in children’s upbringing, 
including in health care, is that American law presumes that parents are 
motivated to make, and are capable of making, decisions in their children’s 
best interests.123 Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority in Parham v. 
J.R., a case addressing parental authority for decisions to place their minor 
children in mental hospitals without judicial oversight, opined that the 
“natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their 
children.”124 While acknowledging that this presumption may not always 
hold, as in the case of child abuse or neglect, the Court concluded that the 
existence of exceptions “is hardly a reason to discard wholesale those pages 
of human experience that teach that parents generally do act in the child’s 
best interests.”125 Justice Burger’s assertion regarding the proclivities of 
most parents conforms with the dominant view in society that parents try to 
do the best they can by and for their children. Indeed, those of us who are 
fortunate enough to be parents can attest to the powerful emotional forces 
that lead most of us to dedicate ourselves to promoting what we believe is 
in our children’s best interests. As Barbara Bennett Woodhouse observes 
with the example of a parent who runs into a burning building to rescue his 
or her child, parental love and protective instincts can motivate a parent to 
                                                                                                                     
120 Id. at 299.   
121 Id. at 299–300. 
122 Scott & Scott, supra note 118, at 2440. 
123 Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit assert as well that it is in children’s best interests to have 
autonomous parents whose discretion in decisionmaking is protected against most potential or actual 
forms of state intrusion. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 4–5 
(1973). 
124 Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979). 
125 Id. at 602–03. 
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place herself or himself at great personal risk—without a second thought—
to further a child’s well-being.126  
Embedded in the presumption that parents act in their children’s best 
interests is the notion that the interests of parents and children typically align 
or are coextensive. Thus, there is a corollary presumption that there is an 
“identity of interests” between parent and child.127 The parent is presumed 
to speak on the child’s behalf. Thus, to the extent that there is evidence that 
the interests of a parent and minor are not aligned, the appropriateness of 
relying on parental decisionmaking is questionable. As Chief Justice Burger 
acknowledged, sometimes the evidence is clear that parental conduct and 
choices harm or endanger minor children, providing a strong basis to rebut 
the presumption that parents are acting in their children’s best interests.128 
Yet, there may be situations that fall short of documented child abuse or 
neglect that reveal a conflict, rather than identity, of interests between 
parents and children.129  
A fourth rationale for parental decisional authority over their minor 
children recognizes that, in light of the physiological, psychological, and 
economic dependence of children, someone must play the roles alluded to 
by Grossberg. Most children have not achieved adult levels of maturity in a 
range of areas of functioning. They depend upon adults to meet their 
essential needs.130 Although the age at which children typically reach 
species-typical milestones characterizing adult levels of functioning differs 
with the particular skills and capacities in question, and from individual to 
individual, it is undeniable that most children need adult care, protection, 
and nurturance to survive and to have the best opportunity to thrive.131   
                                                                                                                     
126 Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Of Babies, Bonding, and Burning Buildings: Discerning 
Parenthood in Irrational Action, 81 VA. L. REV. 2493, 2496–97 (1995). 
127 J. Shoshanna Ehrlich, Shifting Boundaries: Abortion, Criminal Culpability and the 
Indeterminate Legal Status of Adolescents, 18 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 77, 86–87 (2003); Amy L. 
Komoroski, Stimulant Drug Therapy for Hyperactive Children: Adjudicating Disputes Between Parents 
and Educators, 11 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 97, 107 (2001). But see Hazel Glenn Beh & Milton Diamond, 
David Reimer’s Legacy: Limiting Parental Discretion, 12 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 5, 30 (2005) 
(discussing the concept of parent-child identity versus conflict of interests in the context of surgical 
intervention for children with ambiguous genitalia); Hillary Rodham, Children Under the Law, 43 HARV. 
EDUC. REV. 487, 507 (1973) (proposing that the traditional presumption of identity of interests between 
a parent and child should be rejected when the child’s interests are “demonstrably independent” from 
those of the parents). 
128 See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess. ch. 
524) (allowing finding of neglect if substantial risk of serious harm due to parents’ failure to obtain 
needed medical treatment for child).  
129 See the discussion of statutory exceptions to the doctrine of parental consent infra Section 
II.B.2.iii. 
130 Lois A. Weithorn, A Constitutional Jurisprudence of Children’s Vulnerability, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 
179, 226–27 (2017) [hereinafter Weithorn, Children’s Vulnerability]. 
131 Id. at 227. 
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One component of children’s immature physiological and psychological 
status is their not-yet-fully-developed cognitive and socioemotional 
decisional capabilities. The law generally views children as incapable of 
acting in their own best interests and treats their incompetence in making 
most personal decisions of legal import, including health care decisions, as 
presumptive.132 In Parham, the majority stated that “[m]ost children, even in 
adolescence, simply are not able to make sound judgments concerning many 
decisions, including their need for medical care or treatment.”133 Indeed, the 
Court has distinguished the constitutional status of children and adults based, 
in part, on children’s perceived “inability to make critical decisions in an 
informed and mature manner.”134 For the reasons asserted above, parents are 
typically the logical and convenient first choice to serve as proxy 
decisionmakers for their children.135   
Yet, as many have observed, de facto or actual competence for a 
particular legal purpose may not track the bright-line age-based, and to some 
extent arbitrary, division between minority and majority that serves as the 
default for delineation of legal rights and duties.136 In fact, those “pages of 
human experience” referred to by Chief Justice Burger and a growing body 
of empirical research tell us that—depending upon the particular skills and 
capacities relevant to the law—minors may satisfy legal standards of 
competence at ages younger or older than the legal age of majority.137 Thus, 
                                                                                                                     
132 B. Jessie Hill, Medical Decision Making by and on Behalf of Adolescents: Reconsidering First 
Principles, 15 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 37, 40–41 (2012); Jennifer L. Rosato, Let’s Get Real: 
Quilting a Principled Approach to Adolescent Empowerment in Health Care Decision-Making, 
51 DEPAUL L. REV. 769, 771–72 (2002); Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, 29 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 547, 550–51 (2000). See Laurence Steinberg, Does Recent Research on Adolescent 
Brain Development Inform the Mature Minor Doctrine?, 38 J. MED. & PHIL. 256, 256 (2013) (citing 
constitutional jurisprudence holding that minors’ immaturity mitigates their criminal culpability). 
133 Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979). 
134 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979). 
135 The Court in Parham indicated that “[p]arents can and must make . . . judgments [as to children’s 
need for medical care or treatment].” Parham, 442 U.S. at 603. 
136 Thomas Grisso & Linda Vierling, Minors’ Consent to Treatment: A Developmental Perspective, 
9 PROF. PSYCHOL. 412, 415–16 (1978); Rodham, supra note 127, at 488–89; Lois A. Weithorn, 
Developmental Factors and Competence to Make Informed Treatment Decisions, 5 CHILD & YOUTH 
SERVICES 85, 86 (1982) [hereinafter Weithorn, Developmental Factors]. 
137 Lois A. Weithorn, Children’s Capacities in Legal Contexts, in CHILDREN, MENTAL HEALTH, 
AND THE LAW 25, 37–38 (N. Dickon Reppucci et al. eds., 1984); Grisso & Vierling, supra note 136, at 
423; Grace Icenogle et al., Adolescents’ Cognitive Capacity Reaches Adult Levels Prior to Their 
Psychosocial Maturity: Evidence for a “Maturity Gap” in a Multinational, Cross-Sectional Sample, 43 
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 69, 79 (2019); Laurence Steinberg et al., Are Adolescents Less Mature than 
Adults?: Minors’ Access to Abortion, the Juvenile Death Penalty, and the Alleged APA “Flip-Flop”, 64 
AM. PSYCHOL. 583, 586–87 (2009); Weithorn, Developmental Factors, supra note 136, at 95–96; Lois 
A. Weithorn & Susan B. Campbell, The Competency of Children and Adolescents to Make Informed 
Treatment Decisions, 53 CHILD DEV. 1589, 1595 (1982). The capacities of minors to satisfy legal 
standards of competence to consent to childhood vaccinations independent of their parents is discussed 
below. See infra Parts III.B.2–III.B.3. 
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there are circumstances in which the presumption that minors are 
incompetent to make important life decisions for themselves, including 
certain medical choices, is not supported by the available evidence.138 While 
minors’ competence to make health care decisions may not serve as an 
independent basis for providing minors with generalized decisional 
authority in place of their parents, it may operate to provide the alternative 
mechanism for certain health care decisions if, for one reason or another, a 
reliance on parental consent alone would not achieve important interests.139    
B. Exceptions to the Doctrine of Parental Consent 
Parental authority over the lives of their children is neither boundless 
nor unregulated. While deference to parents remains the default in the 
context of children’s health care decisionmaking, judicial and legislative 
balancing of competing interests involving constitutional and policy 
considerations created a complex web of exceptions to parental control over 
minor children’s health care decisions.   
1. Underlying Constitutional and Policy Frameworks 
The exceptions can be best understood within the context of certain 
constitutional and policy frameworks that allow for analysis of competing 
interests among parents, the state, and children. As noted above, parents 
have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in exercising discretion in 
decisionmaking regarding their children’s welfare, including authority over 
decisions for minor children’s health care. This interest has been classified 
as fundamental, although this classification does not always result in the 
application of strict scrutiny to challenged statutes and regulations. Instead, 
the Court appears to apply context-specific modes of analysis, frequently 
falling back on balancing tests.140  
Not surprisingly, exceptions to the doctrine of parental consent exist in 
circumstances where courts or legislatures determine that the interests of the 
state or the children are weightier than those of the parents. Minors’ own 
                                                                                                                     
138 See infra Parts III.B.2–III.B.3. 
139 See infra notes 237–50 and accompanying text. 
140 Despite its status as a “fundamental right,” strict scrutiny review is not always required of state 
regulations challenged as interfering with that authority. Reiss & Weithorn, Responding to the Childhood 
Vaccination Crisis, supra note 7, at 908–10. While at times the Court does apply strict scrutiny to 
challenged laws, it often applies alternative modes of analysis, such as balancing tests, or other 
context-specific standards of review customized to the particular issues and constellation of parties and 
interests. Id. See also Margaret Ryznar, A Curious Parental Right, 71 SMU L. REV. 127, 128 (2018) 
(observing that the U.S. Supreme Court has “not articulated a consistent level of scrutiny for judicial 
review of restrictions on” parental decisional rights regarding the care, custody, and control of their minor 
children). That said, constitutional scholars have concluded that mandatory vaccination laws, even if 
providing no vaccine exemptions other than those that are medically necessary, satisfy strict scrutiny. 
Erwin Chemerinsky & Michele Goodwin, Compulsory Vaccination Laws Are Constitutional, 110 NW. 
U. L. REV. 589, 614 (2016). 
 
343891-Connecticut_Law_52-2_Text.indd   268 7/28/20   10:48 AM
 
2020] VACCINES AND THE AGE OF CONSENT 797 
constitutional rights may compete with parental claims. Policy 
considerations, such as those relating to preserving life or promoting health 
may override parental rights. In some instances, the justifications and 
rationales underlying the doctrine of parental consent141—each of which 
might be viewed as an assumption about the functioning of the family, 
parents, or children—may simply not hold true. In these circumstances, 
courts or legislatures may fashion exceptions to the doctrine of parental 
consent, that is, alternative decisionmaking structures to promote children’s 
best interests. Throughout the remainder of this Article, when discussing 
legal exceptions to the doctrine of parental consent, we reference one or 
another of these constitutional, policy, or practical bases for creating such 
exceptions. 
The Court often engages in a dyadic balance of parental rights of 
decisional autonomy and the state’s interests (parens patriae and police 
power) in children’s welfare. The parens patriae power refers to the state’s 
paternalistic authority to regulate the lives of individuals to protect and 
promote those persons’ own welfare.142 Parens patriae regulations are 
typically aimed at those persons, such as children or other vulnerable or 
dependent groups, viewed as unable to protect, care, or decide wisely for 
themselves, thus triggering a higher level of protection from the state. The 
police power, by contrast, seeks to regulate the conduct of individuals in 
order to promote the general welfare and promote the interests of the 
community or society as a whole.143 A powerful statement of the state’s 
police power authority appears in the seminal mandatory vaccination case, 
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, in which the U.S. Supreme Court emphasized 
the “social compact” between the state and its citizens, requiring each of us 
to acquiesce to policies that advance “the common good” (that is, the safety 
and protection of the populace), even when such acquiescence restricts our 
liberty.144 
                                                                                                                     
141 The four sets of rationales, as laid out above, are as follows: (1) the family unit serves as a core 
building block within our social structure, the institution best situated to care for, protect, and socialize 
children; (2) parental discretion in raising children is an important accompaniment to legal childrearing 
obligations; (3) parents are those persons typically most motivated, able, and best situated to make 
decisions in the best interests of their children; and (4) most minors have not yet achieved adult levels of 
maturation and must rely on adults to make important decisions for them. See supra notes 111–35 and 
accompanying text. 
142 “Parens patriae, literally ‘parent of the country,’ is the government’s power and responsibility, 
beyond its police power over all citizens, to protect, care for, and control citizens who cannot take care 
of themselves . . . .” Natalie Loder Clark, Parens Patriae and a Modest Proposal for the Twenty-first 
Century: Legal Philosophy and a New Look at Children’s Welfare, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 381, 382 
(2000). 
143 Weithorn, Envisioning, supra note 109, at 1402–03. The state’s police power interest justifies 
regulations that seek to promote the safety, health, and prosperity of society as a whole. See, e.g., 
Developments in the Law: The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156, 1214 (1980) 
(discussing the state’s parens patriae and police power interests).  
144 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 27 (1905). 
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The state has substantially broader authority to regulate the lives of 
children than it does the lives of adults, primarily because government’s 
parens patriae and police power interests are weightier relative to children 
than to adults.145 State involvement in children’s lives provides a classic 
expression of its parens patriae concerns for a subgroup of its citizens. 
Unlike adults, children are presumed to be incompetent under the law and 
therefore incapable of acting effectively on their own behalves or 
safeguarding their own interests.146 The Court has identified, however, a 
second factor that also fuels the state’s paternalistic concern. Children are 
also thought to be more vulnerable than adults.147 Weithorn provides an 
analysis of the construct of vulnerability and its subtypes, as relied upon by 
the Court in justifying the differential legal treatment of adults and 
children.148 In general, persons who are perceived to be vulnerable are 
thought to be at greater risk for, or more susceptible to, deleterious 
consequences as a result of certain experiences, influences, or exposures 
than are others.149 Children as vulnerable persons are in greater need of 
protection by those concerned with their best interests than are those not seen 
as vulnerable. The law’s presumption of children’s incompetence and 
conceptions of children’s vulnerability frequently trigger the state’s 
watchful eye and greater state involvement in children’s than in adults’ lives, 
justified by its parens patriae interests.  
The state’s police power interests regarding children are also broader 
when compared with those justifying intervention in the lives of adults. 
Weithorn has identified two subtypes of police power interests relevant to 
state regulation of children: those generally related to public safety and those 
generally related to children’s socialization.150 The first category is 
analogous to the police power interests the state maintains relative to all its 
inhabitants. It seeks to protect those within its borders from harm by 
restraining dangerous conduct and conditions.151 Thus, a wide range of 
policies, such as health codes, environmental regulations, criminal laws, and 
more, are in place to constrain actions and activities that threaten the welfare 
                                                                                                                     
145 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944).  
146 See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 623 (1979) (indicating that minors under the age of 
seventeen are “presumptively incapable of making [a] voluntary commitment decision for 
[themselves]”); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979) (asserting that “during the formative years of 
childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize 
and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them”). 
147 Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 634 (referring to children’s “peculiar vulnerability” as one of the three 
reasons justifying the treatment of children as constitutionally different from adults). 
148 Weithorn, Children’s Vulnerability, supra note 130, at 187–88. 
149 Id. at 190. 
150 Weithorn, Envisioning, supra note 109, at 1404. 
151 Id. at 235. 
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of others.152 Notably, the most important case reinforcing the state’s 
constitutional authority under its police power relative to public health—
Jacobson v. Massachusetts153—concerned mandatory vaccinations.154 The 
Court acknowledged that the liberty interest claimed by Jacobson (an adult), 
who sought to repel the state’s mandate that he be inoculated against 
smallpox or pay a five dollar fine, was the “greatest of all rights.”155 Yet, it 
held that this right is not absolute, and must give way in instances such as 
that presented in this case, where the public health was at risk from a 
life-threatening contagious disease: “[T]he police power of a State must be 
held to embrace, at least, such reasonable regulations established directly by 
legislative enactment as will protect the public health and the public 
safety.”156 As we have indicated elsewhere, Jacobson remains good law over 
a century after its writing and has been repeatedly cited with approval by the 
Court.157   
The state’s other primary police power interest relative to children 
concerns its goal of fostering children’s socialization in order to promote 
their development into the well-adjusted adults who contribute 
constructively to society. The Court has noted that, if children do not mature 
into such adults, our society cannot prosper: “A democratic society rests, for 
its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into 
full maturity as citizens, with all that implies.”158 Frequently, the state’s 
socialization-oriented police power interests relative to children converge 
with its parens patriae interests. In other words, state regulations viewed as 
promoting a child’s own best interests typically also contribute to children’s 
positive socialization. Two of the best-known regulatory structures justified 
by both the parens patriae and police power authorities are compulsory 
                                                                                                                     
152 See Jorge E. Galva et al., Public Health Strategy and the Police Powers of the State, 120 PUB. 
HEALTH REP. 20, 23–24 (2005) (discussing the police power as a way to restrict harmful conduct and 
promote the public health).   
153 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 11–12 (1905). 
154 For a discussion of the case and its implications for the development of the doctrine relating to 
the police power and health care, see Reiss & Weithorn, Responding to the Childhood Vaccination Crisis, 
supra note 7, at 894–901.  
155 Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 27. 
156 Id. at 25. 
157 Reiss & Weithorn, Responding to the Childhood Vaccination Crisis, supra note 7, at 898–901. 
We observed:  
Although one can speculate that Jacobson might be decided differently today, to date 
no decisions have expressly undercut its authority. To the contrary, Jacobson has been 
cited with approval by the U.S. Supreme Court dozens of times, including in recent 
decades, and by other federal and state courts several hundred times. The general 
principles set forth in Jacobson are sound and well-established. 
Id. at 901 (footnote omitted). 
158 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944). 
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education laws and prohibitions on child labor.159 Mandating education and 
restricting children’s participation in the labor force are seen as promoting 
children’s best interests.160 They require children to spend most of their 
waking hours in settings for the purpose of developing the fundamental skills 
the children will need to become capable adults. They also restrict children’s 
involvement in settings where they might be injured, exploited, or otherwise 
harmed. The laws that promote these parens patriae objectives are also 
deemed to achieve police power goals by preparing children for their future 
involvement in society.161 Compulsory education laws are expected to 
increase the likelihood that children will contribute socially, economically, 
and politically162 once reaching adulthood. Child labor prohibitions not only 
free up the child to attend school, but are designed to protect children from 
dangerous and corrupting influences, such as injuries or other experiences 
that may undercut their development into self-sufficient and contributing 
adult members of society.163 
Thus, although parents are empowered to serve as those persons with 
day-to-day responsibility for nurturing and supporting children’s positive 
development, government continues to play a significant role in the 
formative process. While Meyer and Pierce may have clarified that the 
Constitution protects parental choice in educational decisions, these choices 
must still satisfy the state’s minimal standards. Indeed, in Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, a 1972 case allowing Amish parents of three teenagers to withdraw 
them from public school a year or two (depending on the child) before 
reaching the state-defined minimum age for school exit, the Court made 
clear that its acquiescence was due to consideration of the public school 
education the children had already received together with the Amish 
families’ intention to continue the children’s education by preparing them 
for useful occupations within their community.164 The case is often viewed 
as creating the template for home-schooling laws, which do not allow 
                                                                                                                     
159 See Weithorn, Envisioning, supra note 109, at 235–36 (listing compulsory education and child 
labor productions following the introduction of parens patriae and police power). 
160 Id. at 235. 
161 Id. 
162 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (“[E]ducation provides the basic tools by which 
individuals might lead economically productive lives to the benefit of us all . . . [and] has a fundamental 
role in maintaining the fabric of our society.”); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963) 
(Brennan, J., concurring) (regarding “the public schools as a most vital civic institution for the 
preservation of a democratic system of government”); Elizabeth Lamura, Our Children, Ourselves: 
Ensuring the Education of America’s At-Risk Youth, 31 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 117, 117 (2013) 
(“Education is essential, not only to each individual child, but to the nation as a whole.”). 
163 See Prince, 321 U.S. at 168–69 (referring to “the crippling effects of child employment” and 
stating that “legislation appropriately designed to reach such evils is within the state’s police power, 
whether against the parents [sic] claim to control of the child or one that religious scruples dictate contrary 
action”). 
164 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 235 (1972). 
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wholesale exemptions from educational mandates, but require parents to 
satisfy minimum standards under state regulations.165 
In Prince v. Massachusetts, a case in which the Court upheld a state 
child labor regulation as applied to a Jehovah’s Witness who allowed her 
ward to sell religious newspapers in public, it stated: “[N]either rights of 
religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond limitation. Acting to guard the 
general interest in youth’s well-being, the state as parens patriae may 
restrict the parent’s control . . . .”166 Relative to the police power, the Court 
reinforced that “the family itself is not beyond regulation in the public 
interest.”167 And, in dicta that zeros in on the issue that is the focus of this 
Article, citing conjoined police power and parens patriae concerns, the 
Court indicated that parental rights do “not include liberty to expose the 
community or the child to communicable disease or the latter to ill health or 
death.”168  
Indeed, although deference to parental health care choices for their 
children is the default under our legal system, parental discretion is not 
unlimited, and parental choices may be overridden where parents’ decisions 
are deemed to endanger their children’s welfare169 or the public’s health.170 
When a health care intervention is necessary to serve both the parens patriae 
and police power interests, as in the case of preventing the spread of a 
contagious disease that endangers the health of the child to be immunized 
                                                                                                                     
165 David M. Smolin, State Regulation of Private Education: Ohio Law in the Shadow of the United 
States Supreme Court Decisions, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 1003, 1012–13 (1986). See also Louis A. 
Greenfield, Religious Home-Schools: That’s Not a Monkey on Your Back, It’s a Compelling State 
Interest, 9 RUTGERS J. L. & RELIGION 1, 5 (2007) (“One of the major impacts of Yoder is essentially the 
showing that home-schooling is valid. However, . . . home-schooling is not without its restrictions.”). 
166 Prince, 321 U.S. at 166–67 (“[T]he state has a wide range of power for limiting parental freedom 
and authority in things affecting the child’s welfare . . . .”). 
167 Id. at 166. 
168 Id. at 166–67. 
169 See, e.g., Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108, 1110 (Del. 1991) (stating that a parent’s right 
to make important decisions for their children is not absolute); Custody of a Minor, 379 N.E.2d 1053, 
1056 (Mass. 1978) (overriding parents’ decision to refuse chemotherapy treatment for their child with 
leukemia). State civil and criminal child maltreatment statutes stipulate that parents are obliged to provide 
their children with adequate medical care, and that failure to do so can result in a finding of medical 
neglect. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess. ch. 
524) (stating that the juvenile court may determine a child is a dependent of the court if “the child has 
suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious harm or illness . . . by the willful 
or negligent failure of the parent or guardian to provide the child with adequate . . . medical treatment”). 
For a summary and analysis of medical neglect laws, see SAMUEL M. DAVIS ET AL., CHILDREN IN THE 
LEGAL SYSTEM 573–618 (5th ed. 2014). 
170 See Garcia v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 106 N.E.3d 1187, 1196 (N.Y. Ct. App. 
2018) (upholding New York City Board of Health regulations mandating influenza vaccine for certain 
populations of students, stating that “the rules challenged here do not relate merely to a personal choice 
about an individual’s own health but, rather, seek to ensure increased public safety and health for the 
citizenry by reducing the prevalence and spread of a contagious infectious disease within a particularly 
vulnerable population”); see also Brown v. Smith, 235 Cal. Rptr. 3d 218, 225 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018) 
(distinguishing Yoder as a situation which did not involve risks to the public’s safety or welfare).  
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and of the larger community, and the risk to the child from the immunization 
is extremely low, the case for overriding parental discretion is exceptionally 
strong.171 We have asserted elsewhere that the “current mandatory 
vaccination requirements for children are justified by a robust alliance of 
police power and parens patriae state concerns, which in the context of state 
regulation of children’s lives confers breathtakingly broad authority to 
override parental decisionmaking” by requiring parents to vaccinate their 
children prior to school entry.172 One can analogize the convergence of the 
parens patriae and police power interests in the context of mandatory 
vaccination laws to the policies underlying compulsory education and child 
labor laws.173 This convergence of parens patriae and police power interests 
in the context of required childhood vaccinations distinguishes such medical 
interventions from the typical context in which parents retain substantial 
discretion in making health care decisions for their minor children (that is, 
when parens patriae interests alone are balanced against parental 
decisionmaking discretion).174 Given this convergence of interests, the 
analogy holds as well when considering our proposal to authorize older 
minors to access these interventions independently.    
The constitutional framework discussed thus far presumes a dyadic 
balancing of interests between parents and the state and assumes that these 
two parties’ interests in the child’s welfare will yield a result that serves the 
child’s best interests. Some commentators have challenged this model, 
critiquing the absence of the “child’s voice,” arguing that children’s interests 
are not adequately represented when disputes are framed primarily or solely 
as contests between the parents and the state.175 Justice William O. Douglas 
                                                                                                                     
171 See Chemerinsky & Goodwin, supra note 140, at 610 (asserting that compulsory vaccination 
laws satisfy strict scrutiny).  
172 Reiss & Weithorn, Responding to the Childhood Vaccination Crisis, supra note 7, at 912. 
173 Id. at 914.  
The primary prevention model driving today’s mandatory vaccination of children can 
be closely analogized to the forward-looking goals of compulsory school attendance 
and restrictions on child labor. In these contexts, the policies, while seeking to provide 
benefits and prevent harms to children contemporaneous with the restrictions, also 
emphasize long-term benefits to the children and to society. Many of these benefits 
are to be realized when the children become adults. Thus, although child labor 
restrictions were motivated in part to protect children from the immediate risks of 
workplace dangers, concerns about children’s overall socialization and availability for 
educational opportunities predominate in justifying these regulations in modern times. 
Id. 
174 The Prince Court emphasized that parents’ discretion in making decisions for their children is 
far narrower than the discretion adults can exercise when making decisions about their own lives: 
“Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow they are free, in identical 
circumstances, to make martyrs of their children before they have reached the age of full and legal 
discretion when they can make that choice for themselves.” Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 
(1944). 
175 See generally Leonard P. Edwards & Inger J. Sagatun, Who Speaks for the Child?, 
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famously challenged the Supreme Court majority’s application of a dyadic 
balancing test in Wisconsin v. Yoder in a dissent asserting that the 
preferences of the three minor children, whose education was at the center 
of the case, should have figured into the Court’s analysis.176 The Court began 
to engage, increasingly, in “triadic balancing” of the interests of parents, the 
state, and children as it recognized that minors have constitutionally 
cognizable interests and must be treated as constitutional actors in certain 
legal disputes.177   
In the health care context, there are perhaps two separate sets of minors’ 
interests at stake: (1) the interest in health and the preservation of one’s life 
and (2) the interest in autonomous decisionmaking regarding one’s health 
care, commensurate with their psychological capacities in certain 
circumstances. 
i. Children’s Interest in Health and Preservation of Life 
According to one state supreme court: “All children indisputably have 
the right to enjoy a full and healthy life.”178 Typically, in legal analyses, the 
state articulates the interests in children’s good health and survival. The state 
asserts interests in preserving human life179 and promoting the “healthy . . . 
growth of young people into full maturity.”180 Yet, as those cases that 
perform triadic analyses of interests reveal, minors have strong independent 
interests in these goals as well. The independent interests of minors in 
continued life and good health are aligned with the state’s interests in 
promoting minors’ freedom from the harmful effects of life-threatening and 
                                                                                                                     
2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 67 (1995); Donald H. Stone, The Dangers of Psychotropic Medication 
for Mentally Ill Children: Where Is the Child’s Voice in Consenting to Medication? An Empirical Study, 
23 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 121 (2013); Elaine E. Sutherland, Listening to the Child’s Voice in the 
Family Setting: From Aspiration to Reality, 26 CHILD & FAM. L. Q. 152 (2014). Recognizing the 
importance of independent consideration of the “child’s voice” is but a first step. Debates often follow 
on the question of how to access children’s independent interests. For example, there are multiple models 
that influence the ways in which children’s interests are represented by lawyers in child protection cases. 
See, e.g., Josh Gupta-Kagan, Child Protection Law as an Independent Variable, 54 FAM. CT. REV. 398, 
403 (2016).  
176 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 241 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). But see Emily Buss, 
What Does Frieda Yoder Believe?, 24 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 53, 53 (1999) (questioning whether direct 
elicitation of children’s views ultimately serves their interest in the context of free exercise rights).  
177 See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979). For 
discussion of a triadic framework recognizing children’s developmental interests as distinct from 
interests of parents and the state, see William Galston, Parents, Government, and Children: Authority 
Over Education in a Pluralist Liberal Democracy, 5 LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 284 (2011). For a 
discussion of a “tripartite framework” that reconceptualizes the legal positions of the parties, see Anne 
C. Dailey & Laura A. Rosenbury, The New Law of the Child, 127 YALE L.J. 1448, 1506 (2017). 
178 Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108, 1116 (Del. 1991). 
179 Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 282 (1990) (holding that the state may “assert 
an unqualified interest in the preservation of human life to be weighed against” other constitutionally 
protected interests); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735–36 (1997) (same).  
180 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944). 
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other serious diseases.181 Indeed, state requirements for vaccination of 
children prior to school entry serves those ends.182    
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, which was 
unanimously adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 1989, devotes 
several articles to articulating children’s human rights to “enjoyment of the 
highest attainable standard of health,” and that “no child is deprived of his 
or her right of access to” health care services that include “preventive health 
care.”183 Various scholars have concurred with the basic premise that access 
to adequate health care is a “human right,” that is, something to which “we 
are entitled, simply by virtue of our humanity.”184 The poor performance of 
the United States in meeting the health care needs of its citizens, relative to 
other industrialized nations, has been the subject of much analysis, 
commentary, and criticism.185 We do not revisit that discussion here. Rather, 
                                                                                                                     
181 See, e.g., Custody of a Minor, 379 N.E.2d 1053, 1066 (Mass. 1978) (holding that a child whose 
parents rejected life-saving chemotherapy treatment had a “long-term interest in leading a normal, 
healthy life,” converging with the state’s strong interest in preserving human life, and justifying judicial 
order overriding parental refusal of highly effective treatment for their child’s leukemia). 
182 For a detailed discussion of the ways in which the law can protect the interests of children in the 
context of vaccinations, see Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, Rights of the Unvaccinated Child, 73 STUD. L. POL. 
& SOC’Y 73, 75 (2017).  
183 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 24, Nov. 22, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.   
See also id. art. 23 (recognizing rights of the disabled child to treatment); id. art. 25 (recognizing the right 
of a child in state custody for treatment of physical or mental health). The United States signed the 
Convention in 1995 but did not ratify it. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, UNITED NATIONS 
TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-
11&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Mar. 16, 2020); What Is the Difference Between Signing, 
Ratification, and Accession of UN Treaties?, DAG HAMMARSKJÖLD LIBR. (Apr. 26, 2018), 
http://ask.un.org/faq/14594. While becoming a signatory indicates a nation’s support in principle for the 
tenets set forth in a treaty, ratification indicates the nation’s consent to be bound by the provisions. 
Although most federal and state laws in the United States are consistent with the Convention’s provisions, 
some are not. In particular, the legality of corporal punishment and harsh sentencing policies affecting 
minors are cited as inconsistent with the Convention. Why Won’t America Ratify the UN Convention on 
Children’s Rights?, ECONOMIST (Oct. 7, 2013), https://www.economist.com/the-economist-
explains/2013/10/06/why-wont-america-ratify-the-un-convention-on-childrens-rights.  
184 Mary Gerisch, Health Care as a Human Right, 43 HUM. RTS. 2, 2 (2018); see also George J. 
Annas & Wendy K. Mariner, (Public) Health and Human Rights in Practice, 41 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y 
& L. 129, 136 (2016) (observing that the goals of the human rights and public health frameworks are 
aligned “to promote human flourishing”); Andrea S. Christopher & Dominic Caruso, Promoting Health 
as a Human Right in the Post-ACA United States, 17 AMA J. ETHICS 958, 958 (2015) (citing the World 
Health Organization’s constitutional declaration for “the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of 
health” and noting that this “is one of the fundamental rights of every human being”); Benjamin Mason 
Meier et al., Human Rights in Public Health: Deepening Engagement at a Critical Time, 20 HEALTH & 
HUM. RTS. J. 85, 86 (2018) (citing and endorsing the United Nations World Health Organization 
Constitution: “the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental rights 
of every human being”); Richard Smith et al., Shared Ethical Principles for Everybody in Health Care: 
A Working Draft from Tavistock Group, 318 BMJ 248, 250 (1999) (listing health care as a human right 
and an ethical principle that should govern healthcare systems).  
185 See, e.g., KAREN DAVIS ET AL., COMMONWEALTH FUND, MIRROR, MIRROR ON THE WALL: HOW 
THE PERFORMANCE OF THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM COMPARES INTERNATIONALLY (2014), 
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/sites/default/files/documents/___media_files_publications_fund_r
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we offer the less controversial and relatively straightforward proposition 
that, where there exists a cost-effective high benefit/low risk intervention 
that can protect a child from a serious and potentially life-threatening 
disease, unjustified barriers to that child’s access to that intervention cannot 
be given legal authority.186 Thus, in our view, allowing parents to block 
children’s receipt of medically recommended vaccinations unfairly risks 
those children’s right to health and life.187 As such, any analysis of the 
interests of parents, children, and the state must recognize and weigh heavily 
children’s independent interest in access to these easily available, 
cost-effective, health-promoting, and life-preserving interventions. 
ii. Children’s Autonomy Interest in Making Certain Health 
Care Decisions 
There exist strong arguments that minors have a right to choose for 
themselves in some health care contexts. The foundation for that right varies 
across types of treatment as well in judicial analysis and scholarly 
commentary. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that the 
Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in controlling one’s own procreative 
processes extends to minor females.188 While the Court has indicated that 
minors’ rights are not identical to those of adults because of the balance of 
these rights with parental and state interests,189 minors clearly have a strong 
interest in exercising some measure of personal choice in the context of 
contraception, abortion, and prenatal health decisions. The Court has not 
spoken directly as to whether minors have an interest in bodily integrity that 
confers an autonomy interest in accessing or rejecting forms of treatment 
other than those relating to procreation. It has, however, in cases involving 
adults in other contexts, made clear that there exist rights to refuse 
                                                                                                                     
eport_2014_jun_1755_davis_mirror_mirror_2014.pdf (analyzing the performance of health care systems 
in eleven countries).  
186 B. Jessie Hill, Constituting Children’s Bodily Integrity, 64 DUKE L.J. 1295, 1356 (2015) 
(proposing a right to bodily integrity that, “[f]or younger minors, the right takes the form of a right to 
bodily security or protection—broadly, a right to have their best interests protected by the state against 
parents who fail to do so. For older, mature minors, the right becomes primarily an autonomy right to 
make their own decisions about their bodies when, and to the extent that, they are capable of doing so”). 
187 Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108, 1116 (Del. 1991) (“All children indisputably have the 
right to enjoy a full and healthy life.”); (United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 23, 
Nov. 22, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (highlighting children’s rights “to enjoy a full and decent life”).      
188 See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 647 (1979) (recognizing a minor female’s constitutional 
liberty interest in controlling her own procreative decisions); Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. 
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (same).  
189 Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 418 (1990); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 422 (1981) 
(Stevens, J., concurring); Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 622–23. 
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life-saving interventions,190 psychotropic medications,191 and commitment 
in a psychiatric hospital.192 Lower federal and state court decisions and state 
statutes have clarified that competent adults have an almost unqualified right 
to refuse treatment,193 except where doing so interferes with a weighty police 
power interest.194 And while our legal system does not confer an 
uncategorical and parallel right to receive treatment on all persons in all 
situations, including minors, certain policies seek to reduce barriers to 
treatment.195 Many scholars have argued that denial of available treatment 
to requesting minors solely due to the individual’s minority unfairly deprives 
minors of certain inherent human rights, whether or not those rights are 
constitutionally protected.196 
The concept of empowering minors to choose for themselves, 
commensurate with their capacities for making competent health care 
decisions, is not a new one.197 For example, many scholars have proposed 
                                                                                                                     
190 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (“In a long line of cases, we have held 
that, in addition to the specific freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, the ‘liberty’ specially protected 
by the Due Process Clause includes [various rights to obtain or refuse certain treatments] . . . . We have 
also assumed, and strongly suggested, that the Due Process Clause protects the traditional right to refuse 
unwanted lifesaving medical treatment.”); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 262 (1990) 
(“For purposes of this case, it is assumed that a competent person would have a constitutionally protected 
right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition.”). 
191 See, e.g., Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 133–34 (1992) (holding that there is a significant 
liberty interest in avoiding unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs under the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221–22 (1990) (same). 
192 See, e.g., O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975) (“[T]here is . . . no constitutional 
basis for confining [mentally ill] persons involuntarily if they are dangerous to no one and can live safely 
in freedom.”). 
193 See, e.g., Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 300 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (“[A] patient 
has the right to refuse any medical treatment or medical service . . . . This right exists even if its exercise 
creates a ‘life threatening condition.’”). 
194 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905) (“According to settled principles, the police 
power of a State must be held to embrace, at least, such reasonable regulations established directly by 
legislative enactment as will protect the public health and the public safety.”); Workman v. Mingo Cty. 
Bd. of Educ., 419 F. App’x 348, 353–54 (4th Cir. 2011) (“[F]ollowing the reasoning 
of Jacobson and Prince, we conclude that the West Virginia statute requiring vaccinations as a condition 
of admission to school does not unconstitutionally infringe Workman’s right to free exercise.”); Boone 
v. Boozman, 217 F. Supp. 2d 938, 955–56 (E.D. Ark. 2002) (citing Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279) 
(“[D]etermining that a person has a ‘liberty interest’ under the Due Process Clause does not end the 
inquiry; whether [an individual’s] constitutional rights have been violated must be determined by 
balancing his liberty interests against the relevant state interests.”).  
195 See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18116) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, 
sex, age, or disability in certain health programs or activities). See generally Children’s Health Act of 
2000, Pub. L. No. 106-310, 114 Stat. 1101 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C., 21 
U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 25 U.S.C.). 
196 See supra notes 184–87 and accompanying text. 
197 Although neuroscientific and psychological research have led scholars and the U.S. Supreme 
Court to conclude that adolescents’ immaturity should preclude the imposition of the death penalty and 
other harsh criminal sentences on minors, researchers and other scholars distinguish questions of 
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such a principle, although there are a range of views as to what the triggering 
circumstances and restrictions should be for reliance on minors’ capacities 
as the bases for authorizing their independent health care decisionmaking.198  
For all of the reasons discussed in Section II.A above, we do not propose a 
comprehensive shift in the default framework that authorizes parents to 
make health care decisions for their minor children. Yet, as the remainder of 
this Section demonstrates, there are circumstances in which exceptions to 
the default rule are warranted. Indeed, when it is determined that parents 
should not be sole decision makers in a particular health care context, for 
one reason or another, legislatures or courts must identify the alternative 
mechanism by which the health care choice can be made.199 Depending on  
the treatment context and other variables, such as the age and maturity of the 
children in question, authorizing minors to make autonomous decisions 
regarding their own health may be the most appropriate policy solution.200 
In the specific context of the choice to vaccinate, we propose that as a 
supplementary and alternative consent mechanism, older minors be 
authorized to decide for themselves at the ages when their psychological 
capacities have matured sufficiently to enable them to satisfy the legal 
requirements for competent informed consent. As such, we bring our 
proposal in line with various exceptions to the doctrine of parental consent 
which operate in a manner analogous to our proposed exception. These 
exceptions and others are discussed below in Section II.B.2. In addition, our 
proposal is consistent with the relevant provisions of the first Restatement 
of the Children and the Law. In 2019, the American Law Institute adopted 
Section 19.01.201 Section 19.01 would authorize a minor “who is capable of 
                                                                                                                     
treatment decisionmaking capacity from those relevant to the criminal sentencing context. This 
juxtaposition is addressed further below in Section III.B.2. 
198 See, e.g., Vivian E. Hamilton, Immature Citizens and the State, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1055, 1136–
39 (arguing that in the context of most medical decisions, minors should have decisionmaking authority 
consistent with their psychological capacities to decide competently); Rhonda Gay Hartman, Adolescent 
Autonomy: Clarifying an Ageless Conundrum, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1265, 1269 (2000) (proposing that 
adolescent decisionmaking autonomy correspond to decisional ability in a range of areas of law); Hill, 
supra note 186, at 1356 (suggesting that “[f]or older, mature minors, the right becomes primarily an 
autonomy right to make their own decisions about their bodies when, and to the extent that, they are 
capable of doing so”); Rosato, supra note 132, at 804 (proposing varying levels of decisionmaking 
autonomy of minors depending on those minors’ capacities and the nature and consequences of the 
particular health care decision); Neelam Chhikara, Note, Extending the Practice of Physician-Assisted 
Suicide to Competent Minors, 55 FAM. CT. REV. 430, 439 (2017) (proposing that physician aid in dying 
laws be extended to minors who meet the same capacity standards as adults, with no requirement of 
parental consent). 
199 Lois A. Weithorn, When Does a Minor’s Legal Competence to Make Health Care Decisions 
Matter?, PEDIATRICS (forthcoming in Special Issue Defining Cases in Pediatric Bioethics: Future 
Insights from Past Controversies) (manuscript at 2) (on file with author) [hereinafter Weithorn, When 
Does a Minor’s Legal Competence Matter?]. 
200 Id. 
201 RESTATEMENT OF CHILDREN AND THE LAW § 19.01 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft Two 
2019). 
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giving informed consent to the proposed treatment” the authority to “consent 
to routine, beneficial medical treatment.”202 As we have demonstrated in Part 
I, ACIP-recommended vaccinations are indeed “routine” and “beneficial” 
medical interventions. 
2. The Exceptions 
We identify three sets of circumstances justifying exceptions to the 
doctrine of parental consent. These exceptions exist when legislatures or 
courts determine that, relative to a particular health care decision, one or 
more of the following conditions exists: (1) parents’ interests in exercising 
authority over the child’s health care are outweighed by the state’s parens 
patriae or police power interests in the child’s welfare and/or the child’s 
independent (and possibly constitutionally protected) interests in health care 
decisional autonomy; (2) the presumption that parents are acting, are capable 
of acting, or are situated to act to promote their children’s best interests 
relative to a health care decision does not accurately reflect the 
circumstances; and/or (3) the presumption that minors are incompetent to 
decide for themselves is not supported by the evidence. Importantly, though, 
the third condition is typically not the sole basis on which an exception is 
grounded. More commonly, the capacity of minors to decide for themselves 
becomes relevant only after constitutional or policy considerations lead to 
rejection or modification of the parental consent requirement.203 At that 
point, the capacities of minors to decide becomes a factor in determining 
what is the most appropriate alternative or supplementary decisional 
structure. Should minors be empowered to choose or should others (such as 
the court or a court-appointed guardian) be authorized to decide on the 
minor’s behalf? We discuss below three primary alternative decisionmaking 
mechanisms: medical neglect proceedings, the mature minor doctrine, and 
treatment-specific statutory exceptions. 
i. State Dependency Statutes: Case-by-Case Substitution of 
the State as Decisionmaker for the Child Under Medical 
Neglect Provisions 
All fifty states and the District of Columbia have created legal 
mechanisms authorizing state intervention in the family in circumstances 
when parents are determined to fall below minimum standards of caregiving 
for their minor children.204 The state’s parens patriae and police power 
                                                                                                                     
202 Id. 
203 Weithorn, When Does a Minor’s Legal Competence Matter?, supra note 199 (manuscript at 3). 
204 SAMUEL M. DAVIS, ELIZABETH S. SCOTT, LOIS A. WEITHORN & WALTER WADLINGTON, 
CHILDREN IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM  439–600 (6th ed. 2020); Lois A. Weithorn, Protecting Children from 
Exposure to Domestic Violence: The Use and Abuse of Child Maltreatment Statutes, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 
1, 54 (2001) [hereinafter Weithorn, Protecting Children]; Weithorn, Envisioning, supra note 109, at 
1323–24; see generally CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
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interests in protecting children from harm and risk of harm permit this 
intrusion into the family. The procedures and substantive standards 
delineating dependency system intervention must meet constitutional 
requirements.205 The legal framework is grounded on a model that requires 
individual case-by-case judicial findings of abuse or neglect prior to state 
substitution as decision maker on any of a wide range of childrearing 
matters, including health care decisions.206 If the court finds that there is 
sufficient evidence of abuse or neglect for it to assume jurisdiction over the 
child, the statutes confer on the state broad authority to regulate the child’s 
life and to supervise the parents’ activities relative to the child.207 The 
investigations, proceedings, and interventions are highly intrusive in the 
family’s functioning and are premised on a finding of parental unfitness.208 
As such, this type of intervention should be invoked only when necessary to 
protect the child from serious harm, where other, less intrusive legal 
strategies have not been, or are unlikely to be, effective. Such interventions 
are most appropriate when parental failure to meet children’s health care 
needs is but one aspect of a more pervasive pattern of a failure to meet 
minimum caregiving standards or where ongoing state supervision of, and 
intervention in, parenting appears necessary to protect the child. When the 
only aspect of parenting that is endangering the child is the failure to 
immunize children from vaccine-preventable diseases, such an option 
should be viewed as an intervention of last resort and a preference given to 
less intrusive options.209  
                                                                                                                     
DEFINITIONS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT (2019), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/ 
define.pdf (describing laws that define child abuse and neglect). 
205 Roe v. Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769, 778 (M.D. Ala. 1969); DAVIS ET AL., supra note 204, at 522–
31; Weithorn, Protecting Children, supra note 204, at 63–64. 
206 DAVIS ET AL., supra note 204, at 573–618; Martha Minow, Beyond State Intervention in the 
Family: For Baby Jane Doe, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 933, 937 (1985); Weithorn, Protecting Children, 
supra note 204, at 12–13. 
207 See DAVIS ET AL., supra note 204, at 513–650. 
208 See Michael S. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of “Neglected” Children: Standards for 
Removal of Children from Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care, and 
Termination of Parental Rights, 28 STAN. L. REV. 623, 625–27, 651 (1976).  
209 Certain provisions within dependency statutes permit the state to override parental health care 
decisions without finding parents neglectful, and thus permit a narrower and somewhat less intrusive 
manner of state intervention. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.01(35)(f) (West, Westlaw through 2019 
First Regular Sess. of the 26th Legislature) (noting that in the context of a parental claim of religious 
exemption for the decision not to provide medical treatment for a child, “a parent or legal custodian who, 
by reason of the legitimate practice of religious beliefs, does not provide specified medical treatment for 
a child may not be considered abusive or neglectful for that reason alone, but such an exception does not 
. . . [p]reclude a court from ordering, when the health of the child requires it, the provision of medical 
services by a physician”); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1627(1)(b) (West, Westlaw through 2019 First 
Regular Sess. of the 65th Idaho Legislature 2019) (providing that “[a]t any time whether or not a child is 
under the authority of the court, the court may authorize medical or surgical care for a child when . . . the 
life of the child would be greatly endangered without certain treatment and the parent, guardian or other 
custodian refuses or fails to consent”). Yet this approach requires the initiation of an adversarial dispute, 
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A recent survey of state case law current through 2016 found nine cases 
in which parental failure to vaccinate was alleged to constitute a ground for 
medical neglect findings.210 Policy statements and analyses from committees 
of the American Academy of Pediatrics indicate that resorting to medical 
neglect proceedings is a disfavored response to parental non-vaccination of 
children within the medical community.211 
ii. The “Mature Minor”: Generic Standards in Statute and Case 
Law 
The “mature minor” doctrine is a statutory or case law principle that 
allows minors authority to consent to or reject medical treatment under 
certain circumstances.212 As reviews of state statutes and applicable case law 
reveal, there is substantial variability across the states in terms of whether 
they have adopted any form of a “mature minor” rule and, if so, what the 
parameters are of that rule.213 In those states that have adopted some version 
of the principle and allow “mature minors” to make independent decisions 
about general medical care, the doctrine will generally apply if minors have 
reached a specified age or if judges or medical professionals determine them 
to be sufficiently “mature” to make their own medical decisions.214   
In one of the first scholarly analyses of the doctrine, published in 1973, 
the late Professor Walter Wadlington observed that the cases to which the 
rule had been applied generally involved older minors, that is, “[t]he 
particular minor was near majority (or at least in the range of 15 years of age 
upward), and was considered to have sufficient mental capacity to 
understand fully the nature and importance of the medical steps proposed” 
                                                                                                                     
pitting the state against the parents and requiring judicial resolution. In light of the intrusiveness into the 
family and the reliance on the state’s already overburdened child protection resources, dependency 
system intervention is a disfavored mechanism for promoting vaccination policy when parents refuse to 
immunize their children. 
210 See Efthimios Parasidis & Douglas J. Opel, Parental Refusal of Childhood Vaccines and 
Medical Neglect Laws, 107 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH L. & ETHICS 68, 68 (2017) (reporting nine cases from 
five states, with seven of the nine courts finding vaccine refusals to constitute medical neglect).   
211 See, e.g., Douglas S. Diekema & Comm. on Bioethics, Responding to Parental Refusals of 
Immunization of Children, 115 PEDIATRICS 1428, 1430 (2005) (recommending an educational approach 
in response to parental refusal); Kathryn M. Edwards et al., Countering Vaccine Hesitancy, 138 
PEDIATRICS e20162146, e11 (2016) (recommending, in addition, an educational approach in response to 
parental refusal).  
212  ANGELA RODDEY HOLDER, LEGAL ISSUES IN PEDIATRICS AND ADOLESCENT MEDICINE 133–
42 (2d ed. 1985); Coleman & Rosoff, supra note 15, at 787; Aviva L. Katz & Sally A. Webb, Informed 
Consent in Decision-Making in Pediatric Practice, 138 PEDIATRICS e20161485, 4 (2016); Rosato, supra 
note 132, at 779; Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 547, 
567 (2000); Walter Wadlington, Minors and Health Care: The Age of Consent, 11 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 
115, 117 (1973). 
213 See, e.g., Coleman & Rosoff, supra note 15, at 789–91 tbl.1 (detailing each state’s provision for 
minors’ consent).  
214 Id. at 789.   
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and the “medical procedures could be characterized by the courts as 
something less than ‘major’ or ‘serious’ in nature.”215 In the decades since 
Professor Wadlington’s seminal article, the generic form of the doctrine has 
not been widely adopted.216 Yet, the circumstances in which it has been 
applied have, in limited instances, expanded to those in which the treatment 
decision was both “major” and “serious,” such as allowing minors with good 
prognoses to refuse lifesaving transfusions for religious reasons.217  
States’ initial adoptions of “mature minor” rules were a means to 
eliminate legal liability of health care professionals treating minors in 
circumstances when parents were unavailable or unwilling to consent.218 
Yet, in the last several decades, some commentators in the fields of law and 
bioethics have asserted that minors should be authorized to make 
autonomous decisions regarding their own bodies if they are psychologically 
capable of making those decisions.219  
Yet, the meaning of the term “maturity” in this context is not completely 
clear.220 Some statutes and case law indicate or imply that the term 
“maturity” in this context is a synonym for health care decisionmaking 
capacity or competence.221 Treatment decisionmaking competence is  
                                                                                                                     
215 Wadlington, supra note 212, at 119. 
216 See, e.g., Coleman & Rosoff, supra note 15, at 789 (indicating that “14 states permit mature 
minors to consent to general medical treatment either in all or a range of restricted circumstances, and 3 
states allow minors regardless of their age or maturity to consent to treatment in either all or limited 
circumstances”); Rosato, supra note 132, at 779–82 (observing that “[e]fforts to adopt a true mature 
minor doctrine have been limited” and discussing the limitations of the doctrine within those states that 
have statutes or recognized the doctrine in case law). 
217 See, e.g., In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322, 323, 328 (Ill. 1989) (allowing a seventeen-year-old who 
was determined by the court to be “mature,” to refuse lifesaving blood transfusions on religious grounds, 
despite a predicted 80% likelihood of remission of leukemia with full treatment compliance); Douglas S. 
Diekema, Adolescent Refusal of Lifesaving Treatment: Are We Asking the Right Questions?, 22 
ADOLESCENT MED. 213, 213 (2011) (discussing the case of Dennis Lindberg, a fourteen-year-old with 
leukemia who, like E.G., (1) objected to blood transfusions because of adherence to the tenets of the 
Jehovah’s Witnesses; (2) had an excellent prognosis with treatment (predicted 70% chance of remission); 
and (3) was determined by the court to be mature enough to make the treatment decision independently); 
Weithorn, When Does a Minor’s Legal Competence Matter?, supra note 199 (manuscript at 12–13).   
218 HOLDER, supra note 212, at 133–35; Coleman & Rosoff, supra note 15, at 789.   
219 See Hamilton, supra note 198, at 1136–39; Hartman, supra note 198, at 1269; Hill, supra note 
186, at 1356; Rosato, supra note 132, at 804; Chhikara, supra note 198, at 439. The empirical research 
revealing that older adolescents can demonstrate adult-like levels of psychological competence to make 
treatment decisions is reviewed below. See infra notes 344–72 and accompanying text. 
220 Shawna Benston, Not of Minor Consequence?: Medical Decision-Making Autonomy and the 
Mature Minor Doctrine, 13 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 1, 3–8 (2016); Coleman & Rosoff, supra note 15, at 
789–90. 
221 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-9-602(7) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Regular Sess. of the 
92d Arkansas General Assembly) (authorizing “[a]ny unemancipated minor of sufficient intelligence to 
understand and appreciate the consequences of the proposed surgical or medical treatment or procedures” 
to consent to such medical or surgical care for himself or herself); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-4503 (West, 
Westlaw through 2019 First Regular Sess. of the 65th Idaho Legislature) (authorizing “[a]ny person . . . 
who comprehends the need for, the nature of and the significant risks ordinarily inherent in any 
contemplated hospital . . . or other health care . . . to consent thereto on his or her own behalf” (emphasis 
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generally viewed as a cognitive standard, emphasizing the individuals’ 
ability to understand, appreciate, and make decisions based on the treatment 
information disclosed by the health care practitioner.222 The standard 
competence inquiry is relatively circumscribed, focusing on capacity to 
make the specific decision at issue, without a broader inquiry into the 
patient’s life functioning in other spheres. It is that laid out by the 
commentary to the 1979 Restatement of Torts (Second):  
To be effective, the consent must be given by one who has the 
capacity to give it or by a person empowered to consent for 
him. If the person consenting is a child or one of deficient 
mental capacity, the consent may still be effective if he is 
capable of appreciating the nature, extent and probable 
consequences of the conduct consented to, although the 
consent of a parent, guardian or other person responsible is not 
obtained or is expressly refused.223  
 In 2019, the American Law Institute approved provisions of its new 
Restatement of Children and the Law, and adopted the treatment 
competence-oriented definition of a “mature minor” as one who is “capable 
of giving informed consent to the proposed treatment.”224 The treatment 
competence-oriented approach to maturity was articulated by the Maine 
Supreme Court in In re Swan, when noting that “[c]apacity exists when the 
minor has the ability of the average person to understand and weigh the risks 
and benefits.”225 The court then proceeded to cite the language of the 
Restatement of Torts commentary above.226 Yet, in some cases, judges have 
laid out two sets of standards: the more familiar treatment decisionmaking 
competence or capacity standard and a broader maturity standard.227 This 
broader maturity standard strives to capture a host of social, emotional, and 
psychological factors in addition to cognitive health care decisionmaking 
skills. For example, the Tennessee Supreme Court in Cardwell v. Bechtol 
considered:  
the age, ability, experience, education, training, and degree of 
maturity or judgment obtained by the minor, [and] the conduct 
                                                                                                                     
added)); In re Swan, 569 A.2d 1202, 1205 (Me. 1990) (per curium) (holding that a minor has capacity to 
consent or refuse treatment when “the minor has the ability of the average person to understand and 
weigh the risks and benefits” and “if he is capable of appreciating the nature, extent, and probable 
consequences of the conduct consented to”).   
222 See infra Section III.B.1. 
223 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1979).   
224 RESTATEMENT OF CHILDREN AND THE LAW §19.01 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft Two 2019). 
225 569 A.2d 1202, 1205 (Me. 1990) (per curiam) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 
226 Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1979)).  
227 See, e.g., Belcher v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., 422 S.E.2d 827, 836–37 (W. Va. 1992); 
Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739, 748 (Tenn. 1987) (comparing standards). 
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and demeanor of the minor at the time of the incident involved. 
Moreover, the totality of the circumstances, the nature of the 
treatment and its risks or probable consequences, and the 
minor’s ability to appreciate the risks and consequences are to 
be considered.228  
There is a rich body of scholarship and empirical research 
operationalizing notions of treatment decisionmaking competence and 
measuring minors’ capacities to make health care decisions. Yet, it is unclear 
how an evaluator—whether a health care professional or a judge—should 
assess the broad spectrum of additional variables cited in the above quotation 
from Cardwell v. Bechtol. Indeed, in those cases in which the broader 
“maturity” standard is suggested, the courts lay out an extraordinarily 
sweeping and open-ended list of factors such as “age, ability, experience, 
education, training, and degree of maturity or judgment.”229  
The concept of “maturity” as a condition for independent health care 
decisionmaking by minors has existed in the context of abortion law for 
decades,230 and thus, theoretically, could serve as a useful model. 
Unfortunately, the abortion context provides a poor guide or analogy for 
delineating what “maturity” means, in that there is no consensus about, or 
even systematic discussion of, the standard. Some have proposed that the 
concept of maturity in the context of abortion be focused on competence to 
make health care treatment decisions.231 Indeed, the Restatement of Children 
and the Law adopts this competence-based definition of maturity in the 
context of minor’s abortion decisionmaking.232  
Yet, unfortunately, the controversial nature of abortion law in this 
country, and the range of viewpoints about regulation of adolescent sexual 
activity, appear to influence judicial assessments of minors’ maturity in the 
courtroom. Indeed, some judges impose an unattainably high standard of 
                                                                                                                     
228 Cardwell, 724 S.W.2d at 748. 
229 Id.  
230 In Bellotti v. Baird, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the parental consent requirement where 
states provided a procedure allowing minors to demonstrate maturity to a judge as one means to bypass 
the requirement. 443 U.S. 662, 623 (1979) (plurality opinion). Many states have, therefore, codified this 
requirement. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 16-34-2-4(e) (West, Westlaw through 2020 Second Regular Sess. of 
the 121st General Assembly) (allowing a minor to bypass parental consent requirement for abortion if 
she can demonstrate to a court that she is mature enough to make the abortion decision, or that having 
the abortion is in her best interests). Other sections of this statute were struck down as unconstitutional 
in Planned Parenthood v. Comm’r, Ind. Dep’t of Health, 258 F. Supp. 3d 929 (S.D. Ind. 2017).  
231 Gary B. Melton & Anita J. Pliner, Adolescent Abortion: A Psycholegal Analysis, in ADOLESCENT 
ABORTION: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES 1, 11–12, 18–19 (Gary B. Melton ed., 1986). 
232 RESTATEMENT OF CHILDREN AND THE LAW §19.02 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft Two 2019) 
(defining a “mature minor” as one who is “capable of giving informed consent to the proposed medical 
treatment,” and authorizing mature minors to consent independently to abortion and to choose whether 
her parents are notified of her choice). 
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maturity233 seemingly entangled with judicial values and attitudes toward 
abortion and teenage sexuality.234 Thus, the maturity standard applied in the 
context of adolescent abortion provides a poor model for more general 
application to minors’ health care decisionmaking.235 
The inherent malleability of the concept of “maturity” as the key that 
opens the door to health care decisionmaking choices for minors may allow 
it to embody social preferences regarding access or barriers to treatment for 
minors.236 The broader and vaguer the test of maturity, the greater is the 
                                                                                                                     
233 Indeed, Elizabeth Scott refers to the maturity test in the context of abortion bypass hearings to 
be a “rather vague prescription” and “indeterminate legal standard,” and observes:  
[J]udicial judgments about where the line between childhood and adulthood should 
be drawn often seem to depend on attitudes about abortion and teen pregnancy. Some 
conservative courts raise the bar very high, evaluating petitioners under a standard for 
general maturity that most minors are unlikely to meet. One is sometimes left to 
conclude that a “mature” minor would have consulted with her parents (and thus have 
no need for the judicial by-pass procedure), and probably would never have been 
foolish enough to become pregnant. Other courts appear to rubber-stamp petitions by 
pregnant teens [and seem] motivated largely by a paternalistic concern for the health 
and welfare of pregnant minors [who may otherwise go on to become teen parents], 
rather than by any deference for adolescent autonomy. 
Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 547, 574–75 
(2000) (internal citations omitted).  
234 For example, Carol Sanger indicates: 
To determine if [a minor] is mature enough [to make the abortion decision], a number 
of judges ask what they consider to be relevant questions about her circumstances. 
These often include such questions as why she got pregnant, whether she knows about 
birth control now so that this will not happen again, and why she will not involve her 
parents in the process. . . . I suspect that the purpose of these hearings is less an attempt 
to assure a sound decision regarding the abortion than it is an attempt to humiliate 
young women—in old socio-legal terms, it is an attempt to use the process itself as 
punishment. The court is supposed to be making a maturity determination, but in 
looking through cases where petitions have been denied, it is evident that something 
more than a display of maturity is sought. Some indication or display of contrition or 
remorse is also valued, and rewarded. 
Carol Sanger, The Role and Reality of Emotions in Law, 8 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 107, 111–12 
(2001) (internal citations omitted). See also Carol Sanger, Decisional Dignity: Teenage Abortion, Bypass 
Hearings, and the Misuse of Law, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 409, 499 (2009) (further developing the 
theme that judicial bypass hearings serve to punish pregnant teens rather than play an evaluative 
function). 
235 Coleman and Rosoff suggest that the criteria used to assess maturity in the abortion context are 
reasonable for assessing minors’ maturity to make health care decisions more generally. Coleman & 
Rosoff, supra note 15, at 792 (citing “aspects of the child’s development and experience including age, 
level of education, success in school, engagement in work or other extracurricular activities, disciplinary 
issues, and future plans”). As in the context of abortion, however, broad criteria invite greater subjectivity 
in application. Furthermore, policy considerations may argue for different standards of maturity in 
different treatment contexts. As discussed below, standards and thresholds of maturity or competence 
may most appropriately vary with the risk/benefit profile of the intervention in question. 
236 Michelle Oberman suggests that the concept of maturity in the context of health care 
decisionmaking “operates as a code word, invoked to permit minors access to treatments that society 
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likelihood that it will serve as a repository for unstated values either about 
the treatment in question or minors’ access to or refusal of it. A narrower 
and more specific standard of maturity, such as one that focuses on skills 
and abilities traditionally associated with capacity to make health care 
decisions, can be more easily operationalized and assessed.  
iii. Treatment-Specific Statutes Authorizing Minors’ 
Independent Access to Treatment 
Throughout the past several decades, legislatures have lowered the age 
of legal consent for minors’ access to certain health care interventions, 
primarily with respect to access to services for contraception, abortion, teen 
pregnancy, mental health and substance abuse disorders, sexually 
transmitted diseases, and sexual assault.237 In contrast to dependency 
determinations, these exceptions to the doctrine of parental consent are not 
premised on a finding of parental unfitness and do not subject the family to 
intrusive investigation and regulation. Rather, most are narrowly tailored 
authorizations for minors to choose for themselves in contexts in which there 
are strong social interests in promoting minors’ access to services.  
The rationales for such statutory enactments include a complex mix of 
constitutional, policy, and practical factors that vary across the types of 
health care involved. However, there are many commonalities among these 
exceptions. First, and importantly, the state has strong parens patriae and 
police power interests in minors’ receipt of the services specified in most of 
these exceptions,238 to be discussed in greater detail with respect to each of 
                                                                                                                     
deems desirable,” and to limit access when there exist social concerns about potential negative 
consequences. Michelle Oberman, Minor Rights and Wrongs, 24 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 127, 127 (1996). 
She asserts that the “present system works not because minors are mature, but because of the tacit 
utilitarian calculus that govern minors’ access to care.” Id.  
237 Some of these legislative changes related to access to contraception and abortion specifically 
preceded, while others followed federal and state court decisions delineating the parameters of minors’ 
constitutional rights to these services without parental consent and, in some cases, without notice to 
parents. See, e.g., Maya Manian, Minors, Parents, and Minor Parents, 81 MO. L. REV. 127, 133–46 
(2016).  
238 We recognize that abortion is a form of treatment about which there is substantial controversy 
in this country, and therefore acknowledge that some would challenge the premise that a state has an 
interest in facilitating minors’ access. Indeed, some state legislatures have recently sought to limit or 
eliminate the availability of abortion, indicating a view that such availability is not in the state’s interest. 
See Sabrina Tavernise, “The Time is Now”: States Are Rushing to Restrict Abortion, or to Protect It, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/15/us/abortion-laws-2019.html 
(discussing states’ approaches to the issue).   
Analysis of the right to abortion, unlike the other treatment categories listed here, is made more 
complex by the state’s acknowledged interest in protecting the future life of the fetus, as well as the 
concern by some that abortion decisions may have deleterious emotional repercussions for women. See, 
e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007) (“While we find no reliable data to measure the 
phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret their choice to abort the 
infant life they once created and sustained . . . . Severe depression and loss of esteem can follow . . . a 
decision so fraught with emotional consequence . . . .”); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 
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the exceptions below. Of course, the state has such interests in many forms 
of treatment for which there are not statutory exceptions authorizing 
independent consent by minors. Thus, other factors converge with these state 
interests to explain why states allow minors to consent to these services.  
Second, one distinction between these treatment contexts and the 
run-of-the-mill treatment for appendicitis or strep throat lies in the 
“sensitive” nature of services related to sexual activity, pregnancy, mental 
health, substance abuse, or sexual assault. While many parents may be fully 
supportive of their minor children who seek to access these services, others 
may be less so. The presumption, discussed above,239 that there is an identity 
of interests between parent and child, does not hold when an older minor 
seeks to access services and his or her parent wants to prevent such access. 
Arguably, in these circumstances, a conflict of interests exists, undercutting 
one of the bases on which the doctrine of parental consent is premised.240 In 
an influential 1973 article, Hillary Rodham argued that:  
                                                                                                                     
(1992) (“Abortion is . . . fraught with consequences for others: for the woman who must live with the 
implications of her decision; for the persons who perform and assist in the procedure; for the spouse, 
family, and society which must confront the knowledge that these procedures exist, procedures some 
deem nothing short of an act of violence against innocent human life; and, depending on one’s beliefs, 
for the life or potential life that is aborted.”). Some Justices suggest these asserted effects are enhanced 
for minors. See, e.g., H. L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 411 (1981) (“The medical, emotional, and 
psychological consequences of an abortion are serious and can be lasting; this is particularly so when the 
patient is immature.”).  
Yet, these assertions by some members of the Court have been challenged by other Justices citing 
research analyzed by key scientific organizations. See, e.g., Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 183–84 n.7 (Ginsburg, 
J., dissenting) (citing psychological literature contradicting majority assertions). See also M. Antonia 
Biggs et al., Women’s Mental Health and Well-Being 5 Years After Receiving or Being Denied an 
Abortion: A Prospective, Longitudinal Cohort Study, 74 JAMA PSYCHIATRY 169, 169 (2017) (“[B]eing 
denied an abortion may be associated with initially experiencing adverse psychological outcomes.”); 
Diana Greene Foster et al., Comparison of Health, Development, Maternal Bonding and Poverty Among 
Children Born After Denial of Abortion vs After Pregnancies Subsequent to an Abortion, 172 JAMA 
PEDIATRICS 1053, 1053 (2018) (“[A]ccess to abortion enables 
women to choose to have children at a time when they have more financial and emotional 
resources to devote to their children.”); BIXBY CTR. FOR GLOB. REPROD. HEALTH, UCSF, TURNAWAY 
STUDY, https://www.ansirh.org/sites/default/files/publications/files/turnaway_study_brief_web.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 17, 2020) (summary of findings) (“Abortion does not increase women’s risk of having 
suicidal thoughts, or the chance of developing PTSD, depression, anxiety, low self-esteem, or lower life 
satisfaction.”). Studies examining mental health and life circumstances of women who had abortions 
during adolescence or prior to age twenty-one report no greater likelihood of detrimental mental health 
consequences for those who had abortions as compared with women who had continued an unintended 
pregnancy. Jocelyn T. Warren, S. Marie Harvey & Jillian T. Henderson, Do Depression and Low 
Self-Esteem Follow Abortion Among Adolescents? Evidence from a National Study, 42 PERSP. ON 
SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 230, 233 (2010); David M. Fergusson, Joseph M. Boden & L. John 
Horwood, Abortion Among Young Women and Subsequent Life Outcomes, 39 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & 
REPROD. HEALTH 6, 11 (2007). 
239 See infra notes 127–29 and accompanying text.  
240 See Jennifer Rosato, Using Bioethics Discourse to Determine When Parents Should Make Health 
Care Decisions for Their Children: Is Deference Justified?, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 43 (2000) (arguing for 
a “conflict of interest exception” when the interests of the family do not coincide with those of the 
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[T]he presumption of identity of interests between parents and 
their children should be rejected whenever the child has 
interests demonstrably independent of those of his parents (as 
determined by the consequences to both of the action in 
question), and a competent child should be permitted to assert 
his or her own interests.241 
These statutory exceptions attempt to address this type of scenario. 
A third, and related, barrier to care exists. Many minors are hesitant to 
inform their parents of their need for services if it requires disclosing that 
they are sexually active, that they are experiencing mental or emotional 
problems, that they are using or abusing certain substances, or that they have 
been victims of sexual assault. These are sensitive matters, and many minors 
would rather forego seeking treatment than involve their parents.242 Even 
when minors do not fear adverse parental reactions, they may be 
uncomfortable or embarrassed about talking with their parents about these 
issues and therefore refrain from such discussions. In some cases, minors 
may suspect, accurately or inaccurately, that their parents will deny consent 
for, or otherwise prevent them from accessing, these services. In other cases, 
the minors may fear negative repercussions from disclosure to parents.243 
They may fear being “grounded” or having their conduct otherwise 
restricted. They may fear other disciplinary measures or reprisals, or perhaps 
even physical or emotional abuse by their parents. Regardless of the 
accuracy of minors’ concerns about informing their parents of their need for 
treatment, the concerns create barriers. Parents are not capable of acting in 
their children’s best interests if their children do not inform them of their 
needs. An alternative consent mechanism to promote the minors’ best 
interests must exist as a supplement to parental consent. The statutory 
exceptions create such an alternative. 
                                                                                                                     
patient). 
241 Rodham, supra note 127, at 507. 
242 Janine P. Felsman, Eliminating Parental Consent and Notification for Adolescent HIV Testing: 
A Legitimate Statutory Response to the AIDS Epidemic, 5 J.L. & POL’Y 339, 383 (1996) (“[M]inors may 
forego HIV testing rather than reveal their high risk behavior to their parents.”); Doris G. Kaplan, Right 
of Privacy of Minors: Statutory Self-Consent in Oklahoma, 54 OKLA. B.J. 1724, 1728 (1983) (stating 
that  “the minor, threatened with revealing sensitive personal problems may forego treatment to avoid 
conflict, abuse or alienation at home”). See also supra notes 245, 290–95, 303–09 and accompanying 
text and Section III.C. 
243 H. L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 438–39 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (observing that 
“[m]any minor women will encounter interference from their parents[,]” “parental disappointment and 
disapproval,” or “physical or emotional abuse, withdrawal of financial support, or actual obstruction of 
the abortion decision”); Melissa Weddle & Patricia K. Kokotailo, Confidentiality and Consent in 
Adolescent Substance Abuse: An Update, 7 ETHICS JAMA 239, 240 (2005) (noting that among 
adolescents who do not involve parents in health care decisions, some “have experienced violence within 
the family, and they fear incurring violence” if parents are involved in the treatment process). 
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Fourth, as discussed in Section II.B.1.ii, there exist constitutional, 
bioethical, and policy rationales for permitting minors to exercise autonomy 
and choose for themselves in the health care matters for which these 
exceptions exist.  
Fifth, the presumption that adolescents are not capable of making wise 
decisions regarding their own medical care has not been confirmed by the 
relevant science. Below, we review the state of knowledge regarding 
children’s competence to consent to treatment.244 In general, research 
indicates that most adolescents are psychologically capable of making health 
care decisions in a manner that satisfies legal standards of competence. The 
ages at which these abilities are sufficiently adult-like to meet such standards 
typically coincide with the ages identified by those statutes creating 
treatment-specific exceptions at the age of consent. While other statutes 
creating treatment-specific exceptions may not identify an age of consent, 
there appears to be substantial overlap in age between minors who are likely 
to seek the services made available to them under the statutes and those who 
are likely to be competent to consent. For example, data reveal that most 
minors who are sexually active are usually age fifteen or older.245 Abuse of 
alcohol and drugs by minors usually begins in adolescence as well.246 
Although mental health problems and victimization by sexual assault can 
occur throughout minority, there are higher rates of both problems in 
adolescence than at younger ages.247 Given that studies suggest that minors 
have developed decisionmaking skills that enable them to satisfy legal tests  
                                                                                                                     
244 See infra Section III.B.3. 
245 Guttmacher Inst., American Teens’ Sexual and Reproductive Health Fact Sheet, SANDERS INST. 
(Aug. 2017), available at https://www.sandersinstitute.com/blog/american-teens-sexual-and-
reproductive-health-fact-sheet. 
On average, young people in the United States have sex for the first time at about age 
17, but do not marry until their mid-20s. 
In 2011–2013, among unmarried 15–19-year-olds, 44% of females and 49% of males 
had had sexual intercourse. These levels have remained steady since 2002. 
The proportion of young people having sexual intercourse before age 15 has declined 
in recent years. In 2011–2013, about 13% of never-married females aged 15–19 and 
18% of never-married males in that age-group had had sex before age 15, compared 
with 19% and 21%, respectively, in 1995.   
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
246 Principles of Adolescent Substance Disorder Treatment: A Research-Based Guide, NAT’L 
INSTITUTES HEALTH, https://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/principles-adolescent-substance-use-
disorder-treatment-research-based-guide/introduction (last updated Jan. 2014). 
247 See, e.g., Children and Teens: Statistics, RAPE ABUSE & INCEST NAT’L NETWORK (RAINN), 
available at https://www.rainn.org/statistics/children-and-teens (indicating that two-thirds of the sexual 
assaults of minors involve adolescent victims); Data and Statistics on Children’s Mental Health, 
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/childrensmentalhealth/data.html 
(revealing that adolescence is the stage of minority in which the highest rates of depression and anxiety 
occur).  
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of competence by age fourteen, and in many cases, by ages twelve or 
thirteen,248 it is likely that most minors seeking the services for which the 
statutory exceptions are created would meet legal standards of 
competence.249   
The following types of health care services are those most commonly 
the subject of exceptions that allow minors to access services without 
parental consent: (1) contraception; (2) prenatal care; (3) abortion; (4) 
testing and treatment for sexually transmitted diseases (STDs), including 
human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and acquired immunodeficiency 
syndrome (AIDS); (5) substance abuse or mental health treatment; and (6) 
sexual assault related services, including counseling, testing, and medical 
care.250   
                                                                                                                     
248 See infra Section III.B.3. 
249 Below, we also discuss further the question of what threshold should exist in competence 
determinations. See infra Section III.B.3. As we indicate, the dividing line between competence and 
incompetence is a policy choice that reflects analysis of competing legal, bioethical, and practical factors. 
To the extent that there is a strong social interest in promoting minors’ access to certain services, and 
these services expose minors to low levels of risk, and are likely to provide a high level of benefit, the 
threshold for capacity may be placed somewhat lower than it would for health care interventions invoking 
less compelling social interests and/or with different risk/benefit profiles. See infra notes 367–69 and 
accompanying text.  
250 Two categories of exceptions are not discussed here. First, there is a limited exception to the 
requirement of parental consent for emergency care. This exception has existed for over a century. See 
HOLDER, supra note 212, at 125 n.6. We do not include it within the treatment-specific exceptions listed 
here because it is not specific to minors, and therefore does not provide a useful analogy for our proposed 
exception to the parental consent requirement in the context of vaccinations. It applies to patients of all 
ages, and is a mechanism that allows health care providers to dispense with informed consent 
requirements for a condition risking serious injury or death, where the treatment is one for which it can 
be reasonably presumed the patient would have given consent and “the time it would take to offer an 
informed consent would significantly increase the patient’s risk of mortality and morbidity.” STEPHEN 
WEAR, INFORMED CONSENT: PATIENT AUTONOMY AND CLINICIAN BENEFICENCE WITHIN HEALTH 
CARE 156–57 (2d ed. 1998). See also Kurt M. Hartman & Bryan D. Liang, Exceptions to Informed 
Consent in Emergency Medicine, HOSP. PHYSICIAN, Mar. 1999, at 53, 54–55. In the case of an adult, the 
patient may be competent, but there is no time to go through the informed consent process without serious 
detrimental consequences. Alternatively, the patient may be unconscious or otherwise unable to provide 
legally valid consent, and delaying treatment to contact a substitute decision maker seriously risks the 
patient’s health. Thus, as applied to minors, it allows providers to treat a child of any age whose 
circumstances meet the criteria without waiting until parents can be reached for consent. HOLDER, supra 
note 212, at 125. 
Second, we do not address the emancipation exception, which gives minors who are legally 
emancipated the sole authority to consent to their own health care. Vivian E. Hamilton, Adulthood in 
Law and Culture, 91 TUL. L. REV. 55, 70 (2016) (“Emancipated minors step into the shoes of their 
parents, exercising for themselves the authority that parents would normally exercise over them.”). See 
generally Carol Sanger & Eleanor Willemsen, Minor Changes: Emancipating Children in Modern 
Times, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 239, 258–60 (1992). Typically, conduct that is consistent with 
assumption of adult responsibilities or roles (such as financial independence, marriage, military service) 
serves as the basis for a determination that the minor is emancipated. This exception is not relevant to 
our proposal because we are not positing that minors’ access to vaccinations independent of parental 
consent be contingent on a determination that the minor is emancipated.  
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iv. Contraception 
Public health efforts over several decades, including the development 
and proliferation of sex education curricula, have sought to reduce teen 
pregnancy.251 The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention report that 
“[t]een pregnancy and childbearing bring substantial social and economic 
costs through immediate and long-term impacts on teen parents and their 
children.”252 For example, according to the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention:  
Pregnancy and birth are significant contributors to high school 
dropout rates among girls. Only about 50% of teen mothers 
receive a high school diploma by 22 years of age, whereas 
approximately 90% of women who do not give birth during 
adolescence graduate from high school. 
The children of teenage mothers are more likely to have lower 
school achievement and to drop out of high school, have more 
health problems, be incarcerated at some time during 
adolescence, give birth as a teenager, and face unemployment 
as a young adult.253 
Clearly, the state’s parens patriae and police power interests are 
implicated in preventing teen pregnancy, as are the interests of minors who 
could become pregnant and the interests of the children they might bear. 
Facilitating minors’ access to contraception furthers these parens patriae 
and police power goals of reducing the burdens accompanying teen 
pregnancy, for those directly affected, and the general public that will share 
many of the costs of teen pregnancies. Sex education programs together with 
adolescent access to family planning services are credited with reducing the 
teen birth rate by 64% between 1991 and 2015, resulting in an estimated 
“$4.4 billion in public savings in 2015 alone.”254 
In addition, availability of certain forms of contraception also reduces 
transmission of sexually transmitted diseases.255 Almost half of the cases of 
such diseases in the United States are in the adolescent and young adult 
groups, ages fifteen to twenty-four.256 Researchers attribute this 
                                                                                                                     
251 Comm. on Adolescent Health Care, Adolescent Pregnancy, Contraception, and Sexual Activity, 
AM. C. OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS (May 2017), https://www.acog.org/Clinical-Guidance-and-
Publications/Committee-Opinions/Committee-on-Adolescent-Health-Care/Adolescent-Pregnancy-
Contraception-and-Sexual-Activity?IsMobileSet=false. 
252 Reproductive Health: Teen Pregnancy, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/teenpregnancy/about/index.htm (last reviewed Mar. 1, 2019).   
253 Id. 
254 Id. 
255 Comm. on Adolescent Health Care, supra note 251.  
256 Guttmacher Inst., supra note 245. 
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disproportionality to “disparities in accessing preventive information and 
services,”257 revealing the dramatic effects of barriers to care. 
The Guttmacher Institute reports that as of October 2019, twenty-three 
states and the District of Columbia expressly allow all minors to consent 
independently to contraceptive services.258 Twenty-four states allow minors 
to consent independently to contraceptive services if certain conditions are 
met.259 For example, eight of these states permit minors who are deemed to 
be “mature” or who have reached the age of twelve or fourteen years old to 
consent.260 Most of these states permit minors who are married to consent.261 
Four states do not have a statutory policy on minors’ consent for 
contraceptive services.262 
v. Prenatal Care 
Adequate prenatal care for minors promotes their own health during 
pregnancy and childbearing and gives their offspring the best chance at a 
healthy future.263 Concern about their own parents’ reactions to the 
pregnancy has been cited as one of the reasons why minors delay accessing 
prenatal care.264 As of October 2019, thirty-seven states and the District of 
Columbia permit minors to have independent access to prenatal services, 
although fifteen of those states permit, but do not require, notification of 
such services to the pregnant minors’ parents.265   
vi. Abortion 
As noted above, teen pregnancy entails medical and social risks for the 
adolescent and her future offspring, as well as substantial economic costs to 
                                                                                                                     
257 Id. 




261 See id. (reporting that nineteen of the twenty-four states allow a married minor to consent to 
contraceptive services). 
262 Id. 
263 See, e.g., Byron C. Calhoun, Healthy Management of Very Early Adolescent Pregnancy, 
31 ISSUES L. & MED. 191, 195 (2016) (reporting that early prenatal care may help prevent adverse 
outcomes in adolescent pregnancy); Katherine Moore, Pregnant in Foster Care: Prenatal Care, 
Abortion, and the Consequences for Foster Families, 23 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 29, 64 (2012) 
(demonstrating efficacy of early intervention programs serving minors). 
264 See Sally Hughes Lee & Laurie M. Grubbs, Pregnant Teenagers’ Reasons for Seeking or 
Delaying Prenatal Care, 4 CLINICAL NURSING RES. 38, 42 (1995) (reporting findings that 41.6% of teens 
delayed prenatal care because of fear that their pregnancies would be disclosed to their parents).  
265 See Minors’ Access to Prenatal Care, GUTTMACHER INST. (Oct. 1, 2019), 
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/minors-access-prenatal-care (reporting that fifteen of 
the thirty-seven states allow physicians to maintain the minor’s confidentiality if doing so is in the best 
interest of the minor). 
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these individuals and the public.266 The American Academy of Pediatrics 
asserts that, in addition to pregnancy prevention efforts, legal policies should 
permit medically safe pregnancy termination when minors seek to end an 
unintended pregnancy.267 In a 2017 Policy Statement, the Academy stated:  
The American Medical Association, the Society for 
Adolescent Health and Medicine, the American Public Health 
Association, the American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists, the AAP, and other health professional 
organizations have reached a consensus that a minor should 
not be compelled or required to involve her parents in her 
decision to obtain an abortion, although she should be 
encouraged to discuss the pregnancy with her parents and/or 
other responsible adults. These conclusions result from 
objective analyses of current data, which indicate that 
legislation mandating parental involvement does not achieve 
the intended benefit of promoting family communication but 
does increase the risk of harm to the adolescent by delaying 
access to appropriate medical care or increasing the rate of 
unwanted births.268 
State laws governing minors’ access to abortion are complex, revealing 
many variations among states.269 The U.S. Supreme Court has held that if a 
state requires parental consent for abortion, it must provide minors with an 
option to bypass parental consent, such as the opportunity to demonstrate to 
a judge that she is mature enough to make her own abortion decision or that 
the abortion is in her best interests.270 Some states, however, while allowing 
minors to consent independently to abortion, require notification of the 
minors’ parents.271 This type of provision has been upheld by the U.S. 
Supreme Court, as long as the laws contain certain exceptions identified by 
the Court, such as a judicial bypass procedure.272 As of October 1, 2019, 
                                                                                                                     
266 See Reproductive Health: Teen Pregnancy, supra note 252 (illustrating the substantial social 
and economic costs of teen pregnancy).  
267Am. Acad. Of Pediatrics Comm. on Adolescence, The Adolescent’s Right to Confidential Care 
When Considering Abortion, 139 PEDIATRICS 1, 1 (2017), https://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/ 
pediatrics/139/2/e20163861.full.pdf. 
268 Id. at 2. 
269 See Parental Involvement in Minors’ Abortions, GUTTMACHER INST. (Oct. 1, 2019), 
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/parental-involvement-minors-abortions (reporting 
patterns in state regulation of minors’ access to abortions). 
270 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 662, 643–44 (1979). 
271 Parental Involvement in Minors’ Abortions, supra note 269. 
272 See Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England, 546 U.S. 320, 327 (2006) (holding 
unconstitutional a New Hampshire parental notification statute that does not allow a physician to perform 
an abortion at a minor’s request in a medical emergency without parental notification); Ohio v. Akron 
Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 502 (1990) (upholding an Ohio statutory provision requiring a 
physician to notify the parent of a minor prior to performing an abortion, unless the minor is able to 
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twenty-six states required parental consent for minors’ abortions, and eleven 
states required notification only.273 In three parental consent states, and three 
parental notification states, the policies have been judicially enjoined and 
are not in effect.274 Seven of the states that require either parental consent or 
notification allow other relatives, such as a grandparent, to substitute for the 
parent at the minor’s request.275 The remaining states do not have parental 
consent or notification requirements for minors’ access to abortion. 
The parental involvement laws and the required judicial bypass 
procedure have been the subject of much criticism because of barriers and 
burdens that attend this process, the inconsistency in standards applied in 
adjudicating maturity and best interests, and the lack of evidence that the 
policies have a positive impact on teenagers’ sexual and reproductive health, 
promote better decisionmaking about abortion by teenagers, or improve 
parent-child communication.276 Research reveals that teenagers seeking 
abortions without parental consent may face challenging and potentially 
insurmountable barriers, including locating a judge who conducts abortion 
by-pass hearings, finding transportation to the courthouse (particularly in 
rural states), taking time off from school, and dealing with the challenges of 
presenting their case to the judge.277 Furthermore, the process can be 
“traumatic and stress inducing” and may lead to delay in receiving services, 
with deleterious medical and psychological repercussions.278   
                                                                                                                     
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence in a judicial bypass hearing that she is mature enough to 
make the abortion decision on her own, that the notice is not in her best interests, or that she has been a 
victim of abuse perpetrated by a parent); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 417 (1990) (upholding 
as constitutional a Minnesota statute that required that notice be given to both parents of a minor prior to 
performing an abortion, as long as the statute provides for a judicial bypass procedure); H. L. v. 
Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 398 (1981) (holding unconstitutional a statutory requirement that a physician 
notify the parents of an unmarried, dependent girl prior to performing an abortion as applied to a girl who 
was immature and unemancipated).  
273 See Parental Involvement in Minors’ Abortions, supra note 269 (reporting that twenty-one states 
require parental consent, three of which require both parents’ consent and five of which require both 
parental notification and consent). 
274 See id. (reporting that courts permanently enjoined enforcement of statutes in Alabama, 
California, Nevada, New Jersey, and New Mexico, and temporarily enjoined the Montana statute).  
275 Id. 
276 See Maya Manian, Functional Parenting and Dysfunctional Abortion Policy: Reforming 
Parental Involvement Legislation, 50 FAM. CT. REV. 241, 244–46 (2012) (analyzing the inefficacy of the 
judicial bypass procedure in improving outcomes for pregnant teens); Carol Sanger, Decisional Dignity: 
Teenage Abortion, Bypass Hearings, and the Misuse of Law, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 409, 414 (2009) 
(arguing that the judicial bypass process is unnecessary and works to humiliate and insult young women).   
277 See IRA MARK ELLMAN, PAUL KURTZ & LOIS A. WEITHORN ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, TEXT, 
PROBLEMS 1203–04 (5th ed. 2010); Manian, supra note 276, at 244; Sanger, supra note 276, at 439; see 
also AMANDA DENNIS ET AL., GUTTMACHER INST., THE IMPACT OF LAWS REQUIRING PARENTAL 
INVOLVEMENT FOR ABORTION: A LITERATURE REVIEW 1 (2009),  https://www.guttmacher.org/sites/ 
default/files/report_pdf/parentalinvolvementlaws.pdf (finding that parental involvement laws increase 
minors’ interstate travel to avoid these restrictions). 
278 See Manian, supra note 276, at 244 (describing the stress experienced by minors undergoing the 
judicial bypass process); Sanger, supra note 276, at 429, 461 (asserting that the judicial bypass process 
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vii. Sexually Transmitted Diseases and Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus 
Sexually transmitted diseases (STDs), including human 
immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and acquired immunodeficiency syndrome 
(AIDS), are infectious diseases spread through human sexual contact. They 
can lead to serious, and at times deadly, consequences if untreated.279 Most 
of these conditions are responsive to treatment.280 Timely medical care for 
minors who have been exposed to these conditions is essential to promote 
the health of a minor seeking services and others who have been, or but for 
timely medical intervention might be, exposed to these contagious diseases. 
Research surveying the attitudes of teens toward seeking needed services for 
STDs reveals that the adolescents’ fears of their parents’ reactions could lead 
them to avoid seeking medical services.281 Researchers emphasize the 
importance of providing minors with independent access to services for 
STDs and with guarantees of confidentiality.282  
All fifty states and the District of Columbia provide some form of access 
by minors to prevention, testing, or treatment services related to STDs and 
HIV without parental consent. Some states permit, but do not require, 
practitioner notification of parents.283 
viii. Mental Health or Substance Abuse Treatment 
One in five adolescents has suffered from a serious mental health 
disorder at some point during his or her minority.284 Despite the existence of 
effective treatments, fewer than half of adolescents with such conditions 
                                                                                                                     
does not have beneficial medical or psychological implications for teens); see also DENNIS ET AL., supra 
note 277, at 1 (reporting study findings that judicial bypass requirements lead minors to travel to states 
with less restrictive abortion policies). For a qualitative study of teens who made abortion decisions 
without involving their parents, see J. Shoshanna Ehrlich, Grounded in the Reality of Their Lives: 
Listening to Teens Who Make the Abortion Decision Without Involving Their Parents, 18 BERKELEY 
WOMEN’S L.J. 61, 65 (2003). 
279 See CDC Fact Sheets, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION: SEXUALLY 
TRANSMITTED DISEASES (STDS), https://www.cdc.gov/std/healthcomm/fact_sheets.htm (containing fact 
sheets on various STDs). 
280 Id. 
281 Jami S. Leichliter et al., Confidentiality Issues and Use of Sexually Transmitted Disease Services 
Among Sexually Experienced Persons Aged 15–25 Years—United States, 2013–2015, 66 MORBIDITY & 
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 237, 237, 239–40 (2017).  
282 Id. at 240; Gale R. Burstein et al., Position Paper: Confidentiality Protections for Adolescents 
and Young Adults in the Health Care Billing and Insurance Claims Process, 58 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 
374, 375 (2016), https://www.jahonline.org/article/S1054-139X(15)00723-5/pdf. 
283 Minors’ Consent Laws for HIV and STD Services, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/hiv/policies/law/states/minors.html (last updated Nov. 30, 2018). 
284 Office of Adolescent Health, Mental Health in Adolescents, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. 
SERVICES, https://www.hhs.gov/ash/oah/adolescent-development/mental-health/index.html (last 
reviewed Feb. 24, 2017). 
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seek treatment.285 Research indicates that “[m]ental and substance use 
disorders are the leading cause of disability in children and youth 
worldwide,” surpassing other medical conditions.286 More generally, we 
have learned in recent years that mental health conditions are among the 
most costly—and are perhaps even the most costly—category of illnesses in 
terms of its lifetime burden of disability.287 One of the reasons for this effect 
is that, unlike heart disease and many other chronic medical conditions, 
mental health disorders often present early in life and can limit the 
opportunities for full and healthy participation in various spheres for those 
affected throughout the lifespan.288 Early diagnosis and treatment is in the 
interests of both the person with the condition and of society at large. In 
addition, rates of suicidality (considering, attempting, and committing 
suicide) among adolescents are high.289 Related to mental health conditions, 
use and abuse of various illicit substances by adolescents is common, 
unfortunately, and presents a myriad of short- and long-term risks to those 
using such substances, including detrimental effects on the developing 
brain.290 Medical professionals indicate that early intervention is essential to 
give minors the best opportunity at a healthy life and to avoid or recover 
from damaging physical and psychological effects of substance abuse.291   
In the context of both mental health and substance abuse treatment, 
concerns about confidentiality constitute significant barriers, and are 
perceived by mental health and medical professionals as a deterrent to 
adolescent help-seeking.292 Unfortunately, in our society, there is substantial 
stigma associated with mental disorders, leading to bias, discrimination, and 
                                                                                                                     
285 Id. 
286 H.E. Erskine et al., A Heavy Burden on Young Minds: The Global Burden of Mental and 
Substance Use Disorders in Children and Youth, 45 PSYCHOL. MED. 1551, 1558 (2015) (emphasis 
added). 
287 See, e.g., Sebastian Trautmann et al., The Economic Costs of Mental Disorders: Do Our Societies 
React Appropriately to the Burden of Mental Disorders?, 17 EMBO REP. 1245, 1247 (2016) (“Mental 
disorders therefore account for more economic costs than chronic somatic diseases such as cancer or 
diabetes, and their costs are expected to increase exponentially over the next 15 years.”); Daniel Vigo et 
al., Estimating the True Global Burden of Mental Illness, 3 LANCET PSYCHIATRY 171, 171 (2016) 
(calculating that mental illness accounts for one-third of the world burden of disability, placing it well 
ahead of any other category of disorders).    
288 Erskine et al., supra note 286, at 1551–52 (“Half of all cases of mental disorders develop by age 
14 years although most remain undetected and untreated until later in life.”).  
289 CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, SUICIDE 1–2 (2015), https://www.cdc.gov/ 
violenceprevention/pdf/suicide-datasheet-a.pdf; S.K. GOLDSMITH, REDUCING SUICIDE: A NATIONAL 
IMPERATIVE 33–58 (2002). 
290 AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS, SUBSTANCE USE SCREENING AND INTERVENTION IMPLEMENTATION 
GUIDE 2–3, 16–19 apps. 2, 3, https://www.aap.org/en-us/Documents/substance_use_screening 
_implementation.pdf (last visited Mar. 17, 2020). 
291 Id. 
292 See, e.g., id. at 8–9; Amelia Gulliver, Kathleen M. Griffiths & Helen Christiansen, Perceived 
Barriers to Mental Health Help-Seeking in Young People: A Systematic Review, 10 BMC PSYCHIATRY 
113 (2010). 
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a range of social and psychological repercussions.293 The evidence for 
stigma is even greater in the context of substance abuse disorders.294 These 
biases create barriers to treatment because individuals hesitate to seek 
services, in part due to fear of the negative repercussions that might flow 
from disclosure of their conditions to others.295 Adolescents seeking such 
treatments may refrain from discussing their need for treatment with parents. 
If not guaranteed the same confidentiality as is promised to adults seeking 
mental health and substance abuse treatment, minors will likely be reluctant 
to contact providers.296 
Most states contain an exception to the doctrine of parental consent for 
substance abuse and mental health treatment.297 In some instances, either 
parent or child can legally consent to such treatment. Statutes authorizing 
minors’ consent may set a minimum age, typically twelve or fourteen years 
of age,298 although New Jersey recently passed legislation authorizing such 
independent consent at age sixteen.299 
                                                                                                                     
293 See GOLDSMITH, supra note 289, at 332–34 (reporting survey results indicating that 45–60% of 
Americans wanted to distance themselves from persons with depression or schizophrenia).   
294 Id. at 333; Sarah Wakeman & Josiah Rich, Barriers to Medications for Addiction Treatment: 
How Stigma Kills, 53 SUBSTANCE USE & MISUSE 330, 330 (2018). 
295 Patrick W. Corrigan et al., The Impact of Mental Illness Stigma on Seeking and Participating in 
Mental Health Care, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 37, 42–43 (2014). 
296 MaryLouise E. Kerwin et al., What Can Parents Do? A Review of State Laws Regarding 
Decision Making for Adolescent Drug Abuse and Mental Health Treatment, 24 J. CHILD ADOLESCENT 
SUBSTANCE ABUSE 166, 167 (2015). 
297 See, e.g., Richard C. Boldt, Adolescent Decision Making: Legal Issues with Respect to Treatment 
for Substance Misuse and Mental Illness, 15 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 75, 90 (2012) (discussing 
“statutory exceptions to the default rule”); Kerwin et al., supra note 296, at 16–17 tbl.1; Tori Lallemont, 
Anna Mastroianni & Thomas M. Wickizer, Decision-Making Authority and Substance Abuse Treatment 
for Adolescents: A Survey of State Laws, 44 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 323, 323 (2009) (discussing how 
“[s]ome states have carved out exceptions” to the doctrine of parental consent). States vary in the ages at 
which minors can consent to substance abuse treatment independently, as well as whether confidentiality 
is promised. Kerwin et al., supra note 296, at 16–17 tbl.1; Pedro Weisleder, Inconsistency Among 
American States on the Age at Which Minors Can Consent to Substance Abuse Treatment, 35 J. AM. 
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 317, 319 (2007). One survey found that thirty-one states permit a minor of any 
age to consent to alcohol or drug abuse treatment, while another additional thirteen states permit minors 
of specified ages to obtain such services without parental consent. Boldt, supra, at 90–92. 
298 See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-14 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Regular Sess.) 
(authorizing health care professionals to consult with or provide medications to minors age fifteen or 
older seeking services for mental health or substance abuse without parental consent); OR. REV. STAT. § 
109.675 (West, Westlaw through 2018 Regular Sess. and 2018 Special Sess. of the 79th Legislative 
Assembly) (same at age fourteen). 
299 Ray Glier, Seeking Mental Health Support: Teens Help Pass New Law to Access Mental Health 
Care Without Parental Consent, YOUTH TODAY (Mar. 14, 2016), https://youthtoday.org/2016/03/ 
seeking-mental-health-support-teens-helped-pass-new-law-to-access-mental-health-care-without-
parental-consent/ (reporting that the New Jersey legislature initially passed a bill authorizing minors’ 
independent access to mental health treatment for minors age thirteen and older but amended the bill 
when former Governor Chris Christie refused to sign the bill without the revision).  Some statutes contain 
additional conditions related to the minor’s maturity or the potentially detrimental effects of denying 
treatment. See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYG. § 33.21(c) (McKinney, Westlaw through L.2019, ch. 373). 
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ix. Sexual Assault Services 
As a society, we are on the cusp of greater legal and social awareness of 
the traumatic impact of sexual assault on victims. Minors, as well as adults, 
are victims of such assaults: “One third of all victims of sexual assault 
reported to law enforcement agencies are adolescents (13 to 17 years 
old).”300 The impact on victims can be extensive and presents substantial risk 
to their health and well-being. Victims may experience a range of physical 
injuries.301 In addition, rape of female adolescents is associated with a 
myriad of psychosocial effects, such as depression, eating disorders, and 
other mental health problems and suicidal ideation or attempts.302 Minors’ 
access to intervention is important for the diagnosis and treatment of the 
effects of the assault on the victim and to enable the criminal justice system 
to apprehend the perpetrator and achieve important social goals of 
deterrence and promoting public safety. Sexual assault services involve not 
only diagnostic and treatment interventions, but forensic evaluation to assist 
law enforcement: “Sexual assault treatment generally consists of a medical 
history, a physical examination, an anogenital examination, testing and 
prophylaxis for HIV and sexually transmitted diseases, emergency 
contraception, pregnancy testing and counseling, treatment for any other 
injuries, rape crisis counseling, referrals for additional services and the 
collection of forensic evidence.”303  
Laws specifically addressing minors’ independent access to sexual 
assault related services are relatively new. Illinois law provides an example: 
Where a minor is the victim of a predatory criminal sexual 
assault of a child, aggravated criminal sexual assault, criminal 
sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual abuse or criminal 
sexual abuse . . . the consent of the minor’s parent or legal 
guardian need not be obtained to authorize . . . medical 
personnel to furnish health care services or counseling related 
to the diagnosis or treatment of any disease or injury arising 
from such offense. The minor may consent to such counseling, 
                                                                                                                     
300 Jeffrey S. Jones et al., Comparative Analysis of Adult Versus Adolescent Sexual Assault: 
Epidemiology and Patterns of Anogenital Injury, 10 ACAD. EMERGENCY MED. 872, 872 (2003).  
301 Id. at 876. 
302 “Studies of female adolescents have found rape during childhood or adolescence to be associated 
with increased risky behaviors and mental health problems, including younger age of first voluntary 
intercourse; higher rates of depression, including suicidal ideation/attempts; and other self harm 
behaviors such as self-mutilation and eating disorders.” Miriam Kaufman, Care of the Adolescent Sexual 
Assault Victim, 122 PEDIATRICS 462, 464 (2008). 
303 JESSICA FEIERMAN ET AL., N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, TEENAGERS, HEALTH CARE & THE 
LAW: A GUIDE TO THE LAW ON MINORS’ RIGHTS IN NEW YORK STATE 93, 93 n.149 (2d ed. n.d.). 
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diagnosis or treatment as if the minor had reached his or her 
age of majority . . . .304 
Similarly, Maryland’s statutes provide that a minor has the same 
capacity to consent as an adult to “Physical examination and treatment of 
injuries from an alleged rape or sexual offense; . . . Physical examination to 
obtain evidence of an alleged rape or sexual offense.”305 While statutes as 
specific as those of Illinois and Maryland may not exist in all states, authors 
have noted that the range of services required to respond adequately to a 
sexual assault may fall within several of the other exceptions to the parental 
consent doctrine already on the books, such as exceptions for STI testing 
and treatment, family planning, mental health counseling, and emergency 
medical services.306 Therefore, medical professionals working with minor 
victims of sexual assault generally take advantage of the range of exceptions 
available under the law to provide the wide range of services necessary to 
assist these victims without requiring parental consent.307 
Clearly, the interests of the minor in receiving needed medical and 
psychological care are weighty, as are the state’s interests in facilitating that 
care and pursuing its law enforcement objectives. In light of the sensitive 
nature of this type of assault, minors would be less likely to seek services if 
parental consent was required. Indeed, in some instances, parents or other 
family members perpetrated the assault. Confidentiality of services is also 
strongly recommended by practitioners, in that fear of disclosures to parents 
may discourage many adolescents from seeking help. 
*** 
The analyses above reveal the strong policy interests in facilitating 
minors’ access to the services that are the subject of the statutory exceptions 
to the doctrine of parental consent. In each case, a requirement for parental 
consent presents barriers to many minors who need access to services. In 
light of the sensitive or controversial nature of the services or the activities 
leading to the need, it is understandable that many minors are hesitant to 
involve their parents. It is not relevant whether a minor’s reluctance to 
disclose her need for medical services is accurate in its prediction of a likely 
punitive or obstructive parental response. If the minor believes that a non-
supportive parental response will follow such disclosure, the minor will be 
deterred from involving her parents. In such cases, whether or not there 
exists a true conflict of interests between the minor and the parent, parents 
are not situated to be able to act in their minor children’s best interests. 
                                                                                                                     
304 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 210/3(b) (West through P.A. 101-115). 
305 MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN. § 20-102(c) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Regular Sess. of the 
General Assembly). 
306 FEIERMAN ET AL., supra note 303, at 41–42, 57, 62. 
307 See generally id. at 37–63 (describing the types of care minors can receive without parental 
consent, and, in those situations, what New York State agencies require of hospitals and physicians, for 
instance when they treat a rape survivor or receive the results of a positive HIV test). 
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Furthermore, as noted with respect to many of the exceptions above, there 
are concerns among medical professionals and minors that legal authority 
for independent access to services for minors is an illusory right without a 
guarantee of confidentiality. As we discuss in Part III below, access to 
childhood vaccines by minors whose parents have failed to vaccinate them 
presents issues analogous to those raised for access to services related to 
contraception, prenatal care, abortion, STDs, mental health and substance 
abuse, and sexual assault. Therefore, we recommend that a legislative 
exception to the doctrine of parental consent for childhood vaccinations 
should be enacted by the fifty states and the District of Columbia. 
III. INDEPENDENT AND CONFIDENTIAL ACCESS BY ADOLESCENTS TO 
CHILDHOOD VACCINES: MEDICAL, LEGAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND POLICY 
ISSUES 
In Part II, we analyzed the justifications for the most common statutory 
exceptions to the doctrine of parental consent across the United States. In 
this Part, we demonstrate that, in light of recent patterns of parental refusal 
to consent to medically necessary vaccinations for their minor children, 
minors’ independent access to such vaccines is one of several policy 
responses necessary to promote the health of unvaccinated minors and the 
general public.   
A. The Necessity of an Exception to the Doctrine of Parental Consent 
1. The Childhood Vaccination Crisis 
Patterns of parental childhood vaccine refusal have led to clusters within 
communities with low vaccination rates which have, in turn, led to increases 
in the rates of disease. By mid-year in 2019, the rate of measles had 
surpassed the highest annual rate since 1992.308 Most of the victims of the 
outbreaks were unvaccinated children in communities with low vaccination 
rates. For example, in a large outbreak in Rockland County, New York, 
80.4% of the 312 cases reported as of September 25, 2019 were persons 
under age eighteen, 79.5% had not received any MMR inoculations.309 Only 
3.2% of those infected had been fully vaccinated with the MMR. There was 
a direct relationship between parental failure to vaccinate their children and 
this and other outbreaks. The rates of vaccination are dangerously low in 
some geographical areas, with numbers of unvaccinated children continuing 
                                                                                                                     
308 Measles Cases and Outbreaks, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/measles/cases-outbreaks.html (last reviewed Oct. 11, 2019). 
309 2018 - 2019 Measles Outbreak in Rockland County, COUNTY ROCKLAND, 
http://rocklandgov.com/departments/health/measles-information/ (last visited June 19, 2020). 
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to increase.310 In light of these factors, the state’s interest in increasing 
vaccination rates to protect the public’s health is exceedingly strong. 
2. The Convergence of State and Child Interests in Immunization from 
Vaccine-Preventable Diseases 
As noted above, state childhood vaccination mandates serve not only the 
state’s police power interest in protecting public health, but also its parens 
patriae interest in promoting the health of the vaccinated children. States 
have allowed parents to refuse vaccinations under limited circumstances.311 
The existence of those exemptions, however, reflects a concession by 
policymakers to the competing interests of parents in making health care 
choices for their children and in practicing religions—the teachings of which 
are inconsistent with compliance with state vaccine mandates. These 
concessions, however, do not reflect a dilution of the state’s strong 
legislative intent to protect the public and individual children from 
vaccine-preventable diseases through high rates of vaccination of the student 
population.312 And, indeed, with recent increases in non-vaccination rates, 
several states that have experienced outbreaks of vaccine-preventable 
diseases have restricted or eliminated nonmedical exemptions.313 Clearly 
these state legislatures have determined that, as the risks to public health 
increase, parental discretion must be limited to the extent necessary to 
contain the spread of infectious diseases.314  
Until recently, the number of parents refusing vaccinations was 
sufficiently low that herd immunity protected children whose parents 
intentionally refused immunization and persons who cannot be vaccinated 
due to age or medical contraindication. Thus, exemption from vaccine 
requirements did not, in the past, measurably risk the welfare of the 
unvaccinated minors or others in the community. Yet, in recent years, public 
                                                                                                                     
310 Holly A. Hill, Vaccination Coverage Among Children Aged 19–35 Months — United States, 
2017, 67 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1123, 1126–27 (2018). 
311 See Reiss & Weithorn, Responding to the Childhood Vaccination Crisis, supra note 7, at 915–
19 (summarizing and discussing the pattern of statutory exemptions that exist across the states). See also 
States with Religious and Philosophical Exemptions from School Immunization Requirements, NAT’L 
CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (June 14, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/school-immunization-
exemption-state-laws.aspx (summarizing state vaccination exemption policies). 
312 In addition, the existence of exemptions does not reveal any legislative position on whether teens 
who seek to comply with governmental vaccination recommendations should be able to do so. With the 
exception of those instances cited within, legislatures have not previously addressed the question of 
minors’ legal authority to consent to childhood vaccinations. See supra notes 20–24.   
313 See Neal D. Goldstein, Joanna S. Suder & Jonathan Purtle, Trends and Characteristics of 
Proposed and Enacted Legislation on Childhood Vaccination Exemption, 2011–2017, 109 AM. J. PUB. 
HEALTH 102, 104–06, 105 tbl.2 (2019) (summarizing bills enacted between 2011 and 2017).  
314 Some scholars recommend that all states follow this lead. See, e.g., Chemerinsky & Goodwin, 
supra note 140, at 589 (proposing elimination of all nonmedical vaccination law exemptions); Mark 
Fadel, 360 Years of Measles: Limiting Liberty Now for a Healthier Future, 39 J. LEGAL MED. 1, 1, 13 
(2019) (same). 
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health experts have expressed concerns that herd immunity is gradually 
weakening as the number of unvaccinated persons increases, particularly in 
certain geographic locales where there are large clusters of unvaccinated 
children.315 Thus, the threat to the public’s health from a continuation of the 
current non-vaccination trends is real, as are the dangers to each individual 
unvaccinated child. As we have noted elsewhere, the state’s police power 
and parens patriae interests are to some extent additive, resulting in a 
formidable, although not unlimited, grant of state authority that can, in some 
circumstances, override traditional deference to parental discretion, as in the 
case of laws regulating compulsory education and child labor, child 
protection laws, and states’ mandatory vaccination laws.316   
The state’s interests also converge with the interests of minors who wish 
to be vaccinated despite parental objection.317 Children have independent 
                                                                                                                     
315 For example, in a recent article, several authors, including Anthony S. Fauci, Director of the 
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases of the National Institutes of Health, expressed 
concerns about the risks to persons in those population subgroups who cannot be immunized and were 
previously protected by herd immunity:  
The greatest risk of measles-related complications occurs in immunosuppressed 
people. This population may have atypical presentations with severe complications 
that have not been documented in immunocompetent patients, such as giant-cell 
pneumonia and measles inclusion-body encephalitis. Exposure to measles in people 
with HIV infection has led to serious complications and even death. Higher rates of 
measles complications and deaths have also been reported in patients with cancer, 
patients with solid organ transplants, people receiving high-dose glucocorticoids, and 
those receiving immunomodulatory therapy for rheumatologic disease. People with 
profound immunosuppression cannot be safely vaccinated with the live-attenuated 
vaccine and must rely on herd immunity to protect them from measles infection. 
Exposure to measles in the community certainly represents a danger to high-risk 
persons during a local outbreak; however, nosocomial transmission may pose an even 
greater threat and has been reported throughout the world. For example, during a 
measles outbreak in Shanghai in 2015, a single child with measles in a pediatric 
oncology clinic infected 23 other children, more than 50% of whom ended up with 
severe complications, and the case fatality rate was 21%. When the umbrella of herd 
immunity is compromised, such populations are highly vulnerable. 
Catherine I. Paules, Hilary D. Marston & Anthony D. Fauci, Measles in 2019—Going Backward, 380 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 2185, 2187 (2019) (citations omitted). See also Robert A. Bednarczyk, Walter A. 
Orenstein & Saad B. Omer, Estimating the Number of Measles-Susceptible Children and Adolescents in 
the United States Using Data from the National Immunization Survey–Teen (NIS-Teen), 184 AM. J. 
EPIDEMIOLOGY 148, 154 (2016) (reporting that, while national levels of immunization at the time of their 
study were still at or higher than the threshold of 92%, the level needed to sustain herd immunity, the 
numbers and patterns of clustering of nonvaccination could lead to circumstances in which herd 
immunity may not protect some segments of the population); Jacqueline K. Olive et al., The State of the 
Antivaccine Movement in the United States: A Focused Examination of Nonmedical Exemptions in States 
and Counties, 15 PLOS MED., June 2018, at 1, 7 (2018) (warning of the existence of a hotspot vulnerable 
to outbreaks because of high rates of exemptions from vaccines requirements). 
316 Reiss & Weithorn, Responding to the Childhood Vaccination Crisis, supra note 7, at 913–14.  
317 See supra notes 178–82 and accompanying text. 
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interests in avoiding serious illness, disability, and death.318 Where a 
medically recommended high benefit/low risk intervention is available to 
protect the minor’s health, the minor’s interest in receiving that intervention 
over parental objection is substantial. That interest becomes even weightier 
when parents choose to rely on misinformation and myths in the exercise of 
their parental decisionmaking authority, denying minors interventions 
endorsed universally by medical experts. Minors’ interests in protecting 
their own health and that of others outweigh parental authority to endanger 
their children’s and the public’s health through vaccine refusal, particularly 
when aligned with the interests of the state.   
We do not espouse wholesale rejection of the doctrine of parental 
consent. Each treatment context in which the state or a minor seeks an 
exception from the doctrine must be evaluated on its own merits. Thus, our 
proposal does not extend beyond the instant case. We recognize that 
questions about minors’ best interests in the medical context are complex, 
and that what specifically is in any child’s best interests might be 
indeterminate or unknowable without hindsight. And even where outcomes 
are certain, reasonable minds may differ as to what is “best” in many 
situations.319 Yet, this lack of clarity does not characterize decisions to 
accept the recommended childhood vaccinations. Indeed, these vaccinations 
provide the quintessential example of a high benefit/low risk intervention 
supported by a near-universal medical consensus. Thus, we need not 
confront many of the thorny ethical analyses inherent in allocations of 
decisionmaking authority among disputing parties when questions of 
children’s medical best interests are at issue.320 Indeed, the 
                                                                                                                     
318 See supra notes 178–87 and accompanying text. 
319 See, e.g., Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108, 1110, 1120 (Del. 1991) (declining to override 
parental decisionmaking authority on the basis that parents who rejected treatment were acting in the 
child’s best interests, even though the parental decision would likely result in the child’s death within six 
to eight months, where recommended treatment for the child’s cancer had a 40% chance of success, but 
entailed substantial risks and discomforts, and could itself cause death). 
320 In recent decades, pediatric bioethicists and other scholars have contributed substantially to 
debates about the meaning of the best interests standard in the context of medical treatment of children. 
For example, Loretta M. Kopelman provides an overview of the best interests standard, discussing the 
differences among the versions of the standard applied by clinicians, philosophers, and policy makers. 
Loretta M. Kopelman, The Best-Interests Standard as Threshold, Ideal, and Standard of Reasonableness, 
22 J. MED. & PHIL. 271, 272–73 (1997). Some scholars have argued for rejection of the best interest 
standard. See, e.g., Erica K. Salter, Deciding for a Child: A Comprehensive Analysis of the Best Interest 
Standard, 33 THEORETICAL MED. & BIOETHICS 179, 180 (2012). Douglas Diekema has written a number 
of articles arguing that the “harm principle”—that is, that “state intervention should not be trivial but 
should be triggered when a parental decision places the child at significant risk of serious harm”)—should 
replace the best interest standard, see, e.g., Douglas S. Diekema, Parental Refusals of Medical Treatment: 
The Harm Principle as Threshold for State Intervention, 25 THEORETICAL MED. & BIOETHICS 243, 252 
(2004) (introducing the “harm principle”); Douglas S. Diekema, Revisiting the Best Interest Standard: 
Uses and Misuses, 22 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 128, 128 (2011) (defending the “harm principle” as superior 
to the best interest standard). In a recent issue of the American Journal of Bioethics, several scholars 
further elaborated on the advantages of the best interest standard, see, e.g., Johan Christiaan Bester, The 
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ACIP-recommended vaccinations provide the quintessential example of a 
high benefit/low risk intervention. 
Parental choices to rely on misinformation about vaccines and mistrust 
of the medical profession, or to privilege personal philosophical or religious 
beliefs over the welfare of their children and the community, should not be 
given legal effect in light of the risks to unvaccinated children and the 
general public. Consistent with the Court’s assertion in Prince, parental 
rights do “not include liberty to expose the community or the child to 
communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death.”321  
The current balance of interests requires new legal solutions. States must 
consider policies to increase rates of parental compliance with mandatory 
vaccination laws.322 In addition, where reliance on the doctrine of parental 
consent fails adequately to protect the welfare of minors and presents a 
danger to the public health, alternate decisional mechanisms must be 
considered. We propose one such mechanism below. 
3. The Nature of Parental Opposition to Vaccinations Creates 
Challenging Barriers to Care 
The growing literature analyzing the vehement opposition that many 
parents demonstrate to childhood vaccinations323 reveals that this 
phenomenon presents particularly challenging barriers to care. While some 
parents may be only “vaccine-hesitant,” others may be “vaccine-rejecting,” 
                                                                                                                     
Harm Principle Cannot Replace the Best Interest Standard: Problems with Using the Harm Principle 
for Medical Decision Making for Children, 18 AM. J. BIOETHICS 9, 10 (2018) (providing a bioethical 
analysis favoring retention of the best interest standard); Thaddeus Mason Pope, The Best Interest 
Standard for Health Care Decision Making: Definition and Defense, 18 AM. J. BIOETHICS 36, 36 (2018) 
(supplementing Bester’s argument with a legal analysis favoring the best interest standard). 
321 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–67 (1944). 
322 Reiss & Weithorn, Responding to the Childhood Vaccination Crisis, supra note 7, at 1611–15.   
323 See, e.g., Amin et al., supra note 95, at 874, 877 (detailing the results of a study finding that 
endorsement of harm and fairness ideas do not predict parental vaccine hesitancy); Gabriela Capurro et 
al., Measles, Moral Regulation and the Social Construction of Risk: Media Narratives of “Anti-Vaxxers” 
and the 2015 Disneyland Outbreak, 43 CANADIAN J. SOC. 25, 40–42 (2018) (discussing the skewed 
media presentation of “anti-vaxxer” and “vaccine hesitant” parents in light of the 2015 Disneyland 
measles outbreak); Matthew Motta, Timothy Callaghan & Steven Sylvester, Knowing Less but 
Presuming More: Dunning-Kruger Effects and the Endorsement of Anti-Vaccine Policy Attitudes, 211 
SOC. SCI. & MED. 274, 274–75 (2018) (detailing the results of study that found that Dunning-Kruger 
effects explain vaccination opposition); Glen J. Nowak & Michael A. Cacciatore, Parents’ Confidence 
in Recommended Childhood Vaccinations: Extending the Assessment, Expanding the Context, 13 HUM. 
VACCINES & IMMUNOTHERAPEUTICS 687, 695–97 (2017) (discussing a study that examined confidence 
ratings and parental behavior towards vaccination); Gregory A. Poland, Jon C. Tilburt & Edgar K. 
Marcuse, Preserving Civility in Vaccine Policy Discourse: A Way Forward, 322 JAMA 209, 209–10 
(2019) (advocating for principled pluralism to restore civility to the vaccination discussion); Aaron 
Rothstein, Vaccines and Their Critics, Then and Now, 44 NEW ATLANTIS 3, 8–11 (2015) (overviewing 
the history and evolution of anti-vaccination movements).  
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that is, “adamant in their refusal to consider vaccination for their 
children.”324 Hagood and Herlihy indicate that, in the cases of these parents:  
[S]uch rejection may not be based upon previous history of a 
vaccine-related adverse event, or actual medical 
contraindication to vaccination, either for themselves or for 
their children. [Vaccine-rejector] parents may express beliefs 
that vaccines cause more harm than good, or that vaccines are 
a plot of a conspiracy involving governments, health 
organizations and pharmaceutical companies. They commonly 
express beliefs in other conspiracy theories as well. These 
belief systems indicate a lack of truth in public institutions and 
“allopathic” medicine. Therefore, [vaccine-rejector] parents 
are more likely to utilize so-called “complementary” or 
“alternative” medical practices, and are least likely to receive 
regular care in a pediatrician’s office. Thus, they are least 
likely to be open to education on the issue due to their 
irrational belief systems.325 
Parents who hold such strong beliefs are likely to see their minor child’s 
desire to be vaccinated in an extremely negative light. Adolescents will no 
doubt be well aware of their parents’ viewpoints and the futility of any 
attempt to persuade their parents to allow them to be vaccinated. Indeed, the 
parents’ refusal to vaccinate their children in prior years—contravening 
governmental policy and the social consensus favoring vaccination—
provides strong evidence that the parents would refuse to consent to 
vaccinations upon a request from their children.326  
Furthermore, minors may reasonably fear other negative repercussions 
from an expression of interest in being vaccinated, ranging from tension and 
conflict in the parent-child relationship, parental actions to prevent the minor 
from taking steps to become vaccinated, punitive consequences for the 
minor or, in extreme cases, abuse directed at the minor.327 Minors’ 
                                                                                                                     
324 E. Allison Hagood & Stacy Mintzer Herlihy, Addressing Heterogeneous Parental Concerns 
About Vaccination with a Multiple-Source Model: A Parent and Educator Perspective, 9 HUM. 
VACCINES & IMMUNOTHERAPEUTICS 1790, 1791 (2013). 
325 Id. (citations omitted). 
326 It is possible that some parents whose children are unvaccinated or who have received only some 
of the full series of recommended vaccines are not actively opposed to vaccinations but have simply not 
made the effort to complete the series. In those cases, parents may be willing to consent if their children 
request vaccination. Yet, as states tighten standards and procedures for vaccination exemptions, see Reiss 
& Weithorn, Responding to the Childhood Vaccination Crisis, supra note 7, at 918–19, the effort required 
to obtain exemptions will exceed the inconvenience of obtaining vaccinations, making it more and more 
likely that parental failure to fully vaccinate their children reflects intentional rejection of state 
requirements. 
327 While we are speculating that in rare cases such abuse might occur, we draw this inference from 
the occasional incidents in which those opposing vaccinations have threatened violence against scholars 
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knowledge of the fervent nature of their parents’ anti-vaccine attitudes may 
deter them from broaching the topic at all. Based on the zealousness with 
which many vaccine-rejecting parents advocate their viewpoints, we do not 
second-guess the wisdom of such cautiousness. Indeed, we argue that the 
nature of some parents’ strongly held opposition to recommended childhood 
vaccinations parallels parental opposition to abortion and other activities 
implicated by the “sensitive” health care interventions just discussed. While 
immunization for vaccine-preventable diseases does not fall within one of 
the traditional categories of behavior or treatment typically characterized as 
“sensitive,” the barriers to care are analogous. A minor’s expression of 
preferences inconsistent with parental viewpoints about vaccinations are 
likely to be treated as taboo in households headed by vaccine-opposing 
parents. A minor seeking immunization may be perceived as violating 
family values and norms. Children reasonably may worry that expression of 
disagreement with their parents on this matter will lead to rebuke by, or 
chastisement from, parents and obstruction of subsequent attempts to access 
vaccines.  
B. Statutory Authorization of Adolescents’ Independent Consent for 
Childhood Vaccinations 
A statutory exception to the doctrine of parental consent, authorizing 
older minors independently and confidentially to access state-mandated 
childhood vaccinations, constitutes an important addition to the range of 
legal responses states are implementing to confront the high rates of non-
vaccination within their populations. Access to childhood immunization for 
vaccine-preventable diseases is justified by the same factors that legitimize 
state empowerment of minors to provide independent consent in the context 
of the other statutory exceptions, bearing the strongest analogy to treatment 
for STDs. In both cases, the medical intervention seeks to protect minors 
from infectious diseases that present substantial risk to health and life. 
Furthermore, in both cases, infection of the minor presents immediate and 
serious dangers to others who might be exposed to the disease.   
1. Competence to Make Health Care Decisions 
According to legal principles in the fifty states, practitioners generally 
do not have legal authority to treat a patient unless that patient provides 
informed consent. In order to be legally valid, a patient’s health care 
                                                                                                                     
and others who promote policies consistent with ACIP and CDC vaccination recommendations. See, e.g., 
Meredith Wadman, Vaccination Opponents Target CDC Panel, 363 SCIENCE 1024, 1024 (2019), 
https://science.sciencemag.org/content/363/6431/1024.summary; Nina Shapiro, Vaccine Proponents 
Receive Death Threats. Again., FORBES (July 22, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ninashapiro/ 
2019/07/22/vaccine-proponents-receive-death-threats-again. 
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decisions must be informed, competent, and voluntary.328 The requirement 
that consent be informed imposes on health care practitioners the duty to 
disclose to prospective patients the information necessary to make the 
treatment decisions. That information should describe, consistent with the 
best available knowledge, and in a manner comprehensible to the patient: 
(1) the nature of the condition, illness, disorder, or symptom for which 
treatment is recommended; (2) the likely consequences of failure to treat the 
condition, illness, disorder, or symptom; (3) the nature of each alternative 
treatment; (4) the possible benefits, risks, discomforts, and side effects of 
each of the alternative treatments and their anticipated likelihood; and (5) 
the treating practitioner’s recommendation among the treatment alternatives 
and its rationale.329 The patient must be competent, that is, have the capacity 
to understand and, according to some standards, also to reason about, or 
appreciate the implications of, the information provided. Finally, patients’ 
decisions regarding treatment must be made voluntarily, that is, at a 
minimum, free from coercive or controlling influences, in order to be legally 
valid.330  
Beginning in the 1970s, researchers have engaged in empirical work 
conceptualizing, operationalizing, and evaluating competence to make 
treatment decisions. 331 This work was advanced substantially by the creation 
of the MacArthur Foundation Network on Treatment Competence. Building 
on the earlier research, that group developed standards for assessment of 
                                                                                                                     
328 Alan Meisel, Loren H. Roth & Charles W. Lidz, Toward a Model of the Legal Doctrine of 
Informed Consent, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 285, 286–87 (1977). 
329 This summary consolidates themes drawn from legal, bioethical, and medical guidelines. See, 
e.g., Code of Medical Ethics Opinion 2.1.1, AM. MED. ASS’N: INFORMED CONSENT, https://www.ama-
assn.org/delivering-care/ethics/informed-consent (last visited Mar. 17, 2020) (indicating that the 
physician should inform the patient of “1. The diagnosis (when known)[;] 2. The nature and purpose of 
recommended interventions[;] 3. The burdens, risks, and expected benefits of all options, including 
forgoing treatment”); TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 
121–22 (6th ed. 2009); Meisel, Roth & Lidz, supra note 328, at 286–87 (describing the three elements 
of informed consent); Alan Meisel & Lisa D. Kabnick, Informed Consent to Medical Treatment: An 
Analysis of Recent Legislation, 41 U. PITT. L. REV. 407, 421–38 (1980); Alan Meisel, The “Exceptions” 
to the Informed Consent Doctrine: Striking a Balance Between Competing Values in Medical 
Decisionmaking, 1979 WIS. L. REV. 413, 418.     
330 See Paul S. Appelbaum, Charles W. Lidz & Robert Klitzman, Voluntariness of Consent to 
Research: A Conceptual Model, 39 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 30, 30 (2009) (analyzing the meaning of the 
voluntariness requirement); Robert M. Nelson et al., The Concept of Voluntary Consent, 11 AM. J. 
BIOETHICS 6, 6 (2011) (same). 
331 See, e.g., PAUL S. APPELBAUM, CHARLES W. LIDZ & ALAN MEISEL, INFORMED CONSENT: 
LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL PRACTICE 3–4 (1987); CHARLES W. LIDZ ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: 
A STUDY OF DECISIONMAKING IN PSYCHIATRY 3–9 (1984); Loren H. Roth, Alan Meisel & Charles W. 
Lidz, Tests of Competency to Consent to Treatment, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 279, 280 (1977); Lois A. 
Weithorn & Susan B. Campbell, The Competency of Children and Adolescents to Make Informed 
Treatment Decisions, 53 CHILD DEV. 1589, 1595 (1982).  
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competence332 that have had substantial influence in law, scholarship, and 
medical practice. Scholars and researchers today generally recognize that the 
following standards of competence are core components of modern 
assessments of treatment decisionmaking capacity, although statutory or 
case law definitions of competence may emphasize some, but not all, as 
required in particular contexts: (1) ability to communicate a choice (that is, 
“[c]learly indicate a preferred treatment option”); (2) ability to understand 
relevant information (that is, “[g]rasp the fundamental meaning of 
information communicated by” the practitioner); (3) ability to reason about 
treatment options (i.e., “engage in a rational process of manipulating the 
relevant information”); and (4) ability to appreciate the situation and its 
likely consequences (that is, “acknowledge medical condition and likely 
consequences of treatment options”).333   
The four standards do not always appear in all legal definitions of 
competence. Most commonly, statutes will incorporate a focus on patient 
understanding of the information provided by the practitioner and 
communication of a treatment preference. For example, California—by 
statute—defines treatment decisionmaking capacity as “a person’s ability to 
understand the nature and consequences of a decision and to make and 
communicate a decision, and includes in the case of proposed health care, 
the ability to understand its significant benefits, risks, and alternatives.”334 
Yet, some statutes identify understanding and appreciation (of the 
consequences of the proposed surgical or medical treatment or procedures), 
while still others also incorporate a reasoning standard (such as “weigh risks 
and benefits” of the options and their likely consequences).335 The 
                                                                                                                     
332 See THOMAS GRISSO & PAUL S. APPELBAUM, ASSESSING COMPETENCE TO CONSENT TO 
TREATMENT: A GUIDE FOR PHYSICIANS AND OTHER HEALTH PROFESSIONALS 1–14 (1998) [hereinafter 
GRISSO & APPELBAUM, ASSESSING COMPETENCE]; Paul S. Appelbaum, Assessment of Patients’ 
Competence to Consent to Treatment, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1834, 1834 (2007) [hereinafter Appelbaum, 
Assessment]; Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas Grisso, The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study. I: 
Mental Illness and Competence to Consent to Treatment, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 105, 106 (1995) 
[hereinafter MacArthur I] (discussing the changes in medicine and law in response to mental illness); 
Jessica Wilen Berg, Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas Grisso, Constructing Competence: Formulating 
Standards of Legal Competence to Make Medical Decisions, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 345, 348 (1996); 
Thomas Grisso et al., The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study. II: Measures of Abilities Related to 
Competence to Consent to Treatment, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 127, 128 (1995) [hereinafter MacArthur 
II]; Thomas Grisso & Paul S. Appelbaum, The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study. III: Abilities of 
Patients to Consent to Psychiatric and Medical Treatments, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 149, 150 (1995) 
[hereinafter MacArthur III] (explaining the results). See also The MacArthur Treatment Competence 
Study: Executive Summary, MACARTHUR RES. NETWORK ON MENTAL HEALTH & L., 
http://www.macarthur.virginia.edu/treatment.html#N_1_ (last updated May 2004).  
333 GRISSO & APPELBAUM, ASSESSING COMPETENCE, supra note 332, at 31–60; Appelbaum, 
Assessment, supra note 332, at 1836 tbl.1; see also MacArthur I, supra note 332, at 108–11. 
334 CAL. PROB. CODE § 4609 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Regular Sess. ch. 524).   
335 For example, the competence concepts defining “maturity” for the purpose of the mature minor 
rule appear in statute or case law as follows: ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-9-602(7) (West, Westlaw through 
2019 Regular Sess. of the 92d Arkansas General Assembly) (authorizing “[a]ny unemancipated minor of 
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MacArthur group also developed standardized measures that can be used by 
health care practitioners336 or researchers.337 The measures allow evaluators 
to customize the assessment of capacity for each treatment or research 
decisionmaking context. 
Scholarship considering minors’ competence to make treatment 
decisions generally falls within two categories: (1) analyses of basic research 
on children’s development and maturation, cognitive functioning, 
socioemotional functioning, and other domains potentially relevant to 
capacity as defined by one or more legal standards; and (2) reports of 
empirical studies designed to measure children’s treatment decisionmaking 
competence, particularly in comparison with adults, by evaluating 
functioning relative to one or more legal standards of competence. Both sets 
of studies are important. The former category identifies and describes the 
domains and patterns of development that change over time, and how 
various factors affect their expression and maturation as children develop 
into adults. The latter category focuses specifically on assessment of minors’ 
capacities according to the legal tests identified above, ensuring that the 
skills and abilities measured are those that are criterion-relevant. Indeed, 
one of the most important contributions of the past several decades of 
research on legal competencies is the core principle that it is necessary to 
operationalize or translate the relevant legal tests into an assessment strategy 
or tool that allows measurement of the functional abilities specified by the 
applicable legal standard.338   
Capacity or competence to make treatment decisions339 is one of several 
types of functional abilities that may be of relevance to the law regulating 
                                                                                                                     
sufficient intelligence to understand and appreciate the consequences of the proposed surgical or medical 
treatment or procedures” to consent to such medical or surgical care “for himself or herself”); In re Swan, 
569 A.2d 1202, 1205 (Me. 1990) (holding that a minor has capacity to consent or refuse treatment when 
“the minor has the ability of the average person to understand and weigh the risks and benefits” and “if 
he is capable of appreciating the nature, extent, and probable consequences of the conduct consented to” 
(citation omitted)).   
336 THOMAS GRISSO & PAUL S. APPELBAUM, MACARTHUR COMPETENCE ASSESSMENT TOOL FOR 
TREATMENT (MACCAT-T) 1–2 (1998). 
337 PAUL S. APPELBAUM & THOMAS GRISSO, THE MACARTHUR COMPETENCE ASSESSMENT TOOL 
FOR CLINICAL RESEARCH (MACCAT-CR) 1–4 (2001).  
338 THOMAS GRISSO, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES: FORENSIC ASSESSMENTS AND INSTRUMENTS 
404–60 (2d ed. 2003) [hereinafter GRISSO, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES]. 
         339 The terms “capacity” and “competence,” in theory, have slightly different meanings in this 
context. Lois A. Weithorn, Psychological Distress, Mental Disorder, and Assessment of Decisionmaking 
Capacity Under U.S. Medical Aid in Dying Statutes, 71 HASTINGS L.J. 637, 641 & n.10 (2020) 
[hereinafter Weithorn, Aid in Dying Statutes]. One set of authors characterized the distinction: 
“‘Capacity’ refers to abilities relevant to performing a task, while ‘competency’ is a legal judgment that 
one has sufficient abilities to perform the task.” Elyn R. Saks & Stephen H. Behnke, Competency to 
Decide on Treatment and Research: MacArthur and Beyond, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 103, 110 
(1999). See also GRISSO & APPELBAUM, ASSESSING COMPETENCE, supra note 332, at 11 (“Most authors 
distinguish between assessments of decisionmaking capacity, which health care professionals can 
conduct, and determination of competence, which are legal judgments left to the courts.”). Yet, the 
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children’s lives.340 Different legal competencies tap somewhat different 
skills and abilities, which may mature on different developmental 
trajectories than other types of competencies of relevance to the law. 
“Unfortunately, many writers and professionals—including, but not limited 
to . . . policymakers and health care personnel—fail to differentiate among 
the various legal competencies . . . .”341 Because each type of legal 
competence is defined by functional criteria relevant to that legal context, 
assessments of each type of competence must track those situation-specific 
functional criteria.342 Findings of incompetence or competence in one legal 
sphere do not obviate the necessity to perform focused criterion-relevant 
assessments of capacity targeted to any other legal question that is of 
interest. This latter observation is one of several factors explaining why a 
conclusion that minors in a given age range may be less mature than adults 
in certain juvenile justice contexts, does not foreclose the question of 
whether minors in the same age range might be competent to make 
independent health care decisions.343 
2. Psychological and Neuroscientific Developmental Findings 
Informing Questions About Minors’ Capacities to Make Treatment 
Decisions 
In the 1970s and early 1980s, some scholars focused on the cognitive 
developmental work of researchers such as Piaget and Kohlberg to 
hypothesize when children would be able to perform the functions necessary 
to understand, reason about, and appreciate health care treatment 
                                                                                                                     
distinction breaks down in practice, particularly when state policies authorize health care professionals’ 
clinical evaluations of patients’ capacity to constitute legally valid judgments. Weithorn, Aid in Dying 
Statutes, supra, at 641 n.10. In such cases, clinicians’ determinations of capacity have the effect of legal 
judgments of competence. GRISSO & APPELBAUM, ASSESSING COMPETENCE, supra note 332, at 11. It is 
noteworthy, however, that, in the context of children’s legal authority to make health care decisions, the 
terms capacity and competence are frequently used interchangeably within or across cases, statutes, and 
scholarly publications. 
340 See, e.g., THOMAS GRISSO, FORENSIC EVALUATION OF JUVENILES 41–140 (2d ed. 2013); 
ELIZABETH S. SCOTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE 118–80 (2008); Lois A. 
Weithorn, Children’s Capacities in Legal Contexts, in CHILDREN, MENTAL HEALTH, AND THE LAW 25, 
49–50 (N. Dickon Reppucci et al. eds., 1984) [hereinafter Weithorn, Children’s Capacities in Legal 
Contexts].  
341 Weithorn, Children’s Capacities in Legal Contexts, supra note 340, at 49. 
342 GRISSO, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES, supra note 338, at 9 (“No single legal criterion or test 
applies across all legal competencies. Each legal competence refers to somewhat different abilities . . . 
.”). Even beyond the formal legal criteria for each type of competence, there are additional relevant 
situation-specific factors. Thus, for example, in determinations of competence to make treatment 
decisions, evaluators must be mindful of the types of information about treatment options that patients 
must understand and reason about in order to demonstrate competence. For expanded discussion of such 
additional relevant factors, see, for example, GRISSO & APPELBAUM, ASSESSING COMPETENCE, supra 
note 332, at 21–24. 
343 See infra notes 356–60 and accompanying text. 
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information.344 These researchers predicted that minors ages fourteen or 
fifteen might be able to demonstrate legally valid competence to consent.345 
As our knowledge of development has itself matured, ultimately 
incorporating neuroscientific understandings of brain development, together 
with direct observation of functioning when assessed with attention to the 
relevant legal standards, discussions about the relevance of these insights for 
children’s capacities in treatment contexts have evolved as well.  
Research on brain development has revealed that important neurological 
maturational changes continue to occur throughout adolescence, and into the 
early twenties.346 We have learned that the “frontal lobes, home to key 
components of the neural circuitry underlying ‘executive functions’ such as 
planning, working memory, and impulse control, are among the last areas of 
the brain to mature; they may not be fully developed until halfway through 
the third decade of life.”347 Furthermore, certain “psychosocial 
characteristics such as impulsivity, sensation seeking, future orientation, and 
susceptibility to peer pressure” show continued development into young 
adulthood.348 By contrast, however, “the ability of a[] [person] to reason and 
consider alternative courses of action . . . reaches adult levels during the 
mid-teen years.”349 Indeed, researchers have distinguished between “cold” 
and “hot” cognition.350 “Cold cognition refers to mental processes (such as 
working memory or response inhibition) employed in situations calling for 
deliberation in the absence of high levels of emotion.”351 Generally during 
circumstances characterized by “cold cognition,” minors have relatively 
unimpeded access to their close-to-adult-like logical reasoning abilities, in 
that emotional arousal is lower and the wild card of peer influence is 
minimized.352 “Hot cognition involves mental processes in affectively 
charged situations where deliberation is unlikely or difficult.”353 In these 
situations, factors such as impulse control and susceptibility to peer 
influence can interfere with an adolescent’s use of his or her reasoning and 
analytic thinking skills.354 Steinberg and others have noted what they refer 
                                                                                                                     
344 Grisso & Vierling, supra note 136, at 417, 420; Weithorn, Developmental Factors, supra note 
136, at 96. 
345 See Weithorn, Children’s Capacities in Legal Contexts, supra note 340, at 35–38. 
346 See, e.g., Sara B. Johnson, Robert W. Blum & Jay N. Giedd, Adolescent Maturity and the Brain: 
The Promise and Pitfalls of Neuroscience Research in Adolescent Health Policy, 45 J. ADOLESCENT 
HEALTH 216, 216 (2009) (finding that the brain continues to mature after the end of adolescence, 
justifying a link between neuromaturation and maturity of judgment).  
347 Id. 
348 Steinberg et al., supra note 137, at 587.  
349 Icenogle et al., supra note 137, at 79. 
350 Id. at 71. 
351 Id. 
352 Johnson et al., supra note 346, at 218; Steinberg, supra note 132, at 258. 
353 Icenogle et al., supra note 137, at 71.   
354 Steinberg, supra note 132, at 258. 
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to as a “maturity gap” in the points in development at which individuals are 
most likely to demonstrate adult-like functioning on tasks invoking cold 
versus hot cognition.355 
Researchers have distinguished the contexts in which minors’ health 
care decisions typically occur from those characterizing certain other 
decisions.356 They observe that the competencies needed for medical 
decisions typically occur in circumstances “where the presence of adult 
consultants and the absence of time pressure impose sufficient external 
control to minimize the dangers of impulsive decisionmaking.”357 By 
contrast, decisions made in the context of criminal behavior, driving, and 
use of alcohol and drugs, which are often influenced by peers, invoke hot 
cognition.358 Researchers examining the relevant psychological and 
neuroscientific databases generally predict that minors are capable of 
making mature health care decisions by adolescence.359 Yet, scholars 
disagree as to the precise ages during adolescence at which minors are likely 
to be capable of demonstrating adult-like decisionmaking in the cold 
cognition context of medical care. Some predict that minors as young as 
eleven or twelve may manifest such capacities,360 while others identify ages 
fifteen or sixteen.361 Predictions are just that, of course, and must be further 
investigated with measures that operationalize the legal standards. It is 
possible that minors will achieve adult-like levels of capacity at different 
ages, depending on the standard of competence evaluated. In addition, 
certain health care treatment situations will present more complex and 
challenging decisionmaking tasks. Finally, as noted below, depending on the 
risk-benefit profile of the treatments involved and the range of legal and 
social factors surrounding the treatment context, policymakers may impose 
a “sliding scale” of sorts in setting the threshold that separates competence 
from incompetence, imposing a higher threshold in some situations, and a 
lower one in others.362 Without specification of the relevant standards of 
competence, the complexity and difficulty of the particular health care 
decision, and the degree of capacity that must be demonstrated in order to 
be considered competent, predictions regarding ages at which minors will 
be capable are necessarily imprecise.  
                                                                                                                     
355 Icenogle et al., supra note 137, at 82–83; Steinberg, supra note 132, at 261–65. 
356 Icenogle et al., supra note 137, at 71 (citation omitted). 
357 Id. 
358 Id. 
359 See infra notes 360–62 and accompanying text.  
360 Petronella Grootens-Wiegers et al., Medical Decision-Making in Children and Adolescents: 
Developmental and Neuroscientific Aspects, 17 BMC PEDIATRICS 120, 126 (2017).  
361 Icenogle et al., supra note 137, at 80 (citation omitted).  
362 This concept is discussed further below. See infra Part III.B.4. 
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3. Empirical Research Examining Children’s Capacities to Make 
Treatment Decisions 
Some researchers have empirically investigated minors’ capacities to 
make treatment decisions by evaluating children’s understanding or 
appreciation of, or reasoning about, hypothetical treatment scenarios or their 
actual health care situation.363 Weithorn and Campbell’s 1982 study, and 
some investigations that have succeeded the MacArthur Treatment 
Competence Study’s work, have incorporated assessment according to the 
several legal standards emphasized by the MacArthur work.364 While some 
research examined participants’ responses to hypothetical medical vignettes 
in the laboratory,365 others evaluated the capacities of participants who were 
medical patients concerning their own treatment or potential treatment or 
clinical research protocols.366  
Those studies that have conducted criterion-relevant assessments in 
which the measures used track the legal standards that courts and legislators 
have determined should serve the gatekeeping function when patients’ 
capacities to decide are at issue have not found statistically significant 
                                                                                                                     
363 For reviews of such studies, see EXPERT PANEL WORKING GRP. ON MAID FOR MATURE 
MINORS, COUNCIL OF CANADIAN ACADS., THE STATE OF KNOWLEDGE ON MEDICAL ASSISTANCE IN 
DYING FOR MATURE MINORS (2018), https://cca-reports.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/The-State-of-
Knowledge-on-Medical-Assistance-in-Dying-for-Mature-Minors.pdf (summarizing ethical, legal, and 
clinical perspectives on medical assistance in dying (MAID)); Victoria A. Miller et al., Children’s 
Competence for Assent and Consent: A Review of Empirical Findings, 14 ETHICS & BEHAV. 255, 255 
(2004). 
364 See Tiffany Chenneville et al., Decisional Capacity Among Youth with HIV: Results from the 
MacArthur Competence Tool for Treatment, 28 AIDS PATIENT CARE & STDS 425, 426 (2014); Irma M. 
Hein et al., Why Is It Hard to Make Progress in Assessing Children’s Decision-Making Competence?, in 
IRMA M. HEIN, CHILDREN’S COMPETENCE TO CONSENT TO MEDICAL TREATMENT OR RESEARCH 9, 10 
(2015), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/28c0/43408c5e5ca1f5ce218ed811cf749d16096e.pdf 
[hereinafter Hein et al., Children’s Competence to Consent]; Irma M. Hein et al., Accuracy of the 
MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool for Clinical Research (MacCAT-CR) for Measuring Children’s 
Competence to Consent to Clinical Research, 168 JAMA PEDIATRICS 1147, 1148 (2014) [hereinafter 
Hein et al., Accuracy] (assessing competence to consent against legal age standards); Irma M. Hein et 
al., Feasibility of an Assessment Tool for Children’s Competence to Consent to Predictive Genetic 
Testing: A Pilot Study, 24 J. GENETIC COUNSELING 971, 973 (2015) [hereinafter Hein et al., Feasibility]; 
Irma M. Hein et al., Informed Consent Instead of Assent Is Appropriate in Children from the Age of 
Twelve: Policy Implications of New Findings on Children’s Competence to Consent to Clinical Research, 
16 BMC MED. ETHICS 76, 78–79 (2015) [hereinafter Hein et al., Informed Consent]; Debbie Schachter 
et al., Informed Consent and Stimulant Medication: Adolescents’ and Parents’ Ability to Understand 
Information About Benefits and Risks of Stimulant Medication for the Treatment of 
Attention-Deficient/Hyperactivity Disorder, 21 J. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 139, 
146–47 (2011) (discussing capacity to consent in the context of adolescent behavioral disorders); Lois 
A. Weithorn & Susan B. Campbell, The Competency of Children and Adolescents to Make Informed 
Treatment Decisions, 53 CHILD DEV. 1589, 1590 (1982). 
365 Miller et al., supra note 363, at 271; Weithorn & Campbell, supra note 364, at 1592.   
366 Chenneville et al., supra note 364, at 426; Hein et al., Children’s Competence to Consent, supra 
note 364, at 16; Hein et al., Accuracy, supra note 364, at 1148; Hein et al., Feasibility, supra note 364, 
at 973; Hein et al., Informed Consent, supra note 364, at 2; Schachter et al., supra note 364, at 140. 
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differences between the capacities of adolescents ages fourteen and older 
and comparison groups of adults.367 Weithorn and Campbell examined 
ten- to eleven-year-olds, fourteen-year-olds, eighteen-year-olds, and 
twenty-one-year-olds, and found statistically significant differences 
between the youngest group and the three older groups on most competence 
scales.368 They did not examine twelve or thirteen-year-olds. Hein and her 
colleagues have examined the capacities of minors within this earlier 
adolescent and pre-adolescent group.369 Their work suggests that even 
minors as young as twelve and thirteen years of age can demonstrate 
adult-like competence according to legal standards.370  
A Canadian panel of experts was charged with making 
recommendations regarding the availability of medical aid in dying to 
mature minors. In summarizing the body of empirical work on adolescents’ 
competence to consent, the panel concluded: “Together, these data point to 
the idea that cognitive foundations for mature decisions are generally in 
place by early adolescence (12 to 15 years of age). Therefore, age should not 
preclude a minor from providing informed consent to the same healthcare 
decisions that adults are presumed capable of making.”371  
Several observations regarding the findings discussed here are relevant. 
First, although researchers applying the studies discussed in Part III.B.2 
suggest that age fifteen is the point at which minors have developed 
adult-like cognitive skills that facilitate the logical reasoning and 
understanding tasks relevant to competence,372 some who have assessed 
capacity according to criterion-relevant competence measures with samples 
including preadolescents have identified age twelve as the point at which 
minors do not differ significantly from adults.373 The findings from these 
two sets of studies are not necessarily inconsistent. It is possible that the 
skills required to be competent according to legal standards may not require 
acquisition of fully developed adult skills. Rather, those minors whose 
logical reasoning and cognitive analytic abilities approach adult-like 
levels—that is, those who are ages twelve, thirteen, and fourteen—may have 
attained sufficient levels of capacity to meet legal standards of treatment 
                                                                                                                     
367 See, e.g., Weithorn & Campbell, supra note 364, at 1596.  
368 Id. at 1591, 1595. 
369 Hein et al., Children’s Competence to Consent, supra note 364, at 10; Hein et al., Accuracy, 
supra note 364, at 1148; Hein et al., Feasibility, supra note 364, at 973; Hein et al., Informed Consent, 
supra note 364, at 6–7. 
370 Hein et al., Children’s Competence to Consent, supra note 364, at 12; Hein et al., Accuracy, 
supra note 364, at 1151–52; Hein et al., Feasibility, supra note 364, at 975–76; Hein et al., Informed 
Consent, supra note 364, at 6. 
371 EXPERT PANEL WORKING GRP. ON MAID FOR MATURE MINORS, COUNCIL OF CANADIAN 
ACADS., supra note 363, at 74. 
372 Id.  
373 Id. 
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decisionmaking competence, despite the continued development of those 
abilities likely to occur in the subsequent few years.   
Second, and importantly, the developmental neuroscience research 
reveals that socioemotional factors—that is, psychosocial maturity—can 
impair adolescent decisionmaking.374 Thus, in any health care context in 
which minors’ participation in decisionmaking is sought, factors that 
deleteriously affect minors’ abilities to exercise their logical reasoning and 
analytic processes should be identified, and minimized. For example, minors 
will be best able to make use of their cognitive capacities if they are provided 
with complete information, and are given time to process, analyze, and 
discuss the information in consultation with neutral adults such as health 
care professionals.  
Third, not all health care decisions are the same. Two sets of factors, in 
particular, distinguish some decisions from others. On one hand, the 
complexity of the disclosed information may vary as might the difficulty of 
deciding among options. It is possible that some health care choices require 
more sophisticated cognitive decisionmaking skills than do others. This, in 
turn, could lead to findings of developmental differences depending on the 
complexity of the information and difficulty of deciding among options. 
This could lead to developmental differences among minors during the 
transitional ages of twelve to fifteen years, varying with the cognitive 
demands of the health care decision. On the other hand, and independent of 
the cognitive tasks required, health care decisions differ as well in terms of 
the constitutional and policy issues discussed earlier in this Article. Use of 
different standards of competence, and different thresholds for determining 
when competence is achieved, may be appropriate depending upon the 
nature and consequences of particular health care decisions and the 
constellation of interests involved.   
Based on the relevant research on children’s capacities, and in light of 
the nature and policy context of decisions regarding the recommended 
childhood vaccinations, we conclude that there is ample evidence that 
minors ages fourteen and older can be presumed to be competent to make 
decisions to receive vaccinations independent of parental consent. We 
believe that the policy goals underlying this proposal can be more efficiently 
achieved if states adopt a statutory age of consent of fourteen years, rather 
than requiring minors age fourteen and older to demonstrate capacity on a 
case by case basis. The more efficient option is justified in this context, 
where the intervention is a highly effective low risk-high benefit 
intervention, the risks to the child’s and public’s health of creating barriers 
to access are great, and empirical research on minors’ capacities supports a 
policy granting decisionmaking authority to children age fourteen and older. 
We temper this recommendation, however, with the important caveat that, 
                                                                                                                     
374 Id. at 81. 
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if a state makes vaccinations available to minors without parental consent, 
the administering health care professionals must ensure that the informed 
consent interaction is a thoughtful and deliberative one that facilitates the 
minors’ best use of their cognitive capacities. This is most likely to be 
achieved if the administrating professional takes the time necessary to fully 
inform, discuss, and address questions about the immunizations.   
In addition, in light of the policy goals just discussed, the low risk/high 
benefit profile of the vaccinations, and research findings by Hein and 
colleagues,375 it is reasonable to presume that minors ages twelve or thirteen 
are also competent to choose vaccinations for themselves. Indeed, we 
encourage legislatures to allow twelve- and thirteen-year-olds to provide 
independent consent for vaccinations if a physician finds them to be 
competent. Furthermore, courts employing a “mature minor” standard that 
does not incorporate rigid age-based criteria could, in particular 
circumstances, determine that any particular minor in the preadolescent age 
group is mature enough to decide.   
4. Risk-Related or Sliding-Scale Considerations in Determining the 
Appropriate Threshold of Treatment Decisionmaking Competence 
Health care decisions occur within particular contexts, and there may be 
policy reasons for setting higher or lower standards as the threshold 
delineating competence from incompetence.376 Some scholars emphasize the 
importance of examining the consequences—and particularly the 
risk-benefit ratio of a treatment decision—when setting the threshold for 
competence.377 In elaborating upon this “sliding scale” model, Thomas 
Grisso and Paul Appelbaum point out that “[a]s a general rule, a lower 
threshold for competence is set when a patient is accepting a treatment 
option” with a high benefit/low risk profile.378 By contrast, “a somewhat 
higher threshold for competence may be required for patients who are 
refusing” high benefit/low risk treatments.379  
In some respects, standards for decisionmaking in each health care 
context are an expression of the government’s reconciliation of the tensions 
among competing goals and values inherent in the decisions.380 We may 
                                                                                                                     
375 See supra notes 28–71 and 364–71 and accompanying text. 
376 See generally GRISSO & APPELBAUM, ASSESSING COMPETENCE, supra note 332; Dan W. Brock, 
Decisionmaking Competence and Risk, 5 BIOETHICS 105, 105 (1991); Ian Wilks, The Debate Over Risk-
Related Standards of Competence, 11 BIOETHICS 413, 426 (1997); Weithorn, Aid in Dying Statutes, 
supra note 339, at 687–91.  
377 GRISSO & APPELBAUM, ASSESSING COMPETENCE, supra note 332, at 24–26; SCOTT Y. KIM, 
EVALUATION OF CAPACITY TO CONSENT TO TREATMENT AND RESEARCH 34–35 (2010). 
378 GRISSO & APPELBAUM, ASSESSING COMPETENCE, supra note 332, at 25. 
379 Id. 
380 Alternatively, we can conceptualize these balances as reflecting reconciliation of competing 
bioethical principles of beneficence or paternalism versus decisional autonomy. See, e.g., Brock, supra 
note 376, at 105. With respect to decisionmaking for or by children, three sets of interests typically 
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therefore apply lower standards of competence when the state, acting in its 
parens patriae or police power role, seeks to facilitate patients’ access to a 
low risk/high benefit treatment. We can see this principle at work when we 
envision the prospect of refusing to give a twelve-year-old antibiotics for 
treatment of a sexually transmitted disease, knowing the minor may not 
return to the clinic with a parent if refused independent access. In this case, 
the strength of the parens patriae interests (ameliorating suffering and 
preventing serious illness, disability, or death), the police power interests 
(avoiding further transmission of the infection to future sexual partners of 
the minor and identifying past partners for treatment and counseling on 
preventive measures), in combination with the minor’s voluntary request for 
services and the low risk/high benefit treatment profile could reasonably 
lead policymakers to apply a less demanding standard of competence. The 
decision of where to set the bar or threshold in determining competence is 
not a scientific one. It is a social policy judgment and reflects the delicate 
balance between competing interests. The competence threshold will and 
should depend on the consequences of the choices involved. For example, 
when a minor is choosing whether to consent to a low risk/high benefit 
intervention endorsed by medical consensus and government mandate, there 
is no reason to require the minor to demonstrate a higher level of capacity or 
broader array of skills than are required of adults in similar contexts. In the 
case of ACIP-recommended vaccinations, strong parens patriae and police 
power interests converge with the minors’ own interests in maintaining 
health and exercising autonomy. By contrast, different standards and 
decision rules might operate if a minor wished to refuse a lifesaving 
treatment with a relatively low risk and high benefit profile. In that case, the 
minor’s rejection of treatment is in conflict with the state’s interest in 
promoting the minor’s health, justifying a somewhat more persuasive 
demonstration of maturity.381 
                                                                                                                     
compete: those of the state, parents, and child. See supra Section II.B. Jennifer Rosato emphasizes the 
context-dependence of the decisionmaking guidelines involving children, noting that “[t]he facts in each 
case need to be carefully considered to determine” the particular balance of potentially competing 
bioethical principles. Rosato, supra note 132, at 795. 
381 The operation of the current constellation of policies governing minors’ treatment 
decisionmaking in the United Kingdom provides an example. Sensible policy making may distinguish 
between authorizing minors to make independent decisions regarding consent to recommended 
treatments and authorizing them to make independent decisions regarding refusal of recommended 
treatments where such refusal would subject them to a substantial risk of death or serious bodily harm. 
See, e.g., Stephen Gilmore & Jonathan Herring, “No” Is the Hardest Word: Consent and Children’s 
Autonomy, 23 CHILD & FAM. L. Q. 3, 3 (2011). For a discussion of some of the situational factors that 
might lead to greater scrutiny of minors’ health care preferences, see Diekema, supra note 217, at 214.  
We note, however, that acceptance of treatment does not necessarily argue for lower, narrower 
standards and rejection for higher, broader standards. A decision to refuse treatment may not trigger a 
broader and more searching maturity inquiry where a patient’s prognosis with treatment is poor and the 
costs of continuing treatment outweigh the benefits. Indeed, whether sole reliance on the preferences of 
a capable minor in such situations is appropriate may depend, in part, on the minor’s prognosis and the 
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In general, therefore, when a minor’s interests (in promoting and 
protecting his or her health and in exercising decisional autonomy) converge 
with the state’s interests in promoting the minor’s health and protecting the 
public’s health, a lower threshold for determining capacity might be set to 
enable a minor to access a low risk/high benefit intervention that is 
medically necessary to protect against an infectious disease. Furthermore, 
depending on the particular decisionmaking context, the threshold dividing 
competence from incompetence, and the choice of standards of competence, 
might vary.   
C. Protecting the Confidentiality of Minors’ Independent Contacts with 
Health Care Professionals Regarding Vaccinations 
We have analogized the need for adolescent access to vaccinations 
independent of parental consent to access to “sensitive” health care services, 
such as contraception, abortion, diagnosis and treatment for STDs, mental 
health and substance abuse, and sexual assault.382 Various health care 
provider associations recommend that when states extend to minors the legal 
right to consent to sensitive treatments independent of parents, the medical 
information must be maintained in confidence if the adolescents choose not 
to authorize disclosure.383 Most such associations also recommend advising 
                                                                                                                     
risk/benefit profile of the proposed intervention. A minor’s refusal of life-saving intervention in certain 
contexts may require special decision rules. See, e.g., Comm. on Bioethics, Informed Consent in 
Decision-Making in Pediatric Practice, 138 PEDIATRICS 1, 4 (2016). 
382 See supra Section III.B.2.iii. 
383 See, e.g., Am. Med. Ass’n, Code of Ethics Opinion 5.055 – Confidential Care for Minors, 16 
VIRTUAL MENTOR 901, 901–02 (2014), https://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/sites/journalofethics.ama-
assn.org/files/2018-05/coet1-1411.pdf (“For minors who are mature enough to be unaccompanied by 
their parents for their examination, confidentiality of information disclosed during an exam, interview, 
or in counseling should be maintained. Such information may be disclosed to parents when the patient 
consents to disclosure.”); Ass’n of Women’s Health, Obstetric & Neonatal Nurses, Confidentiality in 
Adolescent Health Care: Position Statement, 46 J. OBSTETRICAL GYNECOLOGICAL & NEONATAL 
NURSES 889, 889 (2017) (“Nurses are responsible to provide safe, high quality, confidential health care 
to adolescents.”); Pamela J. Burke et al., Soc’y for Adolescent Health & Med., Sexual and Reproductive 
Health Care: A Position Paper of the Society for Adolescent Health and Medicine, 54 J. ADOLESCENT 
HEALTH 491, 492 (2014) (“Be aware of and promote the availability of confidential [sexual and 
reproductive health] services to ensure that adolescents, especially those at greatest risk, do not forego 
needed care.”); Comm. on Adolescence, Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, The Adolescent’s Right to Confidential 
Care when Considering Abortion, 139 PEDIATRICS 1, 1 (2017) (“[The AAP] reaffirms its position that 
the rights of adolescents to confidential care when considering abortion should be protected.”); Am. 
Acad. of Family Physicians, Adolescent Health Care, Confidentiality, AAFP.ORG, 
https://www.aafp.org/about/policies/all/adolescent-confidentiality.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2019) 
(“Physicians should deliver confidential health services in situations involving sexuality (including 
sexually transmitted infections, contraception, and pregnancy), substance use/abuse, and mental health 
to consenting adolescents.”). See also NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., THE PROMISE OF 
ADOLESCENCE: REALIZING OPPORTUNITY FOR ALL YOUTH 231–35 (Richard J. Bonnie & Emily P. 
Backes eds., 2019) (addressing the importance of ensuring confidentiality and privacy for adolescents in 
the context of screening and services for “sensitive” health matters). 
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adolescents to involve their parents in their health care decisions whenever 
possible, while recognizing that, without protections for confidentiality, 
many minors will forego seeking services.384 
Research findings and clinical experiences reveal that minors’ concerns 
about parental access to health care information can be a major deterrent to 
adolescents seeking, and therefore receiving, needed care for sensitive health 
matters (such as those related to sexual activity and reproduction, sexually 
transmitted diseases, mental health or substance use, or sexual assault).385 
For example, one comprehensive national study reported that  
U.S. adolescents who forgo care due in whole or in part to 
confidentiality concern are a particularly high-risk population 
in need of health care services. Among boys, prevalence of 
mental health difficulties was significantly higher among 
those who cited confidentiality concern as a reason for forgone 
care, as compared with those who did not cite confidentiality 
concern. Among girls, those citing confidentiality concern had 
a significantly higher prevalence of risk characteristics related 
to mental health, sexual/reproductive health, and substance 
use. . . . [A]dolescents who reported elevated depressive 
symptom levels, suicidal ideation, suicide attempt, sexual 
activity, birth control nonuse at last sex, STI history, alcohol 
use, and/or unsatisfactory parental communication were 
significantly more likely than adolescents who did not report 
these factors to cite confidentiality concern as a reason for not 
seeking needed care in the past year.386 
                                                                                                                     
384 For examples of such recommendations, see Am. Med. Ass’n, Code of Ethics Opinion 5.055 –
Confidential Care for Minors, supra note 383, at 901; Pamela J. Burke et al., Soc’y for Adolescent Health 
& Med., supra note 383, at 492; Comm. on Adolescence, Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, supra note 383, at 1; 
Am. Acad. of Family Physicians, Adolescent Health Care, Confidentiality, supra note 383, at 1.  
385 See, e.g., Jocelyn A. Lehrer et al., Foregone Health Care Among U.S. Adolescents: Associations 
Between Risk Characteristics and Confidentiality Concern, 40 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 218, 222 (2007) 
(examining “risk characteristics of adolescents for whom confidentiality concerns” deterred use of health 
care services); Jami S. Leichliter et al., Confidentiality Issues and Use of Sexually Transmitted Disease 
Services Among Sexually Experienced Persons Aged 15-25 Years—United States, 2013-2015, 66 
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 237, 239 (2017) (reporting a relationship between minors’ 
reluctance to seek reproductive and sexual health care and concerns of disclosure to parents). See also 
supra Section III.B. 
386 Lehrer et al., supra note 385, at 222. Other studies support the observation that a substantial 
proportion of adolescents who forego needed medical care do so out of concerns about confidentiality. 
See, e.g., Tina L. Cheng et al., Confidentiality in Health Care: A Survey of Knowledge, Perceptions and 
Attitudes Among High School Students, 269 JAMA 1404, 1407 (1993); Carol A. Ford et al., Foregone 
Health Care Among Adolescents, 282 JAMA 2227, 2232 (1999); Jonathan D. Klein et al., Access to 
Medical Care for Adolescents: Results from the 1997 Commonwealth Fund Survey of the Health of 
Adolescent Girls, 25 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 120, 125 (1999).    
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We expect that in the absence of confidentiality for services related to 
vaccinations, minors will likewise be deterred from seeking care 
independent of parental consent. Parents who have refused vaccinations for 
their minor children have already registered their strong opposition to the 
minor’s receipt of vaccinations by rejecting medical recommendations and 
refusing to comply with legal requirements. Minors in the age groups that 
we recommend be eligible to receive vaccinations without parental consent 
will be aware of their parents’ viewpoints on these matters. 
Legal protections for confidentiality of minors seeking medical services 
independent of parental consent vary across states and with types of health 
care service.387 At the federal level, parents typically have full access to their 
child’s medical records under the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA)’s rules, because they act as their child’s 
personal representatives.388 HIPAA’s provisions indicate, however, that 
when a minor exercises a personal legal right to obtain the relevant 
treatment—that is, if the minor has a right to consent directly—the minor 
retains independent control over her records.389 Yet, HIPAA’s policy may 
not be the last word on this matter. HIPAA typically defers to state 
regulations concerning parental authority and minor children’s health care 
information.390 Depending on the particular state policies, such deference 
may “allow or prohibit disclosure of confidential information [regarding 
adolescents’ health care] to parents or guardians.”391 Therefore, state 
legislators have substantial control over the level of privacy protection given 
to health care information flowing from adolescents’ contacts with health 
care professionals. Legislators can pair statutory authorization for minors to 
                                                                                                                     
387 See ABIGAIL ENGLISH ET AL., GUTTMACHER INST., CONFIDENTIALITY FOR INDIVIDUALS 
INSURED AS DEPENDENTS: A REVIEW OF STATE LAWS AND POLICIES 5–6 (2012), 
https://www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/confidentiality-review.pdf; JOY PRITTS ET AL., 
HEALTH POLICY INST. & O’NEILL INST. FOR NAT’L & GLOB. HEALTH LAW, PRIVACY AND SECURITY 
SOLUTIONS FOR INTEROPERABLE HEALTH INFORMATION EXCHANGE: REPORT ON STATE MEDICAL 
RECORD ACCESS LAWS 3-12–3-18 apps. A-8a–A-9d (2009), https://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/ 
files/290-05-0015-state-law-access-report-1.pdf; Amy L. McGuire & Courtenay R. Bruce, Keeping 
Children’s Secrets: Confidentiality in the Physician-Patient Relationship, 8 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 
315, 320–28 (2008); Amy B. Middleman & Kelly A. Olson, Confidentiality in Adolescent Health Care, 
UPTODATE (Aug. 5, 2019), https://www.uptodate.com/contents/confidentiality-in-adolescent-health-
care.  
388 Uses and Disclosures of Protected Health Information: General Rules, 45 C.F.R. § 
164.502(g)(3)(i) (2018); see also ENGLISH ET AL., supra note 387, at 5–6; PRITTS ET AL., supra note 387, 
at 3-11–3-12.  
389 Uses and Disclosures of Protected Health Information: General Rules, 45 C.F.R. § 
164.502(g)(3)(i) (2018); see also ENGLISH ET AL., supra note 387, at 5–6 (discussing HIPAA 
confidentiality standards); PRITTS ET AL., supra note 387, at 3–11. 
390 PRITTS ET AL., supra note 387, at 3-11–3-12. 
391 HIPAA, Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,462 (Dec. 28, 2000); Standards for Privacy of Identifiable 
Health Information, 67 Fed. Reg 53,182, 53,199–53,203 (Aug. 14, 2002); Melissa Weddle & Patricia K. 
Kokotailo, Confidentiality and Consent in Adolescent Substance Abuse: An Update, 7 VIRTUAL MENTOR 
239, 240 (2005) (citations omitted). 
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consent to vaccines with protection of the confidentiality of the health care 
information related to those services. We recommend such confidentiality 
provisions as an essential component of such legislation. 
Even when state laws prohibit disclosure of adolescent health care 
information to parents by health care professionals, however, this protection 
would not automatically prevent the parent from receiving an Explanation 
of Benefits (EOB) from the insurance company if the minor uses the parent’s 
health insurance plan to pay for the vaccinations.392 Many states require 
EOBs to be provided to subscribers to prevent health fraud.393 This 
requirement has already created privacy concerns for young adults (ages 
eighteen and older) who are covered on their parents’ health plans until age 
twenty-six.394 Similar disclosure problems have arisen in the context of 
treatment for sexually transmitted diseases.395 Regulation of obligations to 
provide EOBs for a specific treatment typically occurs at the state level, 
together with insurance company or plan policies.396 Therefore, it will be 
necessary for state legislators to include a provision that protects minors 
against inadvertent disclosure of their vaccinations through insurance 
communications to parents. 
IV. STATES LEGISLATION AUTHORIZING MINORS’ CONSENT TO 
VACCINATION: A PROPOSAL 
As discussed in Parts II and III, there are strong grounds to authorize 
minors to consent to vaccines, independent of their parents. We agree with 
Silverman and colleagues on this issue that doing so is consistent with a 
range of policy objectives and ethical principles in health care delivery and 
is justified by the literature on adolescents’ decisionmaking.397 This Section 
develops a legislative proposal.  
We strongly recommend enacting the proposed changes via statute. 
Legislative enactment constitutes a more effective mechanism for 
introducing policy reform than does case-by-case judicial determination. 
First, statutes can contain clear, specific language and criteria for the purpose 
                                                                                                                     
392 ENGLISH ET AL., supra note 387, at 9–13.  
393 Id. at 5.  
394 Id.; Valerie K. Blake & Jessica A. Haught, Health Care at a Price: The Impact on Young Adults’ 
Medical Privacy and Autonomy of Being Covered on Their Parents’ Health Insurance Until Age 
Twenty-Six, 51 FAM. L.Q. 303, 304 (2017). 
395 HARRIET B. FOX & STEPHANIE J. LIMB, INCENTER STRATEGIES: THE NAT’L ALL. TO ADVANCE 
ADOLESCENT HEALTH, STATE POLICIES AFFECTING THE ASSURANCE OF CONFIDENTIAL CARE FOR 
ADOLESCENTS 1–2 (2008), http://ww2.nasbhc.org/RoadMap/CareManagement/Special%20Topics/ 
State%20Policies%20and%20Confidential%20Care%20for%20Adolescents%20NAAAH.pdf; Ctrs. for 
Disease Control & Prevention, Sexually Transmitted Diseases Treatment Guidelines, 2010, 17 
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1, 10 (2010), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/rr/rr5912.pdf. 
396 FOX & LIMB, supra note 395, at 3–4 (noting that state policies govern EOB requirements even 
for Medicaid). 
397 Silverman et al., supra note 11, at 104. 
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of regulating the relevant subject matter. Drafters can anticipate a broad 
range of fact patterns that may fall within the purview of the statute. By 
contrast, judicial decisions vary substantially in the degree to which they 
merely resolve the dispute before the court or can delineate rules that will 
govern prospectively. Second, legislatures are generally viewed as more 
competent in developing policies that respond to social needs and changes 
for the purpose of bringing about prospective law reform.398 While courts 
may and do respond to such changes when necessary to resolve a dispute or 
adjudicate a constitutional challenge, various doctrines (such as stare 
decisis) and judicial philosophies (such as judicial restraint in deciding cases 
as narrowly as possible) limit the potential breadth of a holding’s 
applicability.399 Third, legislatures can engage in research that takes into 
account scientific information, epidemiological data, and other sources that 
will inform their lawmaking. Courts may also consider such sources, but 
may be limited by the rules of evidence as well as the proclivities of 
individual judges to consider extra-legal knowledge and expertise.400 Fourth, 
legislation can avoid conflicts with existing statutes by referencing the 
relationship between the new provisions and existing law. If such potential 
conflicts are not raised by the parties in litigation, it is possible the conflicts 
will not be addressed by a judicial decision.401 Finally, as we note below, in 
the context of authorizing minors to have independent access to 
vaccinations, there are uniquely legislative functions—such as allocation of 
funds—that are required for effective implementation of the policies. In 
addition, only the legislature can ensure that companion provisions essential 
to the efficacy of the policy reform, such as confidentiality protections, are 
included in the reform package. Because it is possible that not all states will 
pass such statutes, however, Part V suggests a limited judicial solution in the 
absence of a legislative response.  
                                                                                                                     
398 See, e.g., STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND 
POLITICAL CHANGE, at xxiii–xxiv (2d ed. 2004); Jed Barnes, In Defense of Asbestos Tort Litigation: 
Rethinking Legal Process Analysis in a World of Uncertainty, Second Bests, and Shared Policy-Making 
Responsibility, 34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 5, 6–7, 15–16 (2009) (contrasting judicial and legislative 
functions). 
399 Barnes, supra note 398, at 8, 10; Doriane Lambelet Coleman & Philip M. Rosoff, The Legal 
Authority of Mature Minors to Consent to General Medical Treatment, 131 PEDIATRICS 786, 788 (2013). 
Note that courts sometimes do step in successfully when legislatures do not act. In general, however, 
policy reforms are more frequently and appropriately effectuated by legislatures. Barnes, supra note 398, 
at 6–7, 15–16. 
400 Barnes, supra note 398, at 8, 10.  
401 For example, below we observe that the complex interplay of federal and state confidentiality 
protections, as well as the regulations regarding insurance company dissemination of Explanations of 
Benefits to subscribers, may conflict with, and thereby undercut, state policies allowing minors to consent 
independently to vaccinations. See supra notes 387–97 and accompanying text. Therefore, it will be 
necessary for the legislature to take proactive steps to reconcile the potential conflicts when creating an 
exception to the doctrine of parental consent as applied to recommended vaccinations.  
 
343891-Connecticut_Law_52-2_Text.indd   323 7/28/20   10:48 AM
 
852 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:2 
Our central proposal, however, recommends statutory reform, creating 
a treatment-specific exception to the doctrine of sole parental consent in the 
context of childhood vaccinations. The exception would authorize certain 
groups of minors to consent independently to ACIP-recommended 
vaccinations. Such an exception is consistent with the law creating other 
limited exceptions to the policy of parental control over health care decisions 
for their minor children. Over the last several decades, the laws governing 
such exceptions have become increasingly well-established and 
uncontroversial. Furthermore, our proposed exception is also consistent with 
the recent legislation and court decisions that promote compliance with 
mandatory vaccination policies. Indeed, we are not aware of successful legal 
challenges to mandatory immunization policies. In particular, multiple 
courts have already held that school-entry immunization requirements are 
necessary to address a compelling state interest in protecting the public’s 
health by preventing the spread of disease.402  
The research on children’s development and health care decisionmaking 
reveals that minors age fourteen and older should be presumed capable of 
consenting to the recommended childhood vaccines.403 Age fourteen is also 
consistent with, for example, the age of consent identified in many states’ 
statutory or case law mature minor exceptions.404 Even younger minors are 
permitted to provide consent for vaccines related to sexually transmitted 
infections in, for example, California.405 Given the relevant policy 
considerations, high benefit/low risk profile, and medical consensus 
regarding advisability of recommended vaccines, together with research on 
children’s decisionmaking capacities, we contend that minors ages twelve 
and thirteen are also competent to consent to recommended childhood 
vaccinations. In the case of minors ages twelve and thirteen, however, we 
recommend that states require that physicians evaluate minors’ capacities to 
make the decision before authorizing such consent as an additional 
precaution to ensure that all minor consents are competent.406 
Our proposal is, to some extent, asymmetrical. It authorizes minors to 
consent to vaccines independent of their parents but does not authorize 
                                                                                                                     
402 Workman v. Mingo Cty. Bd. of Educ., 419 F. App’x 348, 355–56 (4th Cir. 2011); Whitlow v. 
California, 203 F. Supp. 3d 1079, 1091 (S.D. Cal. 2016); Brown v. Smith, 24 Cal. App. 5th 1135, 1146 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2018). 
403 See supra Section III.B.3.  
404 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8-4 (Westlaw through Act 2019-540) (authorizing any minor age 
fourteen or older to give effective consent for medical care); Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739, 745 
(Tenn. 1987). 
405 See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 6926(b) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Regular Sess. ch. 524) (“A 
minor who is 12 years of age and older may consent to medical care related to prevention of a sexually 
transmitted disease”); Table of State Laws Relevant to Minors’ Consent to Vaccinations Independent of 
Parents, https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1uUDrkdYqzzSG9icTTSHEIWQbgtm0uFVGtBZ7rT 
DU8sQ/edit?usp=sharing (last visited Oct. 16, 2019).  
406 See supra notes 367–72 and accompanying text. 
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minors to refuse vaccines where their parents provide consent. Decisional 
structures in other health care contexts involving minors might lead to a 
different allocation of decisional authority between parents and children. In 
each context, such allocations follow from analysis of the constitutional, 
policy, and practical considerations; the risk-benefit profile of the specific 
intervention; the medical consensus concerning recommendations for the 
specific health care intervention; and the capacities of minors to make health 
care decisions.407 In the context of ACIP-recommended vaccines, which are 
low risk/high benefit health care interventions endorsed by a consensus of 
medical experts and state legislatures to promote the welfare of the 
vaccinated minor and the public’s health, both parent and competent child 
should possess the legal right to consent, even over the objection of the other.  
We consider also the process for obtaining the minor’s informed 
consent. The federal National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act requires the 
disclosure of specified information included in the Vaccine Information 
Statement (VIS) to the vaccine recipient or his or her legal representative 
prior to vaccinating.408 Under our proposal, minors authorized to consent to 
vaccination would become the legally designated recipients of the VIS. We 
recommend additional guarantees for the informed consent process when 
minors are the persons consenting so as to ensure that the recipient’s 
acquiescence reflects a meaningful consent process.409 The vaccine 
administrator should review the VIS after the minor has received and read 
it, and offer to answer questions for the minor, emphasizing sections 
describing the disease that the vaccination was developed to prevent and its 
risks, who should not be vaccinated, the vaccine’s risks, and what the minor 
should do if experiencing a problem following the vaccination. Furthermore, 
we recommend that the minor be asked to initial each of these sections and 
                                                                                                                     
407 See supra Part II.B.2. For further discussion of “asymmetries” in minors’ involvement in health 
care decisions, see, for example, Neal C. Manson, Transitional Paternalism: How Shared Normative 
Powers Give Rise to the Asymmetry of Adolescent Consent and Refusal, 29 BIOETHICS 66, 67 (2015).  
408 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-26(d)(2) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-108) (“[N]ot later than 6 months 
after the date such materials are published in the Federal Register, each health care provider who 
administers a vaccine set forth in the Vaccine Injury Table shall provide to the legal representatives of 
any child or to any other individual to whom such provider intends to administer such vaccine a copy of 
the information materials developed pursuant to subsection (a), supplemented with visual presentations 
or oral explanations, in appropriate cases. Such materials shall be provided prior to the administration of 
such vaccine.”). 
409 There are good grounds to think that an adult-informed consent process should also involve an 
oral explanation, and certainly an opportunity to ask questions. See Dorit Rubinstein Reiss & Nili 
Karako-Eyal, Informed Consent to Vaccination: Theoretical, Legal, and Empirical Insights, 45 AM. J.L. 
& MED. 357, 400 (2019) (“[W]hile the first circulate determines that the information may be provided to 
parents orally, in writing, or through pamphlets, the second circulate clarifies that an information form 
does not replace oral explanation (suggesting that an oral discussion is necessary even if written materials 
are provided).”). Legislatures can—and we think should—put in place additional procedural 
requirements to ensure that minors are adequately informed and have the opportunity to discuss any 
questions or concerns.   
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indicate via signature that the information was explained to him or her, and 
that he or she has had the opportunity to ask questions to clarify 
understanding. This procedure sets up the conditions for cold cognition, 
facilitating minors’ best use of their cognitive capacities in light of the 
decisionmaking task before them.410 
The Vaccine Information Statement is accessible, clear, and provides the 
information needed for a vaccine decision.411 It satisfies the general legal 
requirements for disclosure of information under informed consent law. As 
pointed out by Silverman and colleagues, the current VIS is written at a tenth 
grade reading level.412 This language may therefore need to be modified for 
minors who have not yet reached tenth grade. Until revised materials are 
developed, the oral explanation of the vaccine administrator and 
clarifications that follow any questions raised by a minor will be crucial 
complements to the document, together with the minor’s signed 
acknowledgement of receipt of the explanation.413 
As we emphasize above,414 the interplay of HIPAA and state 
confidentiality provisions may lead to inadequate protection for the privacy 
of health care information flowing from minors’ legally authorized 
independent contacts with providers regarding vaccination consultation and 
receipt of immunizations. Therefore, it is incumbent upon state legislators to 
incorporate confidentiality protections into statutes that authorize to consent 
for vaccinations.   
An additional risk to the confidentiality of medical information is 
present when vaccinations are paid for through minors’ parents’ private 
insurance policies and minors receive vaccines without parental consent.415 
Insurance company dissemination of EOBs to parents informs them of the 
minor’s receipt of the vaccinations paid for through their insurance plan. The 
challenges attending minors’ use of parental insurance to pay for 
vaccinations underscore the potential barrier that financing of vaccines may 
pose to minors’ independent access to vaccinations. In general, in the United 
States, vaccines are paid for either under private or public insurance 
programs such as Medicaid or under the Vaccines for Children Program.416 
This latter program provides ACIP-recommended vaccines as a federal 
                                                                                                                     
410 See supra Section III.B.2. 
411 Reiss & Karako-Eyal, supra note 409, at 418. 
412 Silverman et al., supra note 11, at 105–06. 
413 Id. 
414 See supra Section III.C.  
415 Under the Affordable Care Act, insurance plans that are not grandfathered must cover vaccines 
recommended by the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(2) 
(Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-108).  
416 See How to Pay, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, https://www.vaccines.gov/getting/pay 
(last visited Oct. 9, 2019) (providing information about the different ways to pay for vaccines). 
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benefit to uninsured or underinsured children.417 In order to eliminate 
barriers related to cost or disclosure of medical information from insurance 
companies, we recommend that states: (1) allow minors to receive vaccines 
free of charge in health departments; (2) adopt provisions prohibiting 
insurers from sending EOBs listing vaccines that were administered to 
minors without parental consent; and (3) allow pharmacies to sell vaccines 
to eligible minors who choose to pay independently, consistent with 
pharmacies’ authority to sell such vaccinations to adults in that state.   
Research reveals that health care professionals frequently have 
incomplete information about the often-complex confidentiality rules that 
apply to health care interventions with adolescents.418 Therefore, when 
implementing a statute authorizing minors’ consent to vaccinations, state 
officials must ensure that vaccine administrators (that is, physicians, nurses, 
state health officials, pharmacists, and others) are familiar with the 
applicable confidentiality protections for the minors. Because liability for 
any harm from vaccines—a possible, although highly unlikely scenario—is 
already covered by a no-fault federal program, the proposal need not address 
the potential liability of the provider.419  
Finally, the success of our proposal in facilitating competent minors’ 
voluntary access to recommended vaccinations requires that such minors be 
made aware of this option and how to exercise it. Ethan Lindenberger, in an 
interview with the authors, highlighted the need to provide teens with the 
information about the availability and processes for obtaining vaccines.420 
We recommend that state departments of health incorporate information 
about such options and procedures for minors’ consent into the websites they 
maintain to educate the public about school immunization requirements. 
Such information can also be incorporated into the health education modules 
in the public school curricula. States can also require public school districts 
to post such information on the school district websites.   
Proposed Statute: Authority of Older Minors to Consent to Vaccination 
1. Purpose: this statute’s purpose is to provide requesting 
minors with the authority to consent to vaccines 
recommended for their age group, or for younger children 
if they did not receive the vaccinations at those earlier ages, 
                                                                                                                     
417 Vaccines for Children Program, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/programs/vfc/index.html (last visited July 29, 2019).  
418 Margaret Riley et al., Physician Knowledge and Attitudes Around Confidential Care for Minor 
Patients, 28 J. PEDIATRIC & ADOLESCENT GYNECOLOGY 234, 239 (2015).  
419 H. Cody Meissner, Narayan Nair & Stanley A. Plotkin, The National Vaccine Injury 
Compensation Program: Striking a Balance Between Individual Rights and Community Benefit, 321 
JAMA 343, 343 (2019). 
420 Skype Interview with Ethan Lindenberger (June 16, 2019) (recording with authors).  
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if their parents are unwilling or unable to consent to 
vaccination.  
2. Eligible minors, as defined in this section, may consent to 
receiving vaccines recommended for their age and medical 
status, or recommended for younger children (if the minors 
did not receive the vaccines at the recommended ages), by 
the federal Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices 
(ACIP), without need for parental consent. Eligible minors 
are: 
a. Minors age fourteen years and older. 
b. Minors ages twelve and thirteen, upon 
determination in writing by a physician that the 
minor is capable of consenting to vaccination. The 
authorizing physician can administer the 
vaccination, direct another health care professional 
to administer the vaccination, or write a 
prescription authorizing other professionals legally 
qualified to administer vaccines in this state, such 
as pharmacists or nurses, to administer the 
vaccinations.    
c. Emancipated minors. 
3. “Capacity to consent” under Section 2b requires that the 
individual understand the nature and consequences of the 
proposed vaccination (that is, the risks and benefits of the 
vaccination to be administered) and is capable of making 
and communicating an informed decision concerning the 
administration of the vaccine.  
4. A consenting minor, acting as her or his own legal 
representative under this act, will receive the Vaccine 
Information Statement (VIS) required under 42 U.S.C. § 
300aa-26. The vaccine administrator will explain the 
sections addressing the disease that the vaccine is intended 
to prevent and its risks, who should not be vaccinated, the 
vaccine’s risks and what to do if there is an adverse reaction, 
and will offer to answer and will answer any questions 
regarding this information. The minor will initial those 
sections and sign a form indicating that the minor was 
provided and understands the explanation of the vaccine’s 
risks and benefits. 
5. Any branch of the state Department of Health will provide 
vaccines free of charge to minors seeking to vaccinate under 
this act. 
6. The confidentiality of minors who request vaccinations 
shall be protected. Laws addressing medical freedom shall 
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be interpreted to permit non-disclosure of medical 
information related to the request and provision of 
vaccinations to minors who seek immunization without 
parental consent. To the extent permissible by federal law, 
Explanations of Benefits related to administration of 
vaccinations to minors eligible under Section 2 of this 
statute, will not be sent to parents. Insurance programs may 
implement alternatives to prevent fraud in these areas. 
7. Pharmacies and other locations providing vaccines, 
including school clinics, may administer vaccines to 
eligible minors without parental consent under the 
conditions and requirements specified in this act.  
8. The state’s health department will include information 
about minors’ right to consent on the state’s public 
education website that describes the state’s school 
immunization requirements, on pages providing general 
information about vaccines, and on other pages likely to 
appear in internet searches for the information by a minor.  
V. JUDICIAL CREATION OF A TREATMENT-SPECIFIC MATURE MINOR RULE 
AUTHORIZING CAPABLE MINORS TO CONSENT TO VACCINES IN THE 
ABSENCE OF PERTINENT STATE LEGISLATION 
We recognize that, despite the advantages of implementing our 
recommendations through legislative reform (that is, development of a 
coordinated framework that establishes a right to vaccinations for eligible 
minors, addresses practical barriers to vaccinating, and provides clear 
guidance to providers and agencies), there may be obstacles to passage of 
such a statute. Vaccine-resistant parents, in spite of their strong appeal to the 
language of choice and right when it comes to fighting school mandates,421 
may vehemently oppose legislation allowing minor children to get 
vaccinated over parental opposition.422 
                                                                                                                     
421 Barbara Loe Fisher, Forcing Vaccination on Every Child Undermines Civil Liberties, LEAPS 
MAG. (Mar. 28, 2019), https://leapsmag.com/forcing-vaccination-on-every-child-undermines-civil-
liberties (characterizing state vaccination mandates as “elimination of civil liberties, including freedom 
of speech and the right to dissent guaranteed under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution”). 
422 This is an experience-based observation, not a theoretical prediction. In several states that 
introduced such legislation, anti-vaccine activists resisted strongly. For a relatively measured 
anti-vaccine response, see Kate Raines, New York Bill Would Strip Parental Consent for Vaccinating 
Children, VACCINE REACTION (Mar. 28, 2019), https://thevaccinereaction.org/2019/03/new-york-bill-
would-strip-parental-consent-for-vaccinating-children; and, for a more typical response, see AMA Says 
Mature 12-Year-Olds Can Consent to Vaccination Without Parents Taking Away the Last Barrier 
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In the absence of such legislation or an existing mature minor doctrine, 
we recommend that courts adopt a narrow mature minor doctrine allowing 
capable minors to become vaccinated without parental consent. In support 
of this doctrine we cite the strong parens patriae interests and high 
benefit/low risk profile for recommended childhood vaccination (that is, the 
expert consensus that, absent medical contraindications, vaccination is the 
safer course of action for the minor, providing protection from the dangerous 
effects of the vaccine-preventable diseases); the important police power 
interests (that is, the benefits of decreasing the threat to the public from 
disease outbreaks); and the evidence that adolescents and many 
preadolescents are capable of making decisions regarding vaccinations.423 
Furthermore, we recognize minors’ right to protect their own health and 
well-being, particularly when their personal choices are aligned with the 
state’s interests. In light of the misinformation that appears to be guiding 
many vaccine-resistant and vaccine-hesitant parents, it is both reasonable 
and good public policy to allow minors to correct an objectively ill-founded 
parental decision that endangers their health.424 
States with a mature minor doctrine typically do not set a specific age 
for the doctrine, though Tennessee’s courts apply the rule of sevens used in 
other areas of tort law to suggest that minors over the age of fourteen are 
presumed capable to consent, while minors age seven to thirteen are 
                                                                                                                     
423 See supra Section II.B for a full discussion of the mature minor doctrine and its underlying 
rationale.  
424 Several states, such as Illinois, Kansas, Tennessee, and Washington have broader mature minor 
doctrines than the specific, vaccine-related one proposed here. See In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322 (Ill. 1989) 
(holding that a “mature” seventeen-and-a-half-year-old minor may refuse a lifesaving blood transfusion); 
Younts v. St. Francis Hosp. & Sch. of Nursing, Inc., 469 P.2d 330 (Kan. 1970) (holding that a “mature” 
minor may consent to a beneficial surgical procedure); Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739 (Tenn. 
1987) (holding that a mature minor has the capacity to consent to medical treatment); Smith v. Seibly, 
431 P.2d 719 (Wash. 1967) (holding that a mature minor may give valid consent to a surgical procedure). 
Coleman and Rosoff suggest that a state’s silence as to the existence of a mature minor doctrine should 
not be taken as leaving open a door, but as a reaffirmation of the traditional principles of parental consent. 
Coleman & Rosoff, supra note 15, at 791. Similarly, the existence of other exceptions to the rule of 
parental consent can, as mentioned, be read as implying lack of other exceptions under the omitted case 
canon which states that “[n]othing is to be added to what the text states or reasonably implies (casus 
omissus pro omisso habendus est). That is, a matter not covered is to be treated as not covered.” ANTONIN 
SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 93 (2012).  
However, we do not agree that this principle necessarily applies here. Statutory exceptions to the 
general rule of parental consent are enacted when the legislature seeks to create such an exception, and 
it is not limited in its authority by the existence of the general doctrine. When a legislature drafts a statute 
focusing specifically on, for example, whether minors can consent to treatment for STDs, the more 
specific legislation provides the governing authority. The omitted case canon can be legitimately applied 
if the statute creating the exception specifies the inclusion of treatment, for example, for HIV and 
Chlamydia, but is silent on, for example, treatment for HPV, and there is a question as to whether the 
general doctrine or limited exception applies to treatment for HPV, since the application of the exception 
will be limited to that which it explicitly covers. The legislature may further create other 
treatment-specific parental consent exceptions incorporating mature minor principles. 
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presumed not to have the ability to consent.425 Both presumptions are 
rebuttable if contrary persuasive evidence is presented.426 Other states focus 
on capacity, not age, in determining maturity.427 We recommend that, 
consistent with our proposal above, reviewing courts hold that minors over 
fourteen can consent to vaccines recommended for them. Furthermore, we 
recommend that the court should examine the capacity to consent of younger 
minors and allow minors who are mature—applying a treatment 
decisionmaking capacity standard of maturity—to consent to recommended 
vaccines.  
Minors found capable under the doctrine should be permitted to consent 
to both childhood vaccines and adolescent vaccines recommended by the 
Advisory Committee of Immunization Practices. When the minor is 
completely or partially unvaccinated, “catch-up schedules” created by the 
CDC can guide vaccine administrators and minors as to the appropriate 
timing and spacing of vaccines going forward. Judicial decisions should 
also, to the extent possible under state privacy laws, protect the 
confidentiality of the minor’s decision to vaccinate. 
Judicial doctrines do not, however, solve the problems of funding 
discussed in Part IV. Furthermore, it is uncertain whether courts can protect 
confidentiality in the face of state medical privacy laws or insurance 
company policies that permit parents access to information regarding their 
minor child’s request or receipt of vaccinations. In some states, health 
departments provide free or low-cost vaccines, and minors can find options 
by consulting with the health department (or using online services).428 Use 
of parental insurance without a statute addressing explanations of benefits 
would likely alert parents to the minor’s receipt of vaccinations. State 
medical privacy laws may also create parental rights to access minors’ 
medical records. Judges may have limited authority to alter the application 
of such policies, although there may be room for interpretations that will 
protect a minor’s confidentiality.   
CONCLUSION 
Modern parental refusals of childhood vaccinations differ dramatically 
from many other circumstances in which parents reject the recommendations 
of health care professionals when exercising their legal discretion in health 
care decisionmaking for their children. There is an epidemic of 
                                                                                                                     
425 Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739, 746–49 (Tenn. 1987). 
426 Coleman & Rosoff, supra note 15, at 789.  
427 Cardwell, 724 S.W.2d at 748 (stating that application of the mature minor rule is a question of 
fact for the jury as to “the minor’s ability to appreciate the risks and consequences” of the treatment, as 
well as several other factors). 
428 Where to Go, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, https://www.vaccines.gov/getting/where 
(last visited Oct. 16, 2019). 
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misinformation regarding the safety and efficacy of vaccines influencing the 
judgment of vaccine-resistant and vaccine-hesitant parents. This epidemic 
has proven remarkably impervious to correction through education and 
persuasion. This phenomenon, in turn, places children who are intentionally 
unvaccinated at medical risk while also threatening the health of many in the 
public who are too young or medically unable to be vaccinated. For these 
reasons, policymakers must consider alternatives in the vaccination context 
to the default of sole parental decisionmaking for their minor children’s 
health care. The evidence indicates that teenagers are capable of 
understanding the risks and benefits of vaccinations and of making 
competent informed decisions to be vaccinated. Children of 
vaccine-refusing parents should be authorized to receive accurate medical 
information about the recommended childhood vaccinations upon request. 
If such minors reach a decision regarding vaccination that is in conflict with 
that of their parents, they should be legally authorized to provide 
independent consent to the administration of the vaccinations. 
In an interview with Ethan Lindenberger addressing his decision to 
vaccinate, Ethan explained his moment of understanding of the minimal 
degree of risk presented by vaccines: 
When people say there’s a risk to vaccines, and that nothing is 
without risk, that makes the world sound so dangerous and 
scary. When that vocabulary is so misleading . . . it’s the same 
thing as saying there’s always a risk of going to sleep, there’s 
always a risk in like driving a car. Honestly, it’s a million times 
more scary driving a car than getting vaccines. And that’s the 
thing I didn’t realize . . . yes, there is a “potential” that is below 
a one in a million chance, you’re more likely to die [from] a 
coconut. So, I never heard that. And understanding that was so 
important, because when I realized that and looked at the math 
I realized: “well, duh, this is fine.” And I went in and 
everybody was really kind . . . .429 
Further, understanding the social consequences sealed the decision for 
him:  
The biggest part was learning that vaccinating wasn’t just for 
yourself–it was for other people in your community. So 
learning that part was a thing that really pushed me, where I 
said “wow, being unvaccinated could end up causing a disease 
to transmit from me to someone else–and that person could 
die.”430 
                                                                                                                     
429 Skype Interview with Ethan Lindenberger (June 16, 2019) (recording with authors). 
430 Id.  
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Ethan revealed himself to be a socially conscious, responsible, and 
caring teen—as many parents wish their teens to be. He realized that he was 
putting others at risk by not being vaccinated and wished to correct that 
problem.  
When, prior to the age of eighteen, Ethan decided he wanted to receive 
immunizations, he faced legal barriers. He thus began the process to become 
vaccinated upon reaching adulthood. There too he faced challenges. In the 
final analysis, he received his vaccines at his local health department rather 
than through his health care provider (although with the knowledge and 
support of his provider).431 Adolescents who have decided to make the 
responsible choice for themselves and the public to become vaccinated now 
face legal barriers. Our state governments must eliminate these barriers. We 
recommend that states adopt our proposal in light of the converging interests 
of the state and the minor. The courageous decisions of teens to receive 
vaccinations despite their parents’ opposing viewpoints must be supported 
rather than burdened or barred. The default of parental consent more 
appropriately applies to contexts in which there is not a conflict between the 
interests of parents and their children and that do not contribute to a growing 
threat to the public’s health. 
 
                                                                                                                     
431 Id.  
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